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Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench:
Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging
Lisa L. Casey*
The politicians' rhetoric seemed promising enough. With
corporate scandals making front page headlines and defrauded
investors facing hundreds of billions of dollars in losses, legislators
vowed to "help defrauded investors to recoup their losses."' The
Bush Administration similarly promised "to put the bad guys in
prison and take away their money." 2 Seeking to calm the traumatized
stock markets and anticipating voter outrage, the election-year
Congress expedited, and President Bush signed into law, new
antifraud legislation. This legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, attempts to strengthen the authority of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and to deter future wrongdoing by
corporate executives and accountants through a variety of new
regulations. 3 However, in their lawmaking efforts, federal legislators
largely ignored questions about whether and how injured investors
would get any money back.
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B. Stanford University, J.D.
Stanford Law School. I have benefited greatly from discussions with, and comments from, Jack
Coffee, Jim Cox, Nicole Garnett, Bill Kelley, John Nagle, Mike Perino, Jay Tidmarsh, and
Julian Velasco, as well as insights from federal district court judges Hon. Lewis D. Babcock
and Hon. Milton Shadur. I also received helpful research assistance from Patti Ogden, Dwight
King, Warren Rees, Mark Kundmueller, Justin Krizmanich, and Diane Hellwig. Finally, I could
not have completed this paper without incredible support from Brian, Meg, and Kevin Casey.
1. See, eg., Accountability Issues: Lessons Learned from Enron's Fall: Hearing Before the
S. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy) ("Congress can
do more to make sure that our laws help deter corporate fraud and we should help defrauded
investors to recoup their losses. In fact, by forcing through special exemptions for securities
fraud, accountants and others made Congress a contributor to the Wild West mentality that
came to be reflected in Enron's hidden partnerships. The time has come for Congress to re"),http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgithink and reform our laws in the other direction ....
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senatehearings&docid=f:84416.pdf.
2. Paula Dwyer, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere toHide, Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 2002, at 44
(quoting Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson).
3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, signed by President Bush on July 30, 2002,
includes reforms of accounting, securities fraud, and corporate governance laws aimed at
deterring deceptive conduct by public corporations, their management, and their professional
advisors. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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Now, with fresh reforms in the statute books, public attention
has turned from Capitol Hill to the courts, where federal judges face
the largest number of investor class actions ever filed. 4 The plaintiffs'
bar has invaded, seeking hundreds of billions of dollars on behalf of
shareholders of some of this country's largest publicly traded
corporations-Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Johnson & Johnson,
Merck, Time Warner, Motorola, and HealthSouth. The list grew
longer each month in 2002 and early 2003.' Plaintiffs' lawyers filed a
record 261 class action fraud complaints last year, including claims
against seven of the thirty companies comprising the Dow Jones
Industrial Average and against one out of every eight corporate
constituents of the Standard & Poor's 500 index. 6 With an
unprecedented number of large-cap companies restating their
financial results 7 and spawning new investigations by the bigger-

4. Markets Securities Fraud Suits Hit Record in 2002, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at C4.
5. The recent proliferation of megacases is exemplified by the fact that the wellpublicized Enron securities class action, a case involving $60 billion in losses, represented only
the seventh largest securities fraud lawsuit filed in 2001. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS-2001: A YEAR IN REVIEW 6 (2002), http://
securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/yir__Filings.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). Cornerstone
Research calculates "maximum dollar loss" as the dollar value decrease in the market
capitalization of the defendant issuer from the trading day on which the issuer's market
capitalization reached its maximum during the class period to the trading day immediately
following the end of the class period. Id. at 2. Another study completed by Woodruff-Sawyer
in 2002 found that the number of securities fraud suits against companies with market
capitalizations above $10 billion has more than tripled since 1995. WOODRUFF-SAWYER &
Co., A STUDY OF SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 13 (2002).

6. Adrian Lewthwaite, Lawsuits Increasingly Target Directors, INSURANCEDAY.COM
3, at http://wvw.insuranceday.com (Jan. 29, 2003). One recent study determined that the
likelihood of a public company being sued for securities fraud increased approximately 40%
from 1995 to 2002. ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION: WILL ENRON AND SARANES-OXLEY CHANGE THE TIDES? 4 (2003),

availableat http://wwv.nera.com/wvt/publications/6143.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
7. The number of public companies restating their prior year's financial statements rose
from 233 in 2000 to 270 in 2001 to 330 in 2002. HURON CONSULTING GROUP, AN
ANALYSIS OF RESTATEMENT MAFrERS: RULE, ERRORS, ETHICS, FOR THE FIVE YEARS ENDED

DECEMBER 31, 2002, at 3 (2003), available at http://www.uronconsultinggroup.com/
uploadedFiles/HuronRestatementStudy2002.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). The General
Accounting Office has reported that the average size by market capitalization of a restating
company rose from $500 million in 1997 to $2 billion in 2002. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and
Remaining Challenges, GAO-03-138, at 4 (Oct. 4, 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03138.pdf.
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budget SEC,' more "megasecurities litigation"9 has flooded the
federal courts than ever before.
Decisions made by the judges overseeing this maelstrom of
lawsuits not only will attract continued attention from the media,
but these cases also likely will alter the jurisprudence of securities law
enforcement for years to come, generating fodder for legal
academics. As in the past, most scholars will focus their work on the
deterrence impact of private litigation. 10 At the end of the day,
however, we also should inquire about the results actually achieved
for the victims of the fraud. How much money will shareholders
injured by deceptive accounting and management practices receive as
compensation for their losses? Will these class actions merely transfer
wealth from corporate wrongdoers and their insurers to
opportunistic plaintiffs' lawyers?
Certainly the lawsuits hold the promise of enormous potential
profits for class counsel. As a general matter, the larger the company
sued (as measured by market capitalization), the larger the losses
suffered by the putative class, and the larger the potential settlement
fund." In 2002, more than half of all securities class actions
generated attorneys' fees of 25% or more of the settlement funds
amassed.' 2 Assuming that a megacase settles for $100 million,
8. During the first nine months of fiscal year 2003, the SEC filed 443 enforcement
actions, suspended 11 companies from trading, and froze the assets of 30 companies. SEC's
Donaldson Claims Success for Antifraud Task Force, NAT'L J. CONG. DAILY, July 22, 2003.
Congress raised the SEC's budget to $716 million in fiscal year 2003 from $437.9 million in
fiscal year 2002. Securities and Exchange Commission: Accountants, Economists Easier to Hire,
CHI. TRIB., July 4, 2003, at C2.
9. No single definition of "megacase" exists. However, as used in this Article,
"megasettlements" refer to settlements of securities class actions in excess of $100 million.
10. See, e.g., James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986)
[hereinafter Understandingthe PlaintiffsAtt'y].
11. One study of securities class action settlements determined that, generally, "the size
of the average settlement grows with the size of the market cap." Further, "[t]he settlement
value of shareholder class actions is driven in large part by the loss in shareholder value (market
capitalization). Since the passage of the Reform Act, there is a trend of increasing losses in
shareholder values, which results in higher settlement values." WOODRUFF-SAWYER & CO.,
supra note 5, at 14, 33; see also BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 9 ("Investor losses, an
estimate of what investors lost over a class period relative to an investment in the S&P, are the
single most powerful determinant of settlements .... ").
12. Nicholas Varchaver, Should You Sue? Guess What: You Already Have, FORTUNE,
Dec. 3, 2002, at 129.
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plaintiffs' counsel could expect to receive $25 million for their
litigation services. In fact, a number of the pending megacases likely
will settle for well over $100 million. Eight megasecurities class
actions recently settled for more than $200 million each.'" From
these settlement funds, plaintiffs' counsel applied for awards of
"mega attorneys' fees," receiving as much as 20% of the funds
recovered through settlement. 4 One insurance industry analyst
recently estimated that thirty-six of the one thousand securities class
actions currently on file in the federal courts will settle for more than
$500 million each.' 5 If class counsel receives court-ordered fee
awards of just 10% of such settlement funds, critics of private
enforcement certainly will have new ammunition in their war against
the plaintiffs' securities bar.
The substantial financial incentive motivating plaintiffs' lawyers
to file investor lawsuits-and counsel's actual behavior in response to
those incentives-sparks the debate and ignites the rhetoric in
16
discussions about the social benefits of securities class actions.
Although private enforcement of the securities laws depends on

13.

See STANFORD LAW SCHOOL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE,

at

http://securities.stanford.edu (last modified Nov. 17, 2003). These settlements include: the
Cendant litigation ($3.525 billion, including $3.185 billion in the common equity settlement
and $340 million in the Prides settlement); the Lucent Technologies litigation ($563 million);
the Bank of America securities litigation ($490 million); two separate private class actions
settled by Waste Management ($457 million and $220 million); the Rite Aid litigation
(settlements totaled more than $334 million); the Oxford Health Plans litigation ($300
million total from all defendants); and the 3Com litigation ($259 million).
14. These mega attorneys' fees include the awards in In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities
Litigation, 146 F. Supp. 2d 706, 734-36 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (awarding class attorneys 25% of
settlement fund and accepting expert testimony that fee awards of 25-30% for settlements of
$100-200 million "still seems fairly standard" (citation omitted)), In re BankAmerica Corp.
Securities Litigation, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (awarding class attorneys 18% of
$490 million settlement fund-approximately $86 million), In re 3Com Securities Litigation,
No. C-97-21083 EAI, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2001) (awarding class attorneys 18% of
$259 million fund-approximately $46.6 million), and In re Waste Management, Inc.
Securities Litigation,No. 97-C7709, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16566, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18,
1999) (awarding class attorneys 20% of $220 million fund-approximately $44 million).
15. Lewthwaite, supranote 6, 23.
16. "[C]ondemnation of the securities class action has typically been trained directly on
the peculiar incentives at work on the plaintiffs' attorney." William B. Rubenstein, A
TransactionalModel of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 397 (2001). See generally Edward H.
Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 50 (1996)
("Another cynical belief [about class actions] is that many class actions serve only to confer
benefits on class counsel.").
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critical investments by entrepreneurial attorneys, 7 every dollar
awarded by the courts to the attorneys as return on these
investments is a dollar not available for injured investors' 8 The most
persistent objection to securities class actions is that their prosecution
does much for the lawyers but little for defrauded investors' 9 or the
public interest.2" Class action lawyers stand accused of "abusing" the
legal system for their personal gain at the expense of the investors
they represent. Corporate defendants, reform-minded legislators, and
the business press have vilified the securities class action bar as
"greedy," "extortionist" "bounty hunters."' 1 By reporting on the
multimillion-dollar fee awards obtained by some notorious members
of the plaintiffs' bar, the popular media have further inflamed the
public's offense. 22 "[T]here is a perception among a significant part
17. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairnessand Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987)
[hereinafter Entrepreneurial Litigation]; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
18. Of course, under the so-called "American rule," parties in civil litigation must pay
their own legal fees unless otherwise provided by statute. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-50 (1975); see also infra note 54.
19. Seegenerally DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS
ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 434-37 (2002) (analyzing
attorneys' fees and payouts to class members in study of class action lawsuits from 1995-96)
[hereinafter CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS].
20. Congress has also expressed concern that plaintiffs' attorneys pursue claims with
little or no merit, or without regard for their merit, leading to overdeterrence and less
disclosure of forward-looking information to investors. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at
31-32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31 [hereinafter CONFERENCE
REPORT]. The impact of abusive securities litigation on defendants' disclosure of material
information to investors is beyond the scope of this Article.
21. E.g., 141 CONG. REC. S9173 (daily ed. June 27, 1995); see also, e.g., 141 CONG.
REC. S17,957 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) ("Taken
together, Mr. President, [the PSLRA] should ensure that defrauded investors are not cheated a
second time by a few unscrupulous lawyers who skim their exorbitant fees right off the top of
any settlement."); 141 CONG. REC. S8894 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Christopher Dodd) ("[S]ettlement sounds good for entrepreneurial attorneys, but it does little
to benefit companies, investors or even the plaintiffs on whose behalf the suit was brought.").
22. C.J. Edward R. Becker, Report: Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Class
Counsel, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 689, 693 n.13 (2001) [hereinafter Task Force 2001 Report].
There often is substantial publicity of successful class actions, and the focus of the
publicity will naturally be on the amount of the recovery if it is large. Large
recoveries get public attention, and large recoveries often result in substantial
attorneys' fees that also attract attention. When class actions are dismissed, the
publicity is often sparse or nonexistent, and the fact that class lawyers are
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of the nonlawyer population and even among lawyers and judges
that the risk premium is too high in class action cases and that class
action3 plaintiffs' lawyers are overcompensated for the work that they
2

do."

In 1995, seemingly persuaded that class counsel enrich
themselves at the expense of injured investors,24 Congress passed the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). 25 Among other
objectives, federal legislators sought to protect absent class members
from "manipulation by class action lawyers" and "lawyer-driven
lawsuits" by "giving control of the litigation to lead plaintiffs with
substantial holdings of the securities of the issuer.", 26 The PSLRA
empowered lead plaintiffs to select and retain counsel for the class,
subject to court approval. Congress apparently assumed that the lead
plaintiffs' relatively larger economic interest in the outcome of the
lawsuit and, presumably, greater sophistication would forestall
awards of windfall fees to class counsel and increase the

uncompensated is often not understood. Motions to dismiss on the pleadings are
not big news, although they are common in a number of class action scenarios.
Id. Examples of news stories reporting on fees awarded to lawyers in securities class actions
include: Kurt Eichenwald, Millionsfor Us, Penniesfor You, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993, § 3, at
1; Peter Elkind, The King of Pain Is Hurting, FORTUNE, Sept. 4, 2000, at 190; Peter Thal
Larsen, New Life for the US Lawyers Who Help Shareholders Sue: Corporate Scandal and Falling
Stock Markets Have Boosted ClassAction Litigation, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 28, 2002, at
26. See also Dominic Rushe, America's $20bn Pied Piper of Class Actions, SUNDAY TIMES
(LONDON), May 5, 2002, Business, at 10 ("There's a whole industry out there saying
securities litigation is all frivolous." (quoting John Coffee)). Many of these articles focus
attention on the law firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach and one of its named
partners, Bill Lerach, dubbed "the lawyer corporate America loves to hate" and "the king of
the shareholder class-action suit." Elkind, supra, at 190. For further discussion, see also In a
Class of His Own: How Melvyn Weiss, A Class Action Lawyer, Finds Crimes That Pay,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2002, at 56 ("[A] lawyer could now seek out an injustice and then troll
for clients who could give his firm access to the court-plus a big slice of any settlement.").
23. Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 692.
24. Congressional hearings preceding enactment of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 included testimony recounting various examples of alleged self-dealing
and other abusive practices by the plaintiffs' bar. See infra Part I.A.
25. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 to 78u-5
(2000)).
26. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 31-32. Congress also sought to reform
the law to thwart three other abusive practices by plaintiffs' lawyers: (1) "the routine filing of
[meritless] lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there is a significant
change in an issuer's stock price"; (2) "the targeting of deep pocket defendants . . . without
regard to their actual culpability"; and (3) using discovery "to impose costs so burdensome"
that defendants choose to settle. Id. at 31. However, these three abuses primarily harm
defendants. This Article instead focuses on reforms targeted to benefit absent class members.

1244

1239]

Reforming Securities Class Actions

compensation received by the class. To help ensure this result,
Congress prohibited judges from awarding to lead counsel total fees
and expenses exceeding "a reasonable percentage of the amount of
any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class." 2 7
However, even after nearly eight years of practice under the
PSLRA, it is not clear that the fee regulations have impacted the
economic incentives motivating private enforcers. A number of
presiding judges have reduced requested fee awards, but such
decisions are unpredictable, and no published empirical studies have
compared the attorneys' fees awarded by courts prior to reform with
fees awarded by courts after reform. In the meantime, some
commentators have advocated for more active intervention by the
courts. With the number and size of securities fraud lawsuits
ballooning, commentators are appealing to the courts to protect
absent class members.2 8 Noting that presiding judges are the selfproclaimed "fiduciaries," "agents," or "guardians" of absent class
members, scholars have proposed various mechanisms by which
district judges may fulfill their duties to scrutinize (and cut) the
lawyers' fee requests. Appellate courts, too, have begun to admonish
the lower courts that they themselves must intervene more actively in
class actions to protect absent class members, especially in
compensating class counsel. 29
These entreaties to presiding judges raise important and
previously unexamined questions about the proper exercise of
judicial authority under the PSLRA's statutory regime. Can judges
make securities class actions more "virtuous" 3 by assuming for

27. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2000).
28. See, e.g., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 19, at 485-86 ("[I]t is judges who
hold the key to improving the balance of good and ill consequences of damage class actions.");
James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 524
(1997) (advocating for judges to "become more active in their reviews" of settlement
proposals and fee applications); Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions
Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148
U. PA. L. REv. 2119, 2175-77, 2190-95 (2000) (urging increased judicial regulation of class
counsel by, among other things, requiring counsel to disclose fee information and agreements
and by employing public attorneys to assist judges in evaluating the fairness of proposed
settlements); see also William C. Rand, The Role of the Judge as Protector in Class Action
Settlements, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24, 2002, at 4 (arguing that when a class action settles, the judge
becomes a fiduciary for absent class members).
29. See infra Part III.B.
30. Cox, supra note 28, at 523 (referring to the judiciary as "[v]irtue's [s]lumbering
[g]uardian").
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themselves fiduciary obligations to absent class members? This
Article argues that they cannot. Judges cannot perform fiduciary
duties on behalf of absent class members and still fulfill their
responsibilities as impartial arbiters of the parties' disputes.
Furthermore, Congress recognized that the judiciary cannot
efficiently and effectively police opportunistic behavior by the
plaintiffs' bar. The PSLRA assigns that monitoring responsibility to
the lead plaintiffs for the class, persons whose interests are more
closely aligned with the interests of absent class members.
As the new wave of megacases moves through the judicial
system, it is timely to probe the judiciary's role in reforming
securities class actions. Part I of this Article summarizes the perceived
attorney opportunism that has inspired judges to appoint themselves
as fiduciaries for injured investors. This section describes the need for
private enforcement of the securities laws, the economics of the
traditional private attorney general model, and the potential for
abuse by the plaintiffs' bar. Part I also reviews the agency cost theory
that explains counsel's incentives to act against the interests of the
putative class in prosecuting shareholder lawsuits. Part II discusses
the courts' authority to award attorneys' fees under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the traditional methods and
heuristics used by judges to determine reasonable fees at the
conclusion of the litigation. After examining the vexing obstacles
that have long plagued effective ex post judicial regulation of
attorneys' compensation, Part III considers Congress's efforts to
reform securities class actions. The PSLRA's empowered lead
plaintiff model specifies duties for judges presiding in these cases.
Part III describes the responsibilities of the bench as articulated in
the statute before analyzing how the courts have reacted to
congressional reforms. Specifically, this section reviews post-PSLRA
cases in which courts have reduced class counsel's requested fees at
the conclusion of the litigation, selected and retained lead counsel
themselves, or appointed the lead plaintiff based upon the fee
negotiated with counsel. These decisions illustrate that confusion
persists. Courts cannot seem to agree on the proper approach to
calculate reasonable fees, much less how to apply a particular
methodology when they decide how much to pay the lawyers at the
conclusion of the case. The lack of predictability associated with ex
post judicial regulation of attorney compensation skews the
incentives of the private attorney general and undermines the
1246
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effectiveness of the private enforcement regime. Yet, judges who
have attempted to avoid these inefficiencies by intervening on behalf
of the putative class at the inception of the litigation have infringed
on the lead plaintiffs' rights, as granted by Congress, to select and
retain lead counsel.
Part IV evaluates the extra-statutory justification for greater
judicial activism in this area-the widely accepted but uncritical claim
that judges must represent the interests of absent class members as
fiduciaries. For both normative and pragmatic reasons, I contend
that the courts cannot become default fiduciaries for absent class
members. The notion that judges owe fiduciary duties to absent class
members conflicts with the classical model of the judicial role,
violates the current statutory scheme, and causes injury to prudential
values. Rather than assuming fiduciary obligations themselves
(performing as fiduciary judges), the courts instead should focus
their efforts on judging fiduciaries (lead plaintiffs and lead counsel)
more effectively. In Part V, I explain that presiding judges can
reduce agency costs in securities class actions most efficiently and
effectively by allowing-in fact, by ordering-lead plaintiffs to
negotiate fee agreements with lead counsel at the inception of the
case and approving the negotiated fee arrangements as reasonable,
absent extraordinary circumstances.
I. EVALUATING THE TRADITIONAL PRIVATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL MODEL

A. The "Need"for Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws
The argument supporting private enforcement of the securities
laws is well recognized, though not unassailable. It begins with the
assertion-recently publicized in connection with the uncovering of
major corporate misdeeds at Enron, WorldCom, and elsewherethat the government lacks sufficient resources to prosecute many
violations of the antifraud provisions of the relevant federal statutes. 3
The SEC, as the federal agency principally charged with
31. See, e.g., Mike France, Don't KillAll the Trial Lawyers, Bus. WK., Aug. 26, 2002, at
156 ("At a time when regulators are a step behind public anger and self-policing is a joke, the
attorneys who make a living suing Corporate America have become one of the most powerful
forces compelling executives to behave."); Pitt Says SEC Needs More Bodies to Fight Fraud,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2002, at C3.
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responsibility for securities law enforcement, has suffered from
persistent underfunding for many years." In fact, more than a
decade ago, then-SEC Chairman Richard Breeden told federal
lawmakers that budgetary limitations meant that private class actions
must "perform a critical role in preserving the integrity of our
securities markets." 33 A few years later, Breeden's successor, Arthur
Levitt, declared that private lawsuits, rather than government
actions, had become "the primary vehicle for compensating
defrauded investors." 34 Unless law enforcement efforts are privatized,
victims of fraud will go uncompensated for their injuries,3"
wrongdoers will go unpunished and undeterred (or at least
underpunished and underdeterred), and, consequently, the U.S.
economy will suffer as investors lose confidence in the integrity of
the capital markets. When it enacted the PSLRA, Congress lauded
private securities litigation as "an indispensable tool with which
defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely

32. See, e.g., Noelle Knox and Matt Krantz, SEC Funding a Drop in the Bucket, USA
TODAY, July 18, 2002, at 2B (reporting that David Ruder, former SEC chairman, has
determined that the agency has been underfunded since at least 1980); Stephen Labaton, SEC
Is Suffering Nonbenign Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2002, at BI ("Although both Republican
and Democratic chairmen forged a series of policy initiatives on behalf of investors, the
agency's vital infrastructure has been sorely neglected, starved of adequate money and
manpower by politicians. That hobbled its ability to keep up with the markets at the worst
possible moment-just as ordinary Americans plowed huge amounts of their savings into the
markets."); see also U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, SEC Operations: Increased Workload Creates
Challenges, GAO-02-302, at 11-14 (Mar. 5, 2002) [hereinafter SEC Operations]
(documenting restrictions on SEC staff resources and explaining the resulting constraints on
SEC enforcement actions), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02302.pdf.
33. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearing on S.1533 Before the Subcomm. on
Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 15-16 (1992)
(testimony of then-SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden).
34. Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and
Fin. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (prepared statement of thenSEC Chairman Arthur Levitt) ("[P]rivate actions ...provide a 'necessary supplement' to the
Commission's own enforcement activities by serving to deter securities law violations. Private
actions are crucial to the integrity of our disclosure system because they provide a direct
incentive for issuers and other market participants to meet their obligations under the securities
laws." (footnote omitted)), available at http://wwv.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/
1995/spchO25.txt (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
35. HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22-6 (3d
ed. 1992) ("Private enforcement is necessary to afford relief to those investors injured by
violations of the securities laws. The SEC and the judiciary have recognized that the class
action may be the only meaningful and viable method by which securities investors may
remedy their claims." (footnote omitted)).
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upon government action." 36 The Supreme Court, too, has
recognized that private enforcement of the securities laws must
supplement government regulatory efforts for the benefit of
defrauded investors and the capital markets generally. 7 The benefits
of private enforcement-the private attorney general model-derive
from the reality that the government simply cannot pursue many
persons who violate federal antifraud proscriptions."8 "The SEC is
overwhelmed" and "nothing would be done except for class-action
lawyers." 9 Furthermore, the government faces numerous legal and
practical obstacles in compensating injured investors itself.4"
In truth, we simply cannot know whether the compensation and
deterrence benefits of securities class actions justify the costs of such
litigation because the benefits and costs are difficult to measure. 4 '
According to Congress, however, the social benefits of private
securities litigation do outweigh the costs. Lawmakers concluded in

36. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 31.
37. "Private enforcement ... provides a necessary supplement" to public enforcement.
J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); see also Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc.
v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) ("[T]he securities markets have grown dramatically in
size and complexity, while Commission enforcement resources have declined." (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 93-355, at 6 (1983))); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339
(1980) (sanctioning the need to aggregate relatively small individual claims in a classwide
lawsuit in order that aggrieved persons may redress injuries unremedied by public actions).
38. See SEC Operations, supra note 32, at 11 (reporting that the agency's "ability to
fulfill its mission has become increasingly strained" due to, among other things, "imbalances
between [the] SEC's workload .. .and [its] staff resources").
39. Fred 0. Williams, Adelphia Faces 22 Shareholder Lawsuits, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 28,
2002, at B13 (quoting securities attorney Harvey Greenfield).
40. From 1995 to 2001, the SEC collected only 14% of the $3.1 billion ordered
disgorged from securities law violators. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, SEC Enforcement: More
Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Disgorgement Collections, GAO-02-771, at 3 (July 12,
2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02771.pdf. The SEC not only lacks
sufficient resources to collect disgorgement and money penalties owed by wrongdoers, but
mechanisms and funding to create and administer plans to distribute collected funds to
defrauded investors. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N,

REP. PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(c) OF THE

SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002 at 1-2 (2003).

41. Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action
and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 205 (2001) (reporting
results of ten case studies of resolved consumer and mass tort class actions and concluding that
"[d]etermining whether the benefits of Rule 23 damage class actions outweigh their costseven in only ten lawsuits-turned out to be enormously difficult"). Indeed, for any particular
lawsuit, it is difficult to determine whether class counsel have achieved the optimal outcome for
the class members. Information concerning the merits of the allegations, likelihood of success
on the claims, and amount of damages is not readily available for analysis, and the actual cost
of prosecuting the lawsuit is information well guarded by plaintiffs' counsel.
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1995 that class actions are socially beneficial, both for compensating
victims of securities fraud and for deterring future wrongdoing by
corporate actors, thereby promoting confidence in the nation's
securities markets.4 2 Private securities litigation "promote[s] public
and global confidence in our capital markets and help[s] to deter
wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors,
directors, lawyers, and others properly perform their jobs." 43
Congress has affirmed that enforcement of the securities antifraud
laws should not be left exclusively to government prosecutors.
B. The Economics of PrivateEnforcement
Although Congress sanctioned enforcement of the securities laws
by victims of fraud, many diversified investors who lose money in the
securities markets do not have enough damages at stake to seek out
counsel to investigate potential fraud claims4 4 against the company
and its officers, directors, and advisors.4" The class action, as a
procedural device, enables the economic prosecution of private
securities fraud claims by aggregating the losses of thousands of
similarly situated investors, thereby conserving litigation costs and
attracting the interest of plaintiffs' counsel willing to represent a
large number of injured investors on a contingent fee basis.46 The
attorney for the plaintiff class serves as a "private attorney general,"
an enforcer of legal claims otherwise unprosecuted by the
government.4 7

42. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 31-32.
43. Id. at 31.
44. The prototypical class action complaint alleges that the defendant issuer, through its
senior management and/or advisors, misrepresented or fraudulently failed to disclose material
information about the company to the market in order to inflate the price of the company's
securities artificially. When truthful information about the company is revealed to the market,
the price of the securities corrects to its "proper" level, damaging investors who traded in the
interim.
45. Scholars have challenged this presumption in recent years. See infra Part III.
46. Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
347, 347-48 (1998) ("Contingent fees are the nearly universal form of compensation for class
counsel. Indeed, in most class action litigation no other form of compensation would be
practical." (footnote omitted)).
47. The phrase "private attorney general" denotes "someone who is understood to be
suing on behalf of the public, but doing so on his own initiative, with no accountability to the
government or the electorate." Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney
General, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 179, (tracing the history of the private
attorney general model).
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Drawn to such cases by the large aggregate value of securities
fraud claims against public companies and the prospect of collecting
huge damages,48 lawyers for the proposed class must invest
significant time and assets at the beginning of the case. Plaintiffs'
counsel must recognize the claims, investigate their merits, decide
whom to sue and where, and file the complaint as a putative class
action after selecting one or more injured investors who will sue and
serve as putative lead plaintiff(s) and class representative(s). Plaintiffs'
counsel-and not the named plaintiffs or absent class membersthen assumes the true risk that the court will dismiss the claims or
refuse to certify the class. 9 Absent class members effectively
relinquish authority over their claims to plaintiffs' counsel.5 0 Insofar
as the attorneys command "nearly plenary control over all important
decisions in the lawsuit,"'" the potential for self-dealing by the
lawyers at the expense of the class is evident.
Further, because plaintiffs' counsel is paid a contingent fee, the
return to absent class members is reduced by the amount of the fee
awarded from the common fund. Hence, there is a conflict of
48. Defendants' potential liability runs to all persons who traded at a price affected by
the alleged fraud, and these investors may receive in damages the difference between the
purchase or sale price, as appropriate, and the mean trading price of the security during a 90day period beginning on the date on which the market received the corrected information. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21D(e)(1)-(3); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000). Since
thousands of investors and millions of shares typically are at issue, the dollar amounts in
dispute may total hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars. Thus, the average damages
award in securities class actions greatly exceeds the average damages award in other federal class
action litigation. Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 90 (1996).
49. Patricia M. Hynes, Plaintiffs' Class Action Attorneys Earn What They Get, 2 J. INST.
FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 243, 244-46 (1999). Class counsel stands to lose its entire
investment of time as well as its investment of money for out-of-pocket expenses if the court
dismisses the lawsuit on the pleadings, refuses to certify the case as a class action, or enters
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Assuming the lawsuit survives these challenges,
it is likely that the case will settle and counsel will receive an award of fees and expenses, See
infra notes 58 and 74. That award likely includes a risk premium on counsel's investment of
time and reimbursement of most, if not all, out-of-pocket costs advanced by the law firm.
50. In this regard, the representation model in class actions flies in the face of "[a]
fundamental premise of American adjudicative structures ... that clients, not their counsel,
define litigation objectives." Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1183, 1183 (1982). Judge Richard Posner has described class action litigation as a
"fundamental departure from the traditional pattern in Anglo-American litigation" insofar as
"lawyers for the class, rather than the clients, have all the initiative and are close to being the
real parties in interest." Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l I11.Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677,

678 (7th Cir. 1987).
51. Macey & Miller, supranote 17, at 3.
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interest endemic to class action litigation, indeed, to all contingent
fee litigation. In contrast to other contingent fee lawyers, however,
class attorneys typically do not contract ex ante for compensation. 2
Rather, they prosecute the lawsuit with the expectation that they will
recover their fees and costs at the conclusion of the litigation if they
achieve a successful outcome. 3 Assuming the attorney creates a fund
benefiting the investor class, either through settlement or judgment
on the merits, she may recover her fees and expenses from that pool
of money under the equitable "common fund" doctrine. 4 Courts
determine the amount of any award to class counsel ex post.
C. Overpaying Class Counsel: The Indictment

Class action critics have long claimed that too much of the
money recovered on behalf of investors goes to the lawyers, and that
class counsel most certainly receive excessive awards of attorneys' fees
from the courts. Despite the pervasive notion that attorneys receive
windfalls from securities class actions,55 empirical evidence that
lawyers serve their own interests at the expense of absent class
members is difficult to develop. The evidence of self-dealing by class
counsel is largely anecdotal 6 and circumstantial. For example, critics

52. The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility require that attorneys agree to
contingent fees in writing prior to inception of the case. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.5(c) (1983). The PSLRA has encouraged some ex ante contracting, subject to judicial
review at the end of the case, as discussed in Part III.
53. Alexander, supra note 46, at 348.
54. The common-fund doctrine is a recognized exception to the "American rule" under
which both parties bear their own legal fees and expenses regardless of the outcome of the
litigation. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478-81 (1980); see also Court
Awarded Attorney Fees: Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 241 (1985)
[hereinafter Task Force 1985 Report]. Derived from the doctrine of unjust enrichment, the
common-fund doctrine provides that a plaintiff who sues as a representative of other persons
and recovers a fund for the benefit of others may apply to the court to receive extracontractual
reimbursement of her legal costs. Id. Class actions generating a pool of monies from which
class members and class counsel receive compensation sometimes are denominated "common
fund class actions." See, e.g., Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 692.
55. For an interesting analysis of how the public perceives plaintiffs' lawyers who
represent clients on a contingent fee basis, see Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a
Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 457 (1998).
56. As Arthur Miller, a proponent of class actions, opined,
It seems to me that facile invocations of a clich6 or epithet like "windfall" are
becoming a substitute for (or reflect an unwillingness to come to grips with)
responding to more challenging questions. "Windfall" to whom? By what standards
is that to be judged? Aren't there countervailing values and policies? In a subjective,
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typically compare the amount of fees awarded by the courts to the
lawyers for the class with the amount of money or other
consideration received by each class member.5 7 During the previous
decade, plaintiffs' lawyers in securities class actions typically received
30% of multimillion-dollar compensation funds.5 8 The average award
to class counsel in securities fraud cases was $2.5 million compared
to an average gross settlement of $8.3 million. 9 Class members
recover, on average, just a fraction of the total damages claimed in
these lawsuits.6" During the congressional hearings that preceded
passage of the PSLRA in 1995, lawmakers heard testimony that
shareholders in class actions received just 14 cents for every dollar
lost, while the lawyers received, on average, a third of the amount
recovered. Because judges seldom deviated from benchmark awards

human process aren't some outlier cases (including cases in which class counsel are
significantly undercompensated) inevitable?
Arthur R. Miller, Written Statement Submitted to the Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of
Class Counsel 11 (June 1, 2001) [hereinafter Miller Statement], at http://www.ca3.uscourts.
gov/classcounsel/Witness% 20Statements/arthurrmiller.pdf.
57. Hensler, supra note 41, at 203 ("Critics often use [another] benchmark to assess
plaintiff class action attorney fees: the amount the attorneys are awarded, compared to the
amount class members receive. Because class counsel are paid for what they accomplish for the
class as a whole, their fee awards will almost certainly be greater than any individual class
member's award .. ").
58. Between January 1991 and May 1999, some 733 federal securities class actions
settled for total payments of $6.1 billion. Of that amount, $1.837 billion, approximately 30%,
went to lawyers for the plaintiff classes. See TODD S. FOSTER ET AL., NATIONAL ECONOMIC
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, RECENT TRENDS VI: TRENDS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION AND THE

IMPACTS OF PSLRA 7 (1999) [hereinafter TRENDS VI]. Other prereform studies of settled
shareholder class actions found that attorneys received average fee awards of approximately
28% and 29% of funds recovered. See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 103d
Cong. 740 (1993) (average attorneys' fees in federal securities class actions between July 1991
and June 1992 were 28% of settlements, and were 29% of funds recovered in securities class
actions settled between July 1992 and June 1993).
59. TRENDSVI, supra note 58, at 7.
60. Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of CorporateFraud Through Securities Litigation: The
Role of InstitutionalInvestors, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 155, 157 (citing a
1996 study by National Economic Research Associates reporting that the ratio of settlement
funds to plaintiffs' claimed damages did not exceed 14% on average). The charge that class
actions benefit lawyers for the class rather than class members themselves is not unique to
securities class actions and, in fact, has generated debate since the early 1970s. For a historical
perspective of the controversy, see CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 19, at 15-47. See also
Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739
(2002).
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of 25% to 33% of the common fund 6 -much less refused counsel's
fee requests-legislators might well have agreed that the courts
awarded excessive fees in securities class actions before reform.6 2
Investors apparently have not fared better since enactment of the
PSLRA. One recent study indicates that class members recover, on
average, just 5.1% of their estimated damages.63 Other researchers
have reported that the average securities class action settlement
recovered 3% to 7% of potential investment losses (measured by
market drop) between 1988 and 1999.64 Statistics like these support
the impression that lawyers are the only big winners in securities class
actions; the lawyers make millions of dollars while the individual class
members each receive only negligible monetary recoveries.6 5
The charge that class actions benefit lawyers for the class rather
than class members themselves is not unique to securities class
actions and, in fact, has generated debate since the early 1970s. Not
only do fee-heavy class action settlements harm the interests of
particular shareholder classes, but, to the extent courts compensate
class attorneys in greater amounts than fully informed clients would
have agreed to pay counsel prior to authorizing the filing of the

61. Joseph A. Grundfest, Attorneys Fees in Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation: A
Proposal for Addressing a Problem That Has No Perfect Solution 6 (June 1, 2001)
[hereinafter Grundfest Proposal] (testimony presented before the Third Circuit Task Force on
Selection of Class Counsel), at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/Witness%
20Statements/grundfest2.pdf; see also, e.g., In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th
Cir. 1995) (benchmark attorneys' fee award of 25% of recovery is reasonable, with adjustments
of up to 33% depending on the complexity of the case, risk involved, and nonmonetary
benefits achieved).
62. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection
of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 53,
94.
63. Steve Seidenberg, Little Guys Look at Very Long Odds, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 2002, at
Al (citing study conducted by Cornerstone Research in 2002 covering all 303 securities class
action settlements filed after enactment of the PSLRA through December 2001, defining
damages as the decrease in share value that occurred after the fraud was discovered, adjusted by
changes in a general market index over that period).
64. Id. (citing report by the Law and Economic Consulting Group Inc., for the year
2000 that analyzed 1,203 federal and 92 state case filings from 1988 to 1999).
65. See, e.g., Elkind, supra note 22, at 190. Elkind quotes Joseph Grundfest, describing
class actions as a means to transfer wealth: "The plaintiffs [sic] lawyers are getting a cut of the
money that flows from our left pocket [current shareholders] to our right pocket [former
shareholders] ...." Id.
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complaint, judges also inadvertently distort the incentives for private
attorneys general to prosecute only meritorious cases.6 6
These criticisms of private enforcement have not gone unnoticed
by members of the High Court. Justice O'Connor has commented
publicly that class actions "have made more overnight millionaires
[of lawyers] than almost any other businesses"; and, noting "the
perverse incentives and the untoward consequences" created by class
actions, Justice O'Connor criticized the plaintiffs' bar for becoming
"business partners of plaintiffs in seeking large-dollar recoveries
rather than act[ing] as objective servants of the law." 67 Justice
O'Connor's remarks reflect the concern that fees awarded to class
counsel not only constitute a windfall but actually encourage the
prosecution of groundless securities fraud complaints that never
should have been filed.6 8
Of course, champions of the private enforcement modelparticularly the small number of firms that dominate the plaintiffs'
securities bar 6 9-dispute these charges. They contend that advocates
of reform have created a false impression that courts overcompensate
plaintiffs' counsel and that the lawyers are the only persons who
actually benefit from private litigation.7" They justify class counsel's
66. In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160,
169 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Enforcement of the federal securities laws should be encouraged in
order to carry out the statutory purpose of protecting investors and assuring compliance.").
67. Dennis Kelly, Senate Is Close to Introducing Class-Action Reform Bill, BESTWIRE,
July 10, 2001 (quoting J.O'Connor speaking before a Minnesota women lawyers group), at
http://www3.ambest.com/frames/frameserver.asp?site=news&tab= 1&AltSrc= 14&refnum=43
034.
68. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) ("[A]
plaintiff [initiating a class action under Rule 10b-5] with a largely groundless claim [may]
simply take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in
terroremincrement of the settlement value ....
").
69. For a discussion of some of the most active firms, see Laural L. Hooper & Marie
Leary, Auctioning the Role of Class Counsel in Class Action Cases: A Descriptive Study, 209
F.R.D. 519, 593 (2001).
70. "Defendants attempt to quietly settle class actions that pose the most risk, then
attack less clear-cut cases in the media." Amy J.Longo, Class Action: A Blessing or a Blight on
Civil Justice, ABA LITIG. NEWS, May 2001, at 3 (quoting plaintiffs' lawyer Alan Schulman); see
also David J. Bershad et al., A DissentingIntroduction to SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: ABUSES
AND REMEDIES 20-26 (Edward J. Yodowitz et al. eds., 1994); WILLIAM S. LERACH, 'THE
CHICKENS HAVE COME HOME TO ROOST': How WALL STREET, THE BIG ACCOUNTING
FIRMS AND CORPORATE

INTERESTS CHLOROFORMED

CONGRESS AND COST AMERICA'S

INVESTORS TRILLIONS 3 (2002) ("Demand for passage of the PSLRA was greased by millions
of dollars of lobbying fees and political contributions from corporate and financial interests.
This tsunami of special-interest money was flavored by anecdotal tales of woe by high-tech
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objectively large tax on investors' litigation proceeds by pointing not
only to the aggregate value of the benefits pocketed by investors who
otherwise would receive no compensation for their injuries, but also
to the high level of risk undertaken by lawyers prosecuting such
suits7 and the incalculable benefits obtained for the economy as a
whole.7 2 "[M]any large fee awards that critics pejoratively
characterize as 'windfalls' are . . . appropriate compensation for
counsel whose skill, hard work, creativity, and willingness to expend
resources and take significant risks (generally without any guarantee
of a return on their investment) have resulted in a significant benefit
for the class." 7 3 Unless the plaintiffs' bar receives adequate financial
returns, lawyers will not undertake the risks of representing
defrauded investors. Shareholders will receive less compensation for
their injuries, and fraud will become more rampant because fewer
lawyers will participate in private securities enforcement.
In response to these arguments, private enforcement detractors
counter that plaintiffs' lawyers actually do not face an appreciable risk
of nonrecovery in securities class actions because "virtually all cases
are settled., 74 More accurately, unless dismissed by the court on the

corporate executives who were paraded by the handlers before Congressional committees to
whine about how frivolous class action suits by avaricious lawyers resulted in 'blackmail'
settlements.
), at http://www.enronfraud.com/pdf/chickens.pdf (last visited Nov. 20,
2003).
71. "[M]ost nonlawyers are unaware of many of the risks faced by lawyers who take on
and assume responsibility for class actions." Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 693
n.13; see also Longo, supra note 70, at 4 ("The public focuses on the great successes and
assumes all class actions are like that, but the vast majority of the cases are much closer to the
margin.... What is important is the ratio of attorneys' fees to the recovery. Courts routinely
supervise these cases to ensure that they are proportional." (quoting plaintiffs' lawyer Elizabeth
Cabraser)); Hynes, supra note 49, at 244-46 (arguing that class actions impose greater risks on
plaintiffs' counsel due to the need for attorneys to devote a substantial fraction of their firms'
resources to a single case for an extended period of time and the inability to diversify to reduce
this risk).
72. Fisch, supra note 62, at 56 ("Lawyer-driven litigation is not inherently undesirable.
The willingness of plaintiffs' lawyers to investigate potential causes of action, mobilize the
plaintiff class, and bear the costs and risks associated with the suit leads to an increase in
enforcement and provides a valuable contribution to the deterrence of corporate
misconduct."); see also Longo, supra note 70, at 4 ("Class actions make for a better society
because they ensure that people deal fairly and honestly with each other in the marketplace."
(quoting plaintiffs' lawyer Michael B. Hyman)).
73. Miller Statement, supranote 56, at 18 n.12.
74. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do theMerits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
ClassActions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 578 (1991); see also, e.g., In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc.,
Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 47 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that "[a]n overwhelming
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pleadings, most class action securities claims settle prior to trial.7 5
Recent empirical work indicates that 83% of all resolved securities
fraud cases have settled.76 The larger the potential damages are, the
larger the settlement is, irrespective of the merits of plaintiffs' claims
or the efforts of plaintiffs' counsel. Between 1990 and 2001,
megasettlements on pre-Reform Act cases represented 21% of the
total dollars paid out. Excluding the resolution of one "off-thechart" case,7 7 the share of post-reform megasettlements-those
between $100 million and $500 million-rose to 43% of the total.78
Critics of class actions cite these studies to support their contention
that plaintiffs' counsel will receive fees in many of the cases they
choose to file (sometimes significant fees) and do not bear
substantial risk in prosecuting securities claims.
Whether anyone other than the lawyers benefits from private
class action litigation, and indeed, whether the private enforcement
regime actually serves as an efficient and effective adjunct to
regulatory enforcement of the securities laws, are questions that have
confounded policymakers7 9 and academics8" alike. The answers
depend, in part, on one's evaluation of the social benefits of private
percentage of securities class actions are settled" and citing studies showing that 87.6% of
securities class actions filed between April 1988 and September 1996 "ended in settlement");
Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2064
(1995) (reporting that "virtually all class actions not dismissed on motion are settled").
75. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 74, at 2064.
76. WOODRUFF-SAWYER & Co., A STUDY OF SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION 25 (2002); see also Alexander, supra note 74, at 497 (studying a sample of
settlements in class actions filed against technology companies following initial public offerings
and determining that most cases settled for 25% of potential damages).
77. The Cendant litigations settled in 2000 for $3.525 billion. See supranote 13.
78. Phyllis Plitch, Shareholder Suits Ebb, But Mega -Settlements on the Rise, Dow JONES
NEWS SERVICE, June 13, 2002, http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2002/
20020613_HeadlineOl_Plitch.htm.
79. As Senator Christopher Dodd expressed,
[A]fter a long hearing ... we found no agreement on whether there is in fact a
problem, the extent of the problem, or the solution to the problem. In my
experience with this [Senate Subcommittee on Securities], I've never encountered
an issue where there is such disagreement over the basic facts.
Private Litigation Under the FederalSecurities Laws: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Sec. of the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 280 (1993).
80. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1995); Joel
Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's
"Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's
Authority," 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994).
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securities enforcement. 8 Maximizing the loss returns to individual
defrauded investors is one objective of securities class actions but not
the only objective. Other goals recognized by Congress include
deterrence of future wrongdoing and confidence in the capital
markets.8 2 To be sure, the objectives of individual class members
should not conflict with these broader social objectives, but
thoughtful commentators recognize that "[t]here is often a tension
between these two masters. Approaches that provide the most
effective deterrence of future fraud may not necessarily provide the
largest loss recovery." 3 Even if the litigation outcome does not
maximize class members' individual returns, the private attorney
general model would sanction the result if the outcome maximizes
welfare to society.
Nonetheless, the social benefits of private enforcement cannot
justify receipt by plaintiffs' counsel of excess attorneys' fees. If
plaintiffs' counsel can extract excessive attorneys' fee awards from the
gross settlement proceeds of shareholder suits, the compensation
benefits of private enforcement cannot be realized.84 In addition, the
ability to recover windfall attorneys' fees compromises the deterrence
benefits of securities class actions. Motivated by the potential receipt
of excess returns on their investments, the plaintiffs' bar may file
questionable fraud claims against corporations, their management,
and their professional advisors.8" Overcompensation of class counsel
81. Developments in the Law: The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752,
1831 (2000). In awarding fees, courts also should optimize social benefits of class action
litigation, including deterrence and tort insurance. Id. The private attorney general model
presupposes that potential defendants will abstain from securities fraud in order to avoid the
costs (both monetary and reputational) of defending a class action lawsuit for large damages;
presumably, they would not fear individual or group litigation with much smaller exposure for
damages. Deterring fraud is efficient and increases social welfare if potential defendants are not
overdeterred and if the rules of law are themselves efficient. The efficiency of the federal
antifraud rules and the efficiency of private class action litigation as a tool for enforcing
compliance with those laws are important subjects for inquiry beyond the scope of this Article.
82. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 31.
83. Johnson, supra note 60, at 155 (providing examples of settlement structures that
pay less to investors but arguably have greater deterrence value).
84. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 31-32 (Congress heard some evidence
that securities class actions settle without regards to the merits of the claims asserted in the
lawsuit.).
85. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH & STANFORD LAW SCHOOL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
CLEARINGHOUSE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASES FILED AND DEFENDANT

MARKET CAP LOSSES SURGE IN 2001 (Mar. 15, 2002),
securities.stanford.edu/scac-press/20020315-CRSCAC.pdf.
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encourages the filing of more lawsuits, even if the evidence of fraud
is weak. The filing of numerous lawsuits of questionable merit leads
to management overdeterrence; that is, management becomes so
concerned with avoiding liability for fraud that corporations fail to
disclose information wanted by investors, resulting in social welfare
losses. That is why reconciling the tension between the system-wide
objectives of the private enforcement regime and the self-interested
objectives of the private enforcers requires careful attention to the
lawyers' economic incentives. Agency theory describes those
economic incentives, explains the potential for counsel to profit at
the expense of absent class members, and provides the explanation
for legal rules designed to safeguard against opportunism by
entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers.
D. Agency Theory and Securities ClassActions
Agency theory posits that the nature of the private enforcement
model itself, coupled with counsel's sizable financial incentives,
tempts plaintiffs' lawyers to engage in opportunistic behavior. Such
temptations are so powerful that class counsel cannot be deterred by
fiduciary obligations or ethical proscriptions from acting in their own
economic self-interest. 6 Because, in general, neither individual
investors nor their court-appointed representatives have the
economic incentive, much less the ability, to monitor counsel
effectively, and because attorney-initiated bonding and ex ante
compensation contracts will not reduce substantially the costs of
opportunism, legal rules-including regulations providing for
judicial oversight of class counsel's compensation-have evolved to
protect absent class members.

86. This is not to say that private attorneys general never seek to advance ideological or
professional objectives by prosecuting securities class action lawsuits. However, these lawyers
are economic actors who, assuming they are rational, will not risk their time and capital on
such litigation unless they believe they will achieve a reasonable profit from their investments.
Further, although legal rules impose fiduciary responsibilities on attorneys, agency theory
supposes that class counsel will make litigation investments to maximize their own economic
return, even if the economic return to the class is not maximized thereby. As John Coffee,
author of the largest body of work describing the motivations and behavior of economically
self-interested plaintiffs' lawyers, has argued, "Convenient and comforting as it is to view the
attorney only through th[e] nostalgic lens of fiduciary analysis, a fixation on this mode of
analysis is likely to blind us to the real issues relating to the incentives and misincentives that
the law today creates for the plaintiff's attorney." Understandingthe Plaintiffs Att'y, supra
note 10, at 726-27.
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1. The principal-agentdilemma
In general concept, agency theory examines relationships in
which one party, the principal, delegates work to another party, the
agent. Whether the parties are owner and manager, trustor and
trustee, employer and employee, or client and attorney, the theory
recognizes that the interests or objectives of the principal may
conflict with those of the agent and that it is difficult or costly for
the principal to verify the agent's activities.8 7 Among other
possibilities, the self-interested agent may not have performed the
work as agreed (the moral hazard / hidden action problem), or may
have misrepresented the work or her skills or abilities to perform the
work (the adverse selection / hidden information problem), or both.
The agent's opportunistic behavior-that is, conduct providing value
to the agent at the expense of the principal-harms the principal.
However, the principal cannot determine readily what the agent
actually did and cannot judge accurately whether the agent's failure
to achieve the principal's preferred outcome has occurred as a result
of some deviant behavior on the part of the agent, such as shirking
or setting excessive compensation. In order to reduce the costs of the
agent's opportunism, the principal may employ various monitoring
devices, bonding mechanisms (such as agents guaranteeing fidelity to
the principal), and ex ante incentive compensation structures.
However, these tools may not reduce significantly the agency costs
endemic to securities class actions.
2. Agency costs in class action litigation
A generation of academics has written on the high agency costs
endemic to small-claim, large-scale class action litigation.88
Importantly, this literature derives from the application of agency
theory to the classical attorney-client relationship a model in which
the individual client acts as the primary decision-maker.8 9
87. Michael C. Jensen & William J. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, J. FIN. ECON., October, 1976, at 305, 308 (defining
agency relationship as "a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating
some decision making authority to the agent").
88. One of the most often-cited articles is Understanding the Plaintiff's Att'y, supra
note 10, at 714-20.
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983) ("A lawyer shall abide by
a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation" subject to narrow exceptions in
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Recognizing the potential for conflict between the self-interested
lawyer and her client, the classical form is premised on two
normative canons: (1) the client controls the attorney, and (2) the
attorney has a duty to advance the client's interests to the maximum
extent permitted by law and the rules of ethics governing the
attorney as a professional. Implicit in the assertion that class actions
are characterized by high agency costs is the assumption that such
lawsuits primarily serve as a means for claimants to achieve individual
ends; that is, a mechanism to increase the welfare of individual class
members. Viewed through this normative lens, class counsel should
conduct the litigation in the interest of the class members, which is
to maximize their return. Maximizing returns to class members is a
unifying objective and provides a simple and direct rule-a valuemaximizing decision rule-under which class counsel should make
decisions.
Agency theory posits that class counsel may disregard the valuemaximizing decision rule in order to advance their own economic
self-interests. ° Attorneys may attempt to maximize their fees at the
expense of injured investors, acquiring assets that otherwise would
have gone to class members. Hypothetically, counsel could maximize
her fee by engaging in any of a number of opportunistic behaviors.
For example, counsel might shirk, failing to expend the effort that
she would have exerted if the absent class members were monitoring
her actively. Counsel also might exchange a high fee award for a low
class recovery in settlement negotiations; defendants will agree to
such a settlement if their expected liability at trial exceeds their total
payments to settle the claims.9 Counsel might overstate the value of
Rule 1.2(c), (d), and (e). For example, "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to
accept an offer of settlement of a matter.").
90. Accepting this theory, the Third Circuit recently explained,
[A] rational, self-interested client seeks to maximize net recovery; he or she wants
the representation to terminate when his or her gross recovery minus his or her
counsel's fee is largest. In contrast, at least in theory and often in practice, a rational,
self-interested lawyer looks to maximize his or her net fee, and thus wants the
representation to end at the moment where the difference between his or her fees
and costs ... is greatest. These two points rarely converge. As a result, there is often
a conflict between the economic interests of clients and their lawyers, and this fact
creates reason to fear that class counsel will be highly imperfect agents for the class.
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2001).
91. In practice, most negotiated resolutions of securities class actions follow a similar
pattern. The settling defendants, while denying all wrongdoing, agree to pay to the class some
amount of money and/or securities, often funded with the proceeds of directors' and officers'
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the settlement relative to the value of the class members' claims,
including overstating the value of nonpecuniary relief or understating
the probability of success at trial or both. Or counsel might
exaggerate her prosecution efforts, creatively accounting for her time
or engaging in unnecessary activities in order to inflate her fee.
a. Class members are unlikely to monitor. Even if nonparticipating
investors are aware of their claims, the vast majority of absent class
members have little economic incentive to participate actively in the
case or monitor counsel's conduct. They are a large and diffuse
group, usually dispersed geographically. Because they own a
comparatively small claim in relation to the total potential gains of
the lawsuit (and, perhaps, a diversified portfolio of other securities),
absent class members are rationally apathetic. They will not monitor
the litigation or the representatives prosecuting it because their
individual gains from effective monitoring are too small relative to
the policing costs. Further, monitoring is prohibitively expensive
because nonparticipating class members have no routine interactions
with the attorneys managing the lawsuit and cannot directly observe,
except at a high cost, the activities of counsel. "[T]he client, as
principal, is neither well-situated nor adequately motivated to closely
monitor and control the attorney, his agent. Shareholders with welldiversified portfolios or small holdings lack the incentive and
information to police settlements-the costs of policing typically
outweigh any pro rata benefits to the shareholder."9 2 Collective
liability insurance, into a fund from which class members may make claims and class counsel
will receive compensation and reimbursement of costs. The settling defendants also agree to
fund the costs of notifying the class and administering the settlement fund. In exchange, the
class representatives, on behalf of the class, release the settling defendants from any and all
liability relating to the claims made in the complaint, and the parties stipulate to a court order
dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. Following negotiation and documentation of
the terms of their agreement, class counsel joins with the defendants to present to the court for
approval a proposed settlement that includes a suggested fee award to class counsel. One
commentator has described securities class action settlements as "large-scale business
transactions that commodify res judicata" insofar as defendants agree to purchase the class
members' legal right to sue through plaintiffs' attorneys who engage in "primarily businessoriented" rather than "legal activities." William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of
Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 372, 375 (2001).
92. Bell At. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1309 (3d Cir. 1993); see also In re Oracle
Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639, 645 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("The central and long recognized
problem in class litigation arises from the inability of the persons whose rights are at stake to
monitor the faithfulness of their self-appointed champion and the dubious ability of the court
effectively to do so on behalf of the class."); see generally EntrepreneurialLitigation,supra note
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action and free-rider problems render unlikely the possibility of
sharing these high monitoring costs among an organization of class
members.
Even if absent class members had the economic incentive to
monitor the litigation, they lack the necessary information to do so. 3
Nonparticipating class members may have no awareness of their
claims, much less knowledge that counsel filed suit on their behalf,
until they receive individual notice that the litigants have agreed to
settle.94 The attorney-client relationship generally is created by legal
rules rather than actual contracts. Class counsel usually does not
know the absent class members and does not regard them as
individual clients.9" Indeed, it is not clear, as a matter of doctrine or
theory, who the plaintiffs' lawyer actually represents in class action
litigation.9 6 What is clear is that, in traditional class action practice,
the attorney is the real party in interest in the lawsuit97 and controls

17, at 883-89; Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L.
REv. 1051, 1122-30 (1996).
93. The counselor-client relationship, like other professional relationships, is
characterized by informational asymmetry. Legal services are "credence goods"-goods or
services provided by experts who strongly influence (if not decide) the buyers' needs for the
goods or services. Many buyers of legal services cannot efficiently evaluate the quantity of the
service they should purchase, much less whether the seller actually supplied the service
promised or the quality of the service provided. Economists thus theorize that sellers of
credence goods may defraud buyers by charging for services that the buyer does not need, by
charging for services that the seller did not perform, or by providing inferior quality services.
See Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, 28 RAND J. ECON. 107, 111
(1997). The credence goods problem is amplified when clients purchase litigation services and
is amplified even further in class action litigation.
94. The PSLRA attempted to address this problem by providing for early notice of the
lawsuit. See infranote 135. However, this notice is by publication only.
95. This mentality became public in 1993 when Forbes magazine quoted William
Lerach, perhaps the most prominent member of the plaintiffs' securities bar, as saying, "I have
the greatest practice of law in the world .... I have no clients." William P. Barrett, I Have No
Clients, FORBEs, Oct. 11, 1993, at 52.
96. Some scholars have argued that class counsel represents individual class members,
while others theorize that the class, as an entity, is the client. Compare John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 380-85 (2000) [hereinafter Class Action Accountability], with
David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 913,
938-40 (1998). Class action jurisprudence could support either conclusion. Id.
97. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 908 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 500 U.S. 90 (1991) ("Securities actions, like many suits under Rule 23, are lawyers'
vehicles.").
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the complex litigation,9 8 deciding whether to settle the case and for
how much and for what fee, without consulting the class in advance
of these decisions. For this reason, Rule 23(e) requires that courts
approve the parties' settlement agreement, 99 thereby providing, in
theory, "a substitute for individual assent [by absent class members]
to the contract's terms."' 0 0 In fact, scrutinizing class counsel's
determination to settle makes little economic sense for the investor
unless such monitoring could lead that investor to uncover
information affecting her decision to opt out of the class and proceed
against the defendants in a separate lawsuit. If class members would
and could opt out of any settlement that gave them a net recovery
that was materially less than the value of their claims, attorneys for
the class would be motivated to maximize the class members' net
recovery. However, even members of investor classes who suspect
attorney opportunism do not necessarily opt out of poor settlements.
Assuming a suspicious class member would have declined to bring
the claims in the first place (due to the relatively greater cost of
prosecuting a lawsuit compared to the prospects of limited individual
recovery), opting out of the class is irrational; any recovery through
the class action is better than no recovery at all. Further, if the court
has certified the class before settlement, class members cannot opt
out of an insufficient settlement. Although amendments to Rule 23

98. See ClassAction Accountability, supra note 96, at 418 ("[T]he attorney is not simply
an agent of the client. Rather, the attorney is also the creditor and joint venturer who is
effectively financing their common undertaking and has much more at stake then [sic] any
individual class member."); see alsoUnderstandingthe Plaintiffs Att'y, supra note 10, at 726
("[T]he plaintifFs attorney is different from other attorneys, both in terms of the extent of the
conflict and the potential for opportunism.").
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court ....").
100. Susan P. Koniak, The Lawlessness in Our Courts, 28 STETSON L. REv. 283, 294
(1998). Judges rarely reject a settlement negotiated by class counsel and the defendants, even
where the court receives objections from absent class members. In most cases, the courts make
no inquiries into the details of the settlement negotiations. Nor do courts typically require that
the parties file a final report documenting the total amount of money paid out from the
settlement fund to class members, class counsel, and others involved in the administration of
the settlement. When confronted with objections, courts sometimes recite the unobjectionable
tenet that class counsel "possess, in a very real sense, fiduciary obligations to those [absent class
members] not before the court." Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d
Cir. 1973); see also Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978)
(noting that class counsel have the duty to report conflicts of interest between the named
plaintiffs and the rest of the class so that the court may consider intervention on behalf of
absent class members).
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are forthcoming, the current law does not provide an additional optout right for class members who deem the negotiated settlement
inadequate.'
Objection is the only avenue of dissent. In other
words, absent members of a certified class cannot vote with their
feet. If they do not agree with the recommended settlement or fee
application, they only can voice their objections to the court.
Class members also have little incentive to exercise their right to
object. They face small stakes along with information and free-rider
problems.'0 2 Courts often reject motions by objectors' counsel to
recover their attorneys' fees and costs. 3 In addition, courts have
imposed various legal barriers to objectors' challenges. 0 4 Thus, even
those investors who suspect that counsel has breached the valuemaximizing decision rule may, rationally, do nothing.'
b. Named plaintiffs may choose not to monitor. Rather than absent
class members monitoring, the named plaintiffs may monitor counsel
to reduce agency costs in securities class actions. Named plaintiffs
who serve as class representatives act as fiduciaries for absent class
101. Proposed Rule 23(e)(3), approved by the Supreme Court in March 2003, would
permit district judges to order a second opt-out opportunity for members of the certified class
at the time of settlement if the opt-out period expired before public announcement of the
settlement. Assuming no intervention by Congress, this proposed rule and other amendments
to Rule 23 will become effective on December 1, 2003. See Supreme Court Approves Class
Action Rule Changes, ANDREWS CLASS ACTION LITIG. REPORTER, Apr. 2003, at 24.
102. Class members often must opt out at the end of the notice period, and they must
make objections at that time. Some commentators have argued that this timing is unfair
because "the opt-out decision comes prior to the point where class members have a fair
opportunity to evaluate the arguments on both sides of the settlement." Brian Wolfman &
Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71
N.Y.U. L. REv. 439, 490 n.109 (1996).
103. Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without
Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 129, 154-55 & n.150 (2001) (compiling case citations).
For an explanation of how objectors may be "bribed" under the current law, see Class Action
Accountability, supra note 96, at 422-23.
104. Among these legal barriers, district courts may (1) require objectors to submit their
objections in writing before the moving parties file their briefs supporting the fairness of the
proposed settlement, (2) deny the objectors the opportunity to add new objections after
reviewing the proponents' submissions, (3) deny the objectors any discovery, or (4) prohibit
the objectors from discovering the substance of the settlement negotiations. Koniak & Cohen,
supranote 92, at 1109-10.
105. The Federal Judicial Center's 1994-1995 study of class actions in four federal
district courts found that "[t]he percentage of cases in which there was no objection [to the
proposed settlement] ranged from 42% to 64% in the four districts," and "[c]lass members, or
other interested parties, did not object to fees very often." Willging, supra note 48, at 140,
164.
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members. °6 However, at least prior to the PSLRA, the named
plaintiffs selected by class counsel to serve as class representatives
often lacked both the motivation and the ability to fulfill their
fiduciary duties to monitor the lawyers. As courts have long
recognized, °7 "the named plaintiff is largely a figurehead who plays
little or no part in the initiation and prosecution of the class
claim."' °8 Before Congress enacted the PSLRA, district courts
routinely certified classes represented by persons with nominal
investments, and defendants seldom challenged the adequacy of such
representatives based upon potential intraclass conflicts.' 0 9
Further, although prereform class action jurisprudence pays lip
service to "the duty of the class representative to ensure that absent
members' interests are adequately protected,"'' 0 district courts
certified the named plaintiffs as adequate class representatives even
when they demonstrated lack of understanding of their claims and
lack of ability or interest in overseeing the prosecution of those

106. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949) (describing
the class representative as a volunteer who assumes a position of fiduciary nature); see also In re
Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("A class
representative, once designated by court, is a fiduciary for the absent class members."); Kline v.
Wolf, 88 F.R.D. 696, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that a class representative serves as
fiduciary to advance and protect interests of those whom he purports to represent), affd,702
F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1983). For further discussion, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement
Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1270 (1995) ("The plaintiff in a class suit ... undertake[s]
to act for others in prosecution, and possibly settlement, of claims owned by the absentees.
Thus, the class representatives do not speak only for themselves but also are fiduciaries who
speak for others, with the constraints that a fiduciary obligation imposes on their freedom of
decision.").
107. "Experience teaches that it is counsel for the class representative and not the named
parties, who direct and manage these actions. Every experienced federal judge knows that any
statements to the contrary [are] sheer sophistry." Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d
824, 832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973).
108. Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in
Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 179 (1990).
109. William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEo. L.J. 371,
406-07 (2001) ("Only occasionally have defendants attempted to defeat securities certification
on intraclass conflict grounds .... [D]ifferences in the amount of damages among plaintiffs, in
the size and manner of their purchases, or in the nature of the purchaser, render certification
inappropriate .... [Yet] few securities class actions consider such intraclass disputes, and most
of those that do dismiss them as not preclusive of certification." (footnotes omitted)).
110. Nat'l Ass'n of Reg'l Med. Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340, 346 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); see also Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 726-27 (11th Cir.
1987).
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claims."' Presiding judges rarely imposed on named plaintiffs any
specific responsibilities or duties to participate actively;. 2 the courts
apparently recognized that, with much smaller stakes in the litigation
than plaintiffs' lawyers (and with the prospect of receiving repeated
bonus payments from those lawyers prereform)," 3 class representatives
were unlikely to monitor class counsel or even consult with the
lawyers." 4 "[C]lass representatives often are recruited by class
counsel, play no client role whatsoever, and-when deposed . . . commonly show no understanding of their litigation."" 5 Simply put,
class representatives appointed prior to securities litigation reform
seldom reviewed class counsel's time records, expenses, or work
product, much less objected to class counsel's fee application at the
conclusion of the litigation. In any event, courts generally balked
when appointed class representatives attempted to exercise
meaningful control over
key litigation decisions, such as the decision
6
claims.'
class
settle
to

111. Morris v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 694, 698 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Fickinger
v. C.I. Planning Corp., 103 F.R.D. 529, 533 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1984); see also Edward H. Cooper,
The (Cloudy) Furureof Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923,927 (1998).
112. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 103, at 163 (arguing that "the law nowhere defines
the responsibilities of class representatives to absent class members or in relation to class
counsel").
113. Making monitoring even more unlikely, some plaintiffs' lawyers prior to 1996 used
"professional plaintiffs"-persons who purchased a small number of shares in many public
companies-to file multiple lawsuits in exchange for bonus payments. See CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 20, at 32-33 ("[M]any of the 'world's unluckiest investors' repeatedly
appear as lead plaintiffs in securities class action lawsuits."). With passage of the PSLRA,
Congress constrained the use of professional plaintiffs by limiting persons (other than
institutional investors) from serving as lead plaintiffmore than five times in three years. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(vi), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2000). The statute also barred bonus
payments to named plaintiffs. See id. §§ 77z-1(a)(4), 78u-4(a)(4) (2000). However, investors
still may receive reimbursement of the reasonable costs and expenses they incur as a direct
result of serving as lead plaintiff. Id.
114. See Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 20 ("No rational plaintiff would take on the
role of litigation monitor because she would incur all the costs of doing so but would realize
only her pro rata share of the benefits.").
115. Cooper, supra note 111, at 927.
116. See, e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072 (2d Cir. 1995)
(affirming district court's denial of motion to remove class counsel and district court's approval
of settlement negotiated by counsel over objections by four of five named class
representatives); Laskey v. Int'l Union, 638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981) (upholding settlement
over named plaintiffs' objections); Kincade v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501 (5th
Cit. 1981) (upholding settlement despite plaintiffs' objections); see also Class Action
Accountability, supra note 96, at 406-09 (describing the Third Circuit's decision to approve
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c. Bonding mechanisms fail to reduce opportunism. Bonding,
another theoretical mechanism for reducing agency costs, is not
effective in securities class actions. Bonding describes methods by
which agents provide assurances that they will act faithfully even in
the absence of monitoring by their principals. In the classical model
of attorney-client relations, lawyers, like other professionals, invest in
their reputation as a bonding mechanism in order to reduce,
although not eliminate, agency costs. The threat of losing future
business deters opportunistic behavior, and the possibility of
attracting future business encourages behavior that promotes the
client's interests. However, bonding is problematic for litigators
because litigation outcomes are not easily correlated to the quality of
the lawyers' efforts. Furthermore, in the context of most class actions
involving small claims but large stakes, reputational bonding is even
more unlikely to affect agency costs" 7 for two primary reasons. First,
class members do not select counsel; rather, counsel initiates the
litigation after finding one or more class members to represent the
class. Counsel, then, typically has no need to develop or maintain her
reputation in order to attract business from absent class members." 8
Second, the potential for a multimillion-dollar fee award may cause
class counsel to risk (or "cash in") her reputation in exchange for
profits now. The larger the potential fee, the greater the risk of this
"last period problem.""' 9 Megacases would pose the greatest
temptation for plaintiffs' lawyers. 2 '

settlement over objections by three of four named class representatives in Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco
Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999)).
117. Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 20-22.
118. John C. Coffee Jr., Rethinking the ClassAction: A Policy Prineron Reform, 62 IND.
L.J. 625, 629 (1987) (noting that class counsel needs to impress the court, not the absent class
members).
119. The last period problem describes why agents facing the last period of their
employment may behave more opportunistically, assuming greater risks that the principal will
learn of the wrongful behavior in exchange for greater rewards in the short term.
120. On the other hand, if the fee award is extraordinarily high, counsel's concern for her
reputation may motivate her to reduce her percentage share of the recovery. See Daniel J.
Capra et al., The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys' Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2827, 2845
(1999) (recounting decision of plaintiffs' firm to forgo its contractual right to receive $1.5
billion fee award in the tobacco litigation).
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d. Contractingwith class counsel may reduce agency costs.
(1) Benefits and limitations of contingent fee compensation.
Although agency theory suggests that class members and class
representatives will not monitor class counsel effectively and cannot
reduce agency costs through bonding by class counsel, the theory
also posits that certain compensation structures may deter the
lawyers from behaving opportunistically. Contingent fees represent
one such compensation structure with the potential to reduce agency
costs.' By deferring compensation to counsel until the class realizes
a positive gain at the conclusion of the case, contingency fees give
class counsel a direct interest in the outcome of the litigation, thus
aligning counsel's interests with the interests of the class.'
Of
course, a contingent fee lawyer anticipates that she will receive a
compensation premium for assuming the risk that her clients will
23
lose and, as a result, that she will be paid nothing for her services.
As Justice Blackmun once explained, "[L]awyers charge a premium
when their entire fee is contingent on winning .... The premium
added for contingency compensates for the risk of nonpayment if the
suit does not succeed ....""'Although contingent fee structures
require payment of premium fees for successful outcomes, to the
extent that contingency fee arrangements effectively link counsel's
compensation to the fate of the class's claims, the principal may
reduce his monitoring costs.
'

121. The economics of contingency fees has spawned a large literature and continuing
empirical study. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency
Fee Legal Practice,47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1997). For a general discussion of how the parties
in ordinary litigation may design contingent fee agreements to reduce agency costs, see Bruce
L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1996).
122. According to Judge Frank Easterbrook,
The contingent fee uses private incentives rather than careful monitoring to align
the interests of lawyer and client. The lawyer gains only to the extent his client
gains. This interest-alignment device is not perfect. . . . But [ail]
imperfect
alignment of interest is better than a conflict of interests, which hourly fees may
create.
Kirchoffv. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1986).
123.

See RiCHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.9, at 567-68 (4th ed.

1992) (noting the established practice in private legal markets of rewarding attorneys for
taking the risk of nonpayment by paying premiums over normal hourly rates for successful
outcomes in contingency cases).
124. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 735-36 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Some of the problems associated with contingent fees are unique
to class actions, but others are not. Whether a contingent fee is
reasonable or excessive in any context depends largely on the risk of
nonrecovery borne by counsel. However, lawyers often possess
superior information about the likelihood of successful prosecution.
Unsophisticated clients may not know enough about the risks
associated with the litigation to make informed decisions about the
terms of representation. Furthermore, counsel must make upfront
investments of both time and capital (for litigation expenses) in
order to prosecute the claims. These investments made by counselin prefiling investigations, drafting the complaint, responding to
motions filed by defendants, engaging in discovery, and the likeaffect the return to the client and, presumably, would increase client
welfare. Nonetheless, insofar as counsel owns only a portion of the
return from the litigation, she does not obtain the full benefit from
investments she makes in the litigation. For this reason, contingent
fees create incentives for lawyers to prefer settlements to trials. A
settlement ensures that the lawyer will receive at least some
attorneys' fees; if counsel tries the case and loses, she will forfeit both
the opportunity cost of her time (and her colleagues' time) spent on
the case as well as the amount of out-of-pocket expenses she has
advanced to her client.
Plaintiffs' counsel may face even greater incentives to settle class
action litigation. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "[W]ith an
already enormous fee within counsel's grasp, zeal for the client may
relax sooner [in negotiating a class action settlement] than it would
in a case brought on behalf of one claimant." 2 ' Class actions
typically are more factually and legally complex than bipolar cases,
and prosecution of such claims requires greater investments of time
and greater outlays for pretrial expenses. Presumably, class counsel
will take on the increased exposure in exchange for the
correspondingly greater potential returns from such an action. In
theory, however, class counsel is also more risk averse than the
typical class member who owns a diversified portfolio of securities.126
The more time and money invested by counsel, the more risk averse

125. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 & n.30 (1999).
126. Class Action Accountability, supra note 96, at 390-92 (explaining why plaintiffs'
attorneys, being comparatively more risk averse than class members, will accept settlement
offers that informed class members would reject).
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counsel will become, resulting in a greater likelihood that counsel's
comparative risk aversion will harm the interests of the class. The
extent of the conflict-counsel's incentive to settle the class claims in
violation of the value-maximizing decision rule in order to recover
counsel's fees and costs-also will depend on the size of the potential
fee and the fee award methodology employed
by courts in the
12 7
jurisdiction where the lawsuit is pending.
This conflict of interest between counsel and class becomes most
troubling when, as almost always occurs, defendants offer to settle
the lawsuit for some fraction of the total potential recovery. Because
the time and effort necessary to obtain a greater return for the class
generally may yield a reduced (hourly) return to class counsel,
counsel may recommend the "cheap settlement" in contravention of
the value-maximizing decision rule.' 28 "Even if a substantially higher
recovery might be obtained through litigation, the return on
counsel's investment might be lower than that provided by the
settlement, especially if lost opportunity costs are taken into
account.', 129 Insofar as class counsel's risk preference deviates from
the risk preference of the class, and insofar as class members do not
monitor class counsel, the attorneys will not invest in the litigation in
a way or to the extent that is most beneficial to class members. 3 ' In
the most extreme case, there is danger that lawyers for the class will
collude with defendants and agree to accept an early and cheap (socalled "sweetheart" or "sell out") settlement in exchange for a larger
award of attorneys' fees.131
127. Courts determine attorneys' fees in class actions using a lodestar (hourly) approach
or a percentage-of-recovery approach. For further discussion, see infra Part II and
accompanying notes.
128. Class Action Accountability, supra note 96, at 390-92; see also Bruce L. Hay,
Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479,

485-87 (1997).
129. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, at 18 (1995) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
130. Class Action Accountability, supra note 96, at 390-91; Hay, supra note 129, at
485-86.

131. See Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 17, at 883 (defining sweetheart
settlements as agreements "in which the plaintiff's attorney trades a high fee award for a low
recovery"). The risk that class counsel will recommend an inadequate settlement in violation of
the value-maximizing decision rule exists regardless of whether the court adopts a lodestar or
percentage-of-recovery approach, as described at length by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. in The
Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiffas Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 35-48 [hereinafter Unfaithful Champion]. However, as described
in Part II, infra, most scholars agree that the contingent percentage-of-recovery method is
more efficient than the lodestar method in reducing agency costs.
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To be sure, agency costs also infect settlements of bipolar
litigation negotiated by plaintiffs' lawyers under the classical
representation model. Clients often cannot evaluate the legitimacy of
their lawyers' assessment of litigation risk or second-guess their
lawyers' settlement recommendations. Nor can clients costlessly
determine whether their counsel has adopted an effective negotiation
strategy and is bargaining zealously on their behalf. Yet, the danger
of lawyer opportunism is more compelling in class action litigation
because plaintiffs' counsel typically does not confer with any of her
"clients" during the course of the settlement negotiations.' 32 Rather,
counsel makes the decision to compromise the claims and negotiates
the settlement price with the defendants in "a black box," providing
little or no opportunity for client participation or monitoring. 3 ' Left
unmonitored by clients, counsel may bargain harder for its own
compensation than for money for the class.
Ironically, the PSLRA may have exacerbated the temptation for
plaintiffs' counsel to settle too cheaply because the risks confronted
by plaintiffs' lawyers specializing in securities litigation may have
increased as a result of congressional reform. Attorneys prosecuting
securities class actions post-PSLRA must invest more time and capital
to investigate claims, draft complaints, and provide early notice of
the lawsuits,"'s but they face greater uncertainty regarding whether
their pleadings will survive defendants' inevitable motions to

132. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995) ("The lawyers can decide when to sue and when to
settle, based largely on their own financial interests, not the interests of their purported
clients.").
133. See Hazard, supra note 106, at 1272 (arguing that settlement decisions of
"ineffectual or self-interested" class attorneys do not receive sufficient scrutiny).
134. The PSLRA established new, more stringent standards for pleading scienter and
strengthened the requirement that plaintiffs plead the circumstances of fraud with particularity.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t,-4(b) (2000).
This means that firms need to invest substantially more resources and manpower in
investigating each case thus raising the cost of filing a case. From an economic
perspective, this change leads to higher stInk costs because of the need to investigate
the case and spend money onl accountants and investigative agents.
Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 NC. L. REV. 115, 192 (2001).
In addition, the statute requires that plaintiffs publish in a widely circulated business
publication a notice to members of the putative class within twenty days of filing the
complaint. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(3)(A), 78u-4(a)(3)(A) (2000). This early notice must
identify the claims alleged in the lawsuit and the purported class period and must inform
putative class members that they may move to serve as lead plaintiff. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(A),
78u-4(a)(3)(A).
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136
and the lawsuits have become more protracted.
dismiss,'
Moreover, the lawyers have no assurance that they will receive the
appointment as lead counsel even if they invest substantial resources
prefiling and draft a well-pleaded complaint." 7
How might members of the plaintiffs' bar react to the increased
risk in securities class actions post-PSLRA? They may decide to select
their cases more carefully, limiting their risk exposure by pursuing
only cases with a high probability of recovery, 13 such as lawsuits
against solvent defendants involved in well-publicized and
government-investigated corporate frauds. They may struggle with a
greater temptation to settle at least some cases in violation of the
value-maximizing decision rule, thus jeopardizing the return to class
members. 3 9 Perhaps they will attempt to diversify their risk by filing
a larger number of lawsuits. 4 ' Rather than spending substantial time

135. Because the PSLRA also provides for a stay of discovery until after resolution of
defendants' motions to dismiss, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(b) (2000), plaintiffs' counsel faces an
increased likelihood that its complaint will fail to meet the statute's enhanced pleading
requirements. Thomas, supra note 135, at 192. According to one study, judges dismissed
24.3% of securities class actions on motions by defendants in 2001. Bruce Rubenstein,
Congressman Fights to Amend 1995 Reform Act: Enron-Andersen Debacle Spurs an Uprising on
the Hill, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 2002, at 16 (citing study by Woodruff-Sawyer & Co.
comparing 2001 dismissal rate of 24.3% to 1994 pre-PSLRA dismissal rate of 8.8%). A 1999
study found that dismissals as a percentage of dispositions more than doubled after enactment
of the PSLRA, from 12% to 25%. TRENDS VI, supra note 58, at 6 (attributing the increase to
the PSLRA's heightened pleading standards).
136. Research trends show,
The rate of disposition of federal court cases appears to have slowed somewhat in
the post-PSLRA period ....We hypothesize that this downward trend is the result
of the PSLRA provision that stays discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending,
which has, in turn, slowed the rate of settlements.
TRENDS VI, supra note 58, at 6.
137. Thomas, supra note 135, at 191. The selection of lead counsel under the PSLRA is
discussed infra Part III.
138. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 528 n.19 (1986)
("[E]xperienced lawyers can make a prediction about the success of a representation and can
refuse to accept cases that are too risky or settle them quickly at any available figure and thus
avoid risking much lawyer capital.").
139. However, recent studies indicate that the median settlement value in securities class
actions has increased as well. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, FEDERAL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
CASES FILED AND DEFENDANT MARKET CAP LOSSES SURGE IN 2001, at 2 (2002) (reporting
$5.5 million median settlement value for cases settled from 1996 through 2001, as compared
to $4.0 million for sample cases pre-PSLRA), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/
scac-press/20020315 CR SCAC.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2003).
140. Thomas, supra note 135, at 193 ("The Reform Act may... make it more important
[for plaintiffs' counsel] to have a diversified portfolio in order to spread the [increased
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and resources on any one case to the benefit of class members,
counsel instead may choose to prosecute an expanded portfolio of
actions, making more minimal investments in many more actions
(recognizing the potential for sanctions 1 '), with the expectation that
a small number will become "winners" and result in large fee awards.
This rational strategy reduces the risks for class counsel' 4 2 but does
not maximize the returns for defrauded investors.
(2) Difficulties in negotiating compensation ex ante. By
negotiating contingent fee agreements up front, informed clients
may direct the performance of counsel and provide incentives
designed to reduce agency costs. The success of such ex ante
compensation contracts in reducing agency costs generally hinges on
three factors: (1) the principal's ability to assess accurately the risk of
opportunism, which is a function of the principal's experience,
sophistication, and access to information about the agent's behavior
in prior comparable transactions; (2) the principal's capacity to
diversify to reduce the risk of agent opportunism; and (3) the
competitiveness of the market for the agent's services.14
Contingency fee agreements can be difficult to tailor because of the
difficulty in predicting outcomes and in tying outcomes to attorney
effort.' 4 4 This problem becomes more pronounced in litigation
involving unique issues of great legal and/or factual complexity.
Class actions pose special challenges for reducing agency costs
through ex ante compensation agreements insofar as putative class
counsel cannot bargain with absent class members ex ante. Indeed,
compensation agreements between counsel and the class could be
deemed unenforceable for two reasons. First, the "class" cannot
contract with counsel before counsel files the complaint. The class
litigation] risks."). Professor Coffee discussed risk-spreading by plaintiffs' counsel as an
explanation for "strike suits" in Unfaithful Champion, supra note 132, at 20-23.
141. Congress attempted to reduce the number of strike suits by strengthening the
potential sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11 for filing frivolous complaints. See 15 U.S.C. §
77z-1(c)(3)(A)(ii), 78u-4(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2000).
142. See Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1988) ("In the
common fund context, attorneys whose compensation depends on their winning the case,
must make up in compensation in the cases they win for the lack of compensation in the cases
they lose.").
143. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review' of Fiduciary Decision Making-Some
TheoreticalPerspectives,80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 5-16 (1985).
144. See Bruce L. Hay, Optimal Contingent Fees in a World of Settlement, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 259 (1997).
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does not exist as a legal entity until the court certifies it, and absent
class members are not bound in the litigation until they receive
notice and have the opportunity to opt out of the class. Second, the
court ultimately must approve the fees and expenses awarded to class
counsel, a determination made at the conclusion of the case.14 For
these reasons, before securities reform empowered lead plaintiffs to
select and retain counsel,' 4 6 many agreements between putative class
counsel and putative class representatives simply provided that the
court would set the fees for services rendered.'4 7
Having examined the agency theory underlying the need to
regulate the private attorney general in securities class action
litigation-and comprehending the limitations of principal
monitoring, agent bonding, and ex ante contracting for reducing
opportunistic behavior by plaintiffs' bar-the next Part describes
how the courts traditionally exercised oversight by deciding the fees
awarded to class counsel. After reviewing the classical model and the
substantial obstacles to effective judicial regulation of plaintiffs'
lawyers, we can understand better Congress's 1995 efforts to reform
securities class actions by empowering lead plaintiffs.
II. REDUCING AGENCY COSTS THROUGH
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

In its current form, Rule 23 itself does not mandate that the
courts decide class counsel's compensation. Federal courts instead
award attorneys' fees and costs to class counsel under a stilldeveloping line of precedent.14 Prior to securities litigation reform,
judges were guided by the deceptively simple principle that they
should award "reasonable attorneys' fees" to class counsel who
create common funds benefiting investors. However, almost since
the enactment of Rule 23 in 1966, judges and academics have
debated the meaning of "reasonable." Reasonable in relation to what
the lawyers could obtain in a functioning market? Reasonable to
compensate counsel for work actually performed or work forgone?
145. See discussion infra Part I.
146. See discussion infra Part III.
147. Nanette L. Stasko, Competitive Bidding in the Courthouse: In re Oracle Securities
Litigation, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1667, 1672 & n.19 (1994) (reciting typical provision in
retainer agreement).
148. Although not pertaining to class actions specifically, courts have awarded attorneys'
fees under the common-fund doctrine by invoking FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2).
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Reasonable in relation to the benefit achieved for the class?
Reasonable in relation to the risk assumed by counsel in prosecuting
the case? Reasonable to provide counsel with a return on investment
such that other private attorneys general are encouraged to represent
defrauded investors?
Furthermore, no consensus exists for how judges should
determine reasonable fees. The only noncontroversial norms
established in the common-fund jurisprudence are (1) judges should
not allow their review of fee applications to create "a second major
litigation," and (2) judges must set forth clearly the reasons for their
awards.' 49 Although appellate panels review fee decisions for abuse of
discretion,'5 ° the courts of appeals recently have reversed a number
of district court awards, apparently recognizing the "special
responsibility upon appellate courts to hear challenges to fee awards
by class members whose claims may have been reduced or in some
way negatively affected in exchange for large fee awards.''. From
the inception of the modern class action, trial courts have used one
of two methods (or both) to calculate reasonable attorneys' fees. The
judiciary has despaired of both approaches.
A. Competing Methodsfor CalculatingReasonable Fees Ex Post
In the years immediately following the adoption of Rule 23,
courts awarded attorneys' fees based on a fixed percentage of the
total recovery obtained for the class. Few reported decisions initially
questioned the wisdom of such an approach; courts seem to have
analogized to familiar contingency fee contracts because the
percentage-of-recovery method compensates lawyers by awarding
them some percentage of the amount recovered from defendants
through settlement or trial. However, as the class action device
became used with greater frequency, judges increasingly became
uncomfortable with the large fee awards generated under the

149. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
150. Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting
that appellate courts give a "great deal of deference to a district court's decision to set fees").
151. In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 728 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing
district court); see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 280-86 (3d Cir. 2001);
Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439 (10th Cir. 1995); Cnter,223 F.3d at 190. In nonsecurities
class actions, too, the courts of appeal recently have reversed lower courts' fee awards. See, e.g., In re
Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2001) (antitrust class action).
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percentage-of-recovery approach, 1 2 and some jurists voiced concern
about the impact of such awards on the public's perception of the
bar." 3 Thus, beginning in the early 1970s, and for the next two
decades, most judges refocused their fee analyses on the time and
effort expended by counsel rather than simply the results obtained
for the class. Courts accomplished this shift by awarding fees using
the lodestar method, abandoning (for a time) the percentage-ofrecovery method."5 4 Under the lodestar approach, judges first
calculate a "lodestar fee" by fixing a reasonable hourly rate for class
counsel and multiplying that rate by the amount of hours spent (or
reasonably spent) by counsel. In determining the reasonable hourly
rate, courts typically review the rates charged by attorneys of like
experience and skill in the community. Judges may then adjust the
lodestar fee up or down using a "multiplier" in consideration of,
among other factors, the risk undertaken by counsel in litigating the
case on a contingency fee basis.
In 1985, the Third Circuit convened a blue ribbon panel to
consider the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the two
alternative approaches for calculating fee awards in common-fund
class actions. The Task Force criticized the lodestar methodology for
creating conflicts of interest between counsel and the class by
motivating counsel to prolong the litigation, engage in unproductive
and unnecessary tasks, staff litigation activities redundantly,
exaggerate the number of hours actually worked, and inflate their
billing rates.' For these reasons, among others,5 6 the final report
sanctioned the percentage-of-recovery approach in order to
compensate attorneys according to the size of the recovery obtained
for the class rather than the hours expended by the lawyers. The
152. Bennett A. McConaughy, Back to the Future: Use of Percentage Fee Arrangements in
Common Fund Litigation, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 43, 44-46 (1988) (asserting that
percentage fees were typical in class actions prior to adoption of the lodestar but created
windfalls for class counsel relative to the time and effort expended).
153. As the Third Circuit explained, "unless time spent and skill displayed [are] used as a
constant check on applications for fees there is a grave danger that the bar and bench will be
brought into disrepute." Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting Cherner v. Transition Elec. Corp., 221 F.
Supp. 55, 61 (D. Mass. 1963)).
154. Id. (initiating use of lodestar method).
155. Task Force 1985 Report, supranote 54, at 247-49.
156. Among the problems noted in the Report, the Task Force found that the lodestar
method caused great expenditures of scarce judicial resources and produced inconsistent and
unpredictable results. Id. at 246-49.
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panel also recognized that awarding fees at the conclusion of the
litigation would require courts to evaluate class counsel's efforts in
hindsight and would eliminate the ability to align the incentives of
counsel with the interests of the class. Thus, the Task Force further
recommended that presiding judges establish "at the earliest
practicable moment" a "percentage fee arrangement agreeable to the
Bench and to plaintiffs counsel." ' 7
B. Using Benchmarks to Simplify Ex Post Decision-making
Following publication of the Third Circuit Task Force's advisory
(but influential) final report in 1985, district courts throughout the
country increasingly utilized the percentage-of-recovery approach to
award attorneys' fees in securities class actions,"' and the federal
courts of appeals sanctioned, if not mandated, use of that
methodology."5 9 Yet, with few exceptions, courts failed to adopt the
report's recommendation that judges (or their agents) negotiate and
establish the percentage fee early in the case. Presiding judges
seemed to take care to avoid the subject of class counsel's incentives
157. Id. at 255. The Task Force assumed that the "earliest practicable moment" would
occur "immediately after the pleadings are closed and before discovery is fully underway." Id.
at 255 n.62. Academics endorsed the percentage-of-recovery approach for reducing agency
costs by linking counsel's rewards to the results counsel achieved for the class. See
Understandingthe Plaintiff'sAtty, supra note 10, at 724; Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at
59.
158. Alexander, supra note 46, at 349 ("Recently, there has been a trend in common
fund cases away from the lodestar and toward a return to the percentage-of-the-recovery
method of calculating fees."); Willging, supra note 48, at 156; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (THIRD) § 24.122 (1995).
159. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Barry, 43 F.3d 474, 487 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding the district
court abused its discretion by using lodestar/multiplier method rather than percentage-ofrecovery); In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir.
1994); In re Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
district courts may use either method to calculate fees, but percentage method is preferred, and
courts should simulate "what the market in fact pays not for the individual hours but for the
ensemble of services rendered in a case of this character").
Courts of appeals also endorsed the percentage-of-recovery approach in nonsecurities,
common-fund class actions. See, e.g., In re Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of San Juan Dupont
Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d 295, 307 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995); Swedish Hosp. Corp. v.
Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Percentage-of-the -fund is the appropriate
mechanism in awarding fees in common fund [class actions.]"); Camden I Condo. Ass'n v.
Dunkel, 946 F.2d 768, 774 (11th Cir. 1991) (mandating that "[h]enceforth in this circuit,
attorneys' fees awarded from a common fund shall be based upon a reasonable percentage of
the fund established for the benefit of the class").
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and compensation until the conclusion of the litigation, at which
time judges could consider various factors in setting the percentage,
including the risk associated with litigating the case, the efforts of
counsel, and the result obtained for the class.16 ° However, to avoid
speculating ex post about class counsel's real risks of nonrecovery or
engaging in time-consuming ex post investigations of counsel's
productivity or attempting to determine the impact of a proposed fee
award on the incentives for the plaintiffs' bar going forward, courts
employed a simple heuristic. Specifically, courts facing the
complexity and uncertainty associated with post hoc review of fee
applications
simplified their decision-making
by adopting
benchmarks to assess the reasonableness of the percentage of the
fund requested by class counsel. 6' In securities class actions, courts
came to rely on a presumption that class counsel are entitled to an
award of between 25% and 33% of the amount recovered from the
defendants through settlement.162 "[D]istrict courts across the
nation ... apparently eased into a practice of 'systematically'
awarding fees in the 25% range, 'regardless of type of case, benefits
to the class, numbers of hours billed, size of fund, size of plaintiff
class, or any other relevant factor."",16 3 A court departing from the
benchmark up or down must explain the reasons for its decision,' 64
further motivating judicial adherence to the benchmark.
A review of numerous reported decisions fails to reveal the basis
for the notion that the benchmark fee is reasonable. To be sure, fee

160. On rare occasions, a certifying court might require counsel to submit periodic
reports documenting counsel's work on behalf of the class. See Fischer Bros. v. Cambridge-Lee
Indus., Inc., No. 82-4921, 1987 WL 26480, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1987); see also In re
Am. Integrity Sec. Litig., No. CIV.A.86-7133, 1989 WL 89316, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8,
1989) (entering pretrial orders designating the lead counsel and setting forth the monthly
process by which counsel would submit contemporaneous time records for review by the
named plaintiff, who then would submit records to the court).
161. See, e.g., Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272-73 (9th Cir.
1989) (establishing that a 25% benchmark fee is proper in common-fund cases). The Ninth
Circuit cited with approval Mashburn v. National Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 692
(M.D. Ala. 1988), which relied upon a study of fees awarded in the Third Circuit under the
Lindy lodestar regime. The study was presented by U.S. District Judge Thomas A. Masterson
at the 1977 Third Circuit Judicial Conference and was cited in the Task Force 1985 Report.
162. See supranote 61 and accompanying text.
163. Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2000).
164. See, e.g., Graulty, 886 F.2d at 273 (explaining that a departure from the benchmark
upward or downward must be accompanied by "a reasonable explanation of why the
benchmark is unreasonable under the circumstances").
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awards have become more predictable under the benchmark
percentage approach, and the use of benchmarks conserves judicial
65
resources otherwise spent reviewing voluminous fee petitions.1
However, courts adopting this heuristic appear simply to "rubberstamp" class counsel's applications for attorneys' fees (at least those
applications submitted in conjunction with motions for approval of
settlement 166) without regard to the quality of the representation, the
work performed, or the risk assumed by the lawyers. 167 In awarding
fees using a simple benchmark standard, judges seldom refer to the
market for class counsel's services 68 and make no attempt to test the
"reasonableness" of the benchmark against a fee recoverable in the
market.169 Rather, courts simply look to the percentage fee applied
by other courts that previously engaged in the same endeavor.
Application of the percentage-of-recovery approach with the use
of standard benchmarks has produced the most controversial fee
awards in cases generating megasettlements and in cases settling at
an early stage of the litigation. 7 ' When the settlement creates a
megafund or when counsel negotiates a speedy conclusion to the
lawsuit, percentage fee awards appear to be grossly excessive. Judicial
application of a 25% to 33% benchmark to a common fund of $100
million or more produces an eight-figure fee likely to engender
criticism. 71 Yet, even if the case settles for a more modest amount
soon after the filing of the complaint, the question may be raised:
what could the lawyers possibly do to earn their 25-33% fee?
165. Monique Lapointe, Note, Attorney's Fees in Common Fund Actions, 59 FORDHAM
L. REv. 843, 866 (1991).
166. Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 48 ("Judges rarely reject fee petitions presented
as part of a settlement.").
167. Fisch, supra note 62, at 60.
168. Prior to the PSLRA, the Seventh Circuit did mandate that district courts use a
market-based approach to setting the percentage fee. In re Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d
566, 568 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (noting that in awarding fees, presiding judges should
"determine what the lawyer would receive if he were selling his services in the market rather
than being paid by court order").
169. But see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 447 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Judges awarding fees must make certain that attorneys are paid
the full value that their efforts would receive on the open market .... ").
170. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 109
F.3d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that a 25% benchmark might be "arbitrary" if the
common fund was extremely large).
171. The fees awarded to counsel retained by the states to prosecute claims against
tobacco companies incited a similar uproar. See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, The Great Tobacco
Robbery, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at 27.
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Compared to the actual hours expended using a dollars-per-hourworked calculation, the fees associated with large settlement funds
and early resolutions seem disproportionate to the value obtained for
the class through counsel's efforts and skills. In these circumstances,
courts adhering to the benchmark percentage appear to
overcompensate counsel by awarding a large monetary fee for little
work rendered, for counsel assuming little risk, or for both.' 72
Intuitively, "it is not ten times as difficult to prepare, and try or settle
a ten million dollar case as it is to try a one million dollar case."' 7 3
However, when courts do balk at awarding the benchmark and
instead award a reduced percentage fee, those judges also may
receive criticism for acting arbitrarily.' 74
C. Criticismsof Ex PostJudicialRegulation Generally
Regardless of the methodology adopted, courts and
commentators alike have recognized that ex post judicial regulation
of class counsel's compensation is both costly and likely ineffective in
reducing agency costs. Commentators have pointed out that judges
lack both the necessary resources 7 ' and the expertise' 7 6 to review fee
172. Courts have recognized that the size of the fund may impact their ability to properly
assess class counsel's fee request. See, e.g., In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19
F.3d 1291, 1297 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing fees awarded from $687 million settlement fund)
("[I]n determining fee awards in class actions, it is especially important that judges not be
unduly influenced by the monetary size of the settlement. A sizable settlement can reflect a
number of factors in addition to the prestige, skill and vigor of Class counsel." (citation
omitted)). However, some commentators have argued that the percentage applied by the
courts should not decrease simply because counsel has obtained a larger fund. See, e.g., Reagan
W. Silber & Frank E. Goodrich, Common Funds and Common Problems: Fee Objections and
Class Counsel'sResponse, 17 REv. LITIG. 525 (1998).
173. In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prod. Bus. Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160, 166
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
174. See Martha Pacold, Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-Sbifting Statutes,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1021 (2001) ("In the 1970s, many courts began to view the
percentage method as problematic because it generated windfalls for attorneys in cases with
exceptionally large funds. Some courts avoided this problem by reducing the percentage
awarded. However, this exposed the method to criticism as unprincipled.").
175. Frank H. Easterbrook, What's So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 773,
778-79 (1990) (reciting the resource limitations affecting judicial decision making). One
important resource is simply time. "[T]he average class action demands considerably more
judge time than the average civil case." Willging, supra note 48, at 96 (reporting the results of
a sample of cases from a then-recent District Court Time Study conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center).
176. According to one recent paper examining judicial opinions in securities fraud
litigation, most federal judges have little experience in securities law prior to taking the bench
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petitions. In order to make optimal decisions about reasonable
attorney compensation, courts must acquire accurate information
about projected litigation outcomes, the lawyers' investments, their
settlement evaluations, the history of the negotiations, and the other
factors necessary either to value the lawyers' services under the
lodestar approach or to set a contingent fee under the percentage-ofrecovery approach. In addition, some important information is
within the exclusive province of the lawyers themselves. "The critical
factors in evaluating a settlement are the timing of settlement
opportunities and amounts left 'on the table.' A court will almost
never have reliable information on these factors."' 7 7 Class counsel
certainly will not volunteer to share such closely guarded information
with the judge.
Furthermore, particularly when judges evaluate fee applications
at the conclusion of the litigation, they cannot rely on the parties
themselves to provide required information. Defendants often have
agreed to keep silent concerning the pending fee application, having
consented to a "clear sailing" provision in the settlement
documents.'7 8 Disaffected absent class members lack information and
incentives to challenge the fee application, and they also have
insufficient stakes in obtaining a reduction of the requested fee to

and little interest or incentive in developing substantial expertise in the area after confirmation.
Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way
Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb inSecurities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J.
83, 103 (2002). Judges also lack recent experience in the market necessary to evaluate fee
applications. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 696 (N.D. Cal. 1990) ("To the
extent that a judge ever possessed such first-hand knowledge [necessary to evaluate fee
applications], it rapidly becomes out of date. Judges who believe that they have any special
expertise on this subject are simply fooling themselves (but probably no one else).").
177. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 692 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
178. Professor Coffee explained how clear sailing provisions-agreements to remain
silent--disable the reviewing courts:
If the defendant agrees not to object to the plaintiff's fee request, there is little
prospect that the court will engage in an elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of
the hours expended by the plaintiff's attorney. Not only does the court have little
incentive to undertake such an inquiry, but when the defendants agree not to
oppose plaintiff's fee request they deprive the court of the only adversary who truly
knows if the time was reasonably expended. Put simply, it is the adversary and not
the court who best understands the justifications (or lack thereof) for the work the
plaintiff's attorney has done. Denied this information by the de facto settlement
agreement, the court is itself a relatively poor and undermotivated monitor of the
plaintiff attorney's performance.
Unfaithful Champion, supra note 131, at 35.
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organize or retain separate representation. They are rationally
apathetic. Thus, when reviewing class counsel's fee petition at the
end of the case, "the court is abandoned by the adversary
system . . . . Rarely do the settling defendants . . . offer any
counterpoint; rarely do members of the class come forward with any
response or opposition to the fees sought. There are no amici curiae
who volunteer their advice."' 7 9 Particularly if no class members have
objected to the fee petition, "[a]ll the dynamics conduce to judicial
approval,"'. 8 ° and the judge likely will accept the settlement package
presented by former adversaries. 8 '
In addition to lacking the information necessary to award
reasonable compensation to counsel, judges reviewing fee
applications at the conclusion of the litigation likely suffer from
hindsight bias.' 82 Because judges, like other human beings, have
difficulty assessing the ex ante predictability of outcomes after the
fact, ' they cannot evaluate impartially the reasonableness of class
counsel's fee requests ex post. When the judge learns the outcome of
the class action (typically, the amount of the settlement negotiated
by the parties), that knowledge will alter her perception of what risks
preceded the settlement, particularly the risks faced by class counsel
at the inception of the case. For example, if the lawyers negotiate a

179. In reActivision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
180. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting), affd en bane by equally divided court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965).
181. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 103, at 152-53 & nn.142-45 (reviewing empirical
evidence supporting the contention that courts are "extremely reluctant to reject proposed
class action settlements" and usually award "the full fee requested"); Rhode, supra note 50, at
1218-19 ("Effectively monitoring class counsel's representation could require more personal
innuendo and factual investigation than many trial judges are disposed to supply.").
182. Hindsight bias describes the tendency for people to overestimate the predictability
of past events. Psychologists have determined that when we learn outcomes, we update our
beliefs, relying on the new beliefs to generate conclusions about what was predictable, without
recognizing that learning the outcome changed the beliefs. See Baruch Fischhoff, For Those
Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) ("In
hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight. They
not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but also to view it as having
appeared 'relatively inevitable' before it happened. People believe that others should have been
able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case.").
183. For a comprehensive discussion of how hindsight bias affects judges, see Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571
(1998) (arguing that even judges who understand the influence of hindsight bias cannot
correct for it).
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settlement before the court decides defendants' motion to dismiss,
the judge may perceive that counsel should receive a fee lower than
counsel has requested, even if the early settlement produced a large
common fund. In hindsight, it would appear to the court that
counsel in that case did not face a serious risk of nonrecovery. On
the other hand, a judge may lean toward awarding higher fees in a
case where counsel settled only after surviving the defendants'
impassioned entreaties for the court to dismiss the complaint and
their vigorous oppositions to class certification, even if the settlement
negotiated represents a relatively small recovery of the losses suffered
by the class. In hindsight, it would appear to the court that counsel
exerted great effort to obtain the result achieved. Counsel in the
second case may receive a larger fee as both a percentage of the fund
and even in actual numbers, yet the outcome secured by the lawyers
in the first case clearly benefited the class more. For judges reviewing
fee applications at the conclusion of the litigation, "hindsight alters
the perception of the suit's riskiness, and sunk costs make it
impossible for the lawyers to walk away if the fee is too low."' 8 4
Absent mechanisms to avoid or reduce its influence, hindsight
bias poses a troublesome problem for judges evaluating fee requests
ex post, resulting in judicial awards that may diverge significantly
from the compensation arrangement that the class could have
negotiated with counsel at the outset of the litigation." In any given
case, the court may overcompensate counsel, thereby harming absent
class members, or undercompensate counsel, thereby injuring the
petitioning lawyers as well as diminishing the incentives for attorneys
to represent investor classes in the future." 6 With regard to the latter
possibility, Justice Scalia recently observed,

184. In reSynthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2001).
185. The Seventh Circuit has analogized ex post judicial regulation of attorneys' fees with
"a public utilities commission, regulating the fees of counsel after the services have been
performed, thereby combining the difficulties of rate regulation with the inequities of
retrospective rate-setting." Kirchoffv. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1986).
186. In reWash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994)
("A large segment of the public might be denied a remedy for violations of the securities laws if
contingent fees awarded by the courts did not fairly compensate counsel for the services
provided and the risks undertaken." (citation omitted)); see also In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131
F.R.D. 688, 693 n.l (N.D. Cal. 1990) ("[U]ncertainty about compensation affects not only
the litigation at hand, but also 'incentives in future roughly comparable cases."' (citation
omitted)).
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It is ... something quite irrational-to look at the consequences of a
contingent-fee agreement after the contingencies have been resolved,
and proclaim those consequences unreasonable because the
attorney has received too much money for too little work. That is

rather like declaring the purchase of the winning lottery ticket void
because of the gross 18
disparity
between the $2 ticket price and the
7
million-dollar payout.
Other scholars-some adopting the "view of the lawyer as a
calculating entrepreneur regulated by calculating judges,"'-have
questioned the courts' motivation to scrutinize fee applications
carefully. 9 Although judges have voiced concerns from time to time
about how the public perceives their fee awards in securities class
actions,' 90 some critics have questioned the courts' sensitivity to
public concerns about the entrepreneurial plaintiffs' bar.' 9'
Institutional pressures to clear the courts' dockets also may motivate
some jurists to approve summarily counsel's fee request. Judges
typically receive fee petitions in conjunction with the parties'
motions for settlement approval. If the court rejects the class action
settlement, a complex and time-consuming case remains on the
judge's docket. Faced with congested dockets, district courts
"frequently se[e] little incentive to delve deeply into an uncontested
matter that is being resolved on terms similar to [those] approved in
other cases by well-respected jurists. ' ' Finally, as some judges have
admitted candidly, the courts simply do not relish the task of
187. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 811 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473,
481 (1981).
189. See, e.g., Koniak & Cohen, supra note 92, at 1122-30 (asserting that judges serve
their own self-interests by approving settlements in order to clear their dockets); Charles W.
Wolfram, Mass Torts-Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1228, 1233 (1995) (noting judicial
incentives toward settlement); Rhode, supra note 50, at 1219 ("Where the pressures to clear
dockets are substantial, the costs of smoking out conflict may seem prohibitive.").
190. See, e.g., Rothfarb v. Hambrecht, 641 F. Supp. 71, 74 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("This
Court is keenly aware of its duty to protect the absent plaintiff class members, and determined
to avoid ... even the appearance of having awarded windfall fees .... " (citations omitted)); In
re Capital Underwriters, Inc. Sec. Litig., 519 F. Supp. 92, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("Excessive
fees have a broader detrimental effect as well on the continued usefulness of the class action
mechanism since such awards provoke criticism of the legal profession and class representation
in particular."), affd in part,vacated in part,705 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1983).
191. See Matt Smith, Soft Firm, S.F. WEEKLY, May 29, 2002, at 13 ("[J]udges, attorneys
all, don't necessarily share the layman's view that lawyer profiteering is a form of social
malaise.").
192. Grundfest Proposal, supra note 61, at 7.
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deciding attorneys' compensation.19 3 No doubt Justice William
Brennan expressed the opinion of many jurists when he observed
that disputes about attorneys' fees are "one of the least socially
productive types of litigation imaginable."' 94 Not surprisingly, then,
under these decision-making restraints and biases, the express use of
benchmarks became the prevailing judicial norm for awarding fees to
class counsel.
III. REDUCING AGENCY COSTS BY EMPOWERING LEAD PLAINTIFFS
Whether empirically valid or not, the popular and theoretically
supported perception that class counsel receive windfall fees from
private securities lawsuits enabled proponents of litigation reform to
garner bipartisan support for legislative action in 1995.'9' Both the
statutory language and the legislative history of the PSLRA make
manifest Congress's concern that securities class counsel, if left
unmonitored, will behave in ways that harm both absent class
members and the private enforcement system generally.' 96 Most
federal lawmakers agreed that the mechanisms and procedures for
controlling class counsel, including through ex post judicial
regulation of attorneys' compensation, had failed to reduce
opportunistic behavior by the plaintiffs' securities bar.' 97 Having
determined that abusive securities litigation was "lawyer-driven,"
Congress attempted to transfer control of the lawsuits from the

193. Charles Kocoras points out,
The idea of getting enmeshed in determining how much a client should pay his
lawyer is distasteful and unappetizing. Lawyers' fee issues, whether arising as part of
a contingent fee contract or by virtue of statutory or other types of considerations,
do not rank high on a judge's menu of things he or she cannot wait to address.
Charles Kocoras, Contingency Fees-A Judge'sPerch, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 421,422 (1998).
194. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 442 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195. "Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act seven years ago out of
a sense that a few select firms were minting money by shaking down innocent companies on
behalf of imaginary clients." Greg Mitchell, Let a Thousand Lerachs Bloom, RECORDER, July
19, 2002, at 2.
196. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 6-7 (1995) (criticizing plaintiffs' class action counsel for,
among other things, "often negotiat[ing] settlement[s] that resulted in huge profits for the law
firms with only marginal recovery for the shareholders").
197. Fisch, supra note 62, at 94 ("It is also fair to read the adoption of the PSLRA as
reflecting some degree of congressional skepticism about the ability of the courts effectively to
supervise the process of selecting class counsel ....
[J]udicial control over plaintiff's attorneys'
fees, coupled with the courts' reluctance to refuse fee requests or to deviate from traditional
benchmarks, has led to excessive fee awards.").
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plaintiffs' bar to the investors whom the bar purports to represent. In
so doing, lawmakers altered the responsibilities of federal benches
presiding over securities class actions.
A. CongressAdopts the Empowered Lead PlaintiffModel
The PSLRA includes new class action procedures designed to
"increase the likelihood that parties with significant holdings in
issuers, whose interests are more strongly aligned with the class of
shareholders, will participate in the litigation and exercise control
over the selection and actions of plaintiff's counsel."' 98 These
innovative rules changed the way courts appoint class representatives
in securities cases.' 99 The PSLRA's appointment scheme favors
investors with the largest financial losses-presumably institutional
investors-based upon the assumption that these investors'
substantial stakes provide them with the economic incentive to
represent the class voluntarily and diligently."' As the appointed
representatives of the class, large investors would be in a position to
monitor class counsel and, in the words of Weiss and Beckerman,
"assess whether plaintiffs' attorneys are acting as faithful champions
20
for the plaintiff class." '
The PSLRA thus mandates that presiding judges appoint as "lead
plaintiff" the "most adequate plaintiff." The most adequate plaintiff
is the person or group of persons whom "the court determines to be
most capable of adequately representing the interests of class
members., 212 Presumptively, the most adequate plaintiff is the
investor seeking to be appointed (via motion) who has "the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class [who] . . . otherwise
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23.,,2°" By adopting this rule and
thus embracing the so-called "empowered lead plaintiff model" of
198. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 32.
199. The genesis of these provisions is the influential work of Professors Weiss and
Beckerman, whose article is cited in the legislative history. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note
74, at 2053.
200. Weiss and Beckerman asserted that most putative classes in securities cases included
shareholders whose interests were large enough to create a strong proprietary interest in the
litigation, and their model assumes that shareholders with more significant interests in the
litigation could more effectively represent the interests of absent class members because they
would have the economic incentive to control the lawyers for the class. Id. at 2088-2104.
201. Id. at 2095.

202. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000).
203. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
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class representation, Congress intended to "encourage institutional
investors to take a more active role in securities class action lawsuits"
in order to "ultimately benefit shareholders and assist courts by
improving the quality of representation" of absent class members.2 °4
While the statute does not give express preference to institutions, the
legislative history reflects the lawmakers' prediction that "courts
[w]ould be more confident [that] settlements negotiated under the
supervision of institutional plaintiffs were 'fair and reasonable' than is
the case with settlements negotiated by unsupervised plaintiffs'
attorneys."2 °5 The statute provides that the presumption in favor of
the person(s) with the largest financial stake may be rebutted only
"upon proof that. . . the presumptively most adequate plaintiff...
will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class[,]
2 6
or ... is subject to unique defenses., 1
The PSLRA also mandates that the lead plaintiff will "select and
retain counsel to represent the class," subject to court approval.2 °7
Weiss and Beckerman had argued that the courts should defer to the
lead plaintiff's discretion in negotiating and setting attorneys' fees,20 8
and they believed that institutions seeking to represent the class
would be in a position to negotiate fee arrangements with proposed
counsel for the class prior to the filing of the complaint.20 9 However,
the statute is silent as to the criteria or method that the lead plaintiff
should employ in selecting and retaining counsel. Nor does the law
dictate that the lead plaintiff must monitor counsel's efforts and
participate in settlement decisions. Nonetheless, a handful of district
courts have opined on the importance of the lead plaintiff
204. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 34. "The Conference Committee seeks to
increase the likelihood that institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs by requiring courts
to presume that the member of the purported class with the largest financial stake in the relief
sought is the 'most adequate plaintiff."' Id.
205. Id. at 35 (quoting Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 74, at 2105); see also Gluck v.
CelIStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("The legislative history of the
Reform Act is replete with statements of Congress's desire to put control of [securities]
litigation in the hands of large, institutional investors.").
206. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).
207. Once appointed as lead plaintiff, the most adequate plaintiff "shall, subject to the
approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class." 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3)(B)(v).
208. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 74, at 2105.
209. Id. at 2107. The authors also predicted that these fee arrangements might differ
substantially from the fee structures courts had approved in securities class actions. Id. at
2122-23.
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negotiating a reasonable fee agreement with putative lead counsel.2"'
The legislative history also indicates that Congress empowered the
lead plaintiff to select class counsel in order to foster competitive
bidding among law firms for class representation or, at the very least,
to generate actual fee negotiations between prospective class counsel
and the lead plaintiff, acting for the benefit of the class. 2 '
The statute does not set forth the standard for judicial review of
the lead plaintiff's performance of its duties, whatever those duties
might be.2 12 The legislative history notes that lawmakers "expect[ed]
that the plaintiff will choose counsel rather than, as [wa]s true
[previously], counsel choosing the plaintiff."2 3 Yet the same
legislative history also advises that Congress intended to preserve
"the court's discretion under existing law to approve or disapprove
the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel when necessary to protect the
interests of the plaintiff class.""214 And, although lawmakers seem to
have intended that the appointed lead plaintiff would monitor class
counsel, the PSLRA did not disturb the several legal rules mandating
judicial oversight of securities class actions as well. Not only must
presiding judges approve the lead plaintiff's selection and retention
of lead counsel under the PSLRA, but, per Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 ' district courts still must certify the
putative class, requiring a determination of, among other things,

210. See In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189 F.R.D. 91, 116 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting the fee
should be "the result of hard bargaining"); In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp.
2d 1017, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("The lead plaintiff owes a fiduciary duty to obtain the
highest quality representation at the lowest price.").
211. Cox, supra note 28, at 516.
212. Weiss and Beckerman recognized that institutions might decline to participate as
lead plaintiffs. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 74, at 2095. However, Congress attempted to
reassure potential lead plaintiffs that they would not face undue liability as a result of their
participation by including in the legislative history a statement that "the most adequate plaintiff
provision does not confer any new fiduciary duty on institutional investors-and the courts
should not impose such a duty .... " CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 34.
213. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 35.
214. Id.
215. The proposed revisions to Rule 23 also are designed to "assur[e] appropriate judicial
oversight of class action litigation from stem to stern, from certification, to class counsel
appointment, to settlement approval, and finally to attorney fee awards." Memorandum from
David F. Levi, Chair of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to
Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
5 (July 31, 2001), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment 2002/8-01CV.pdf.
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representational adequacy." 6 Further, courts still must approve any
settlement of the class's claims,"1 7 although, in practice, judges rarely
determine that class counsel agreed to settle a case for less than its
fair value.218 Finally, district courts retain their authority to award
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to plaintiffs' counsel and to make
appropriate orders "for the protection of the members of the
21 9
class.
With this understanding of the reform model adopted by
Congress, the next section explores the courts' post-reform
regulation of class counsel's compensation.

216. In order to certify a class, the district court must find that the putative class meets
four threshold requirements found in Rule 23(a)-numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation. In addition, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), the court must find that
common questions "predominate over any questions affecting only individual members" of the
class and that resolution of the claims on a classwide basis be "superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
With regard to representational adequacy (FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)), many federal courts have
interpreted this requirement to apply not just to the named plaintiffs but also to their
attorneys. See, e.g., Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1994). Further, the court
may reevaluate the adequacy of the named plaintiffs or class counsel to represent the class at
the time of settlement if the court previously certified the class. If necessary, the court may
decertify the class or replace the representatives. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD)
§ 30.16 (1995).
217. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). Although Rule 23(e) itself does not describe the procedure,
much less the criteria, that judges should employ in deciding whether to approve a proposed
settlement, courts often hold a hearing to consider whether the settlement proposed by class
counsel and the defendants is fair, adequate, and reasonable. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick,
698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The central question raised by the proposed settlement of a
class action is whether the compromise is fair, reasonable and adequate."); 4 ALBA CONTE &
HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.43 (4th ed. 2002) (listing criteria
used in determining whether a judgment is "fair, reasonable, and adequate"). Courts tend to
assess the substantive fairness of the proposed settlement by comparing the amount of the
proposed settlement with the estimated amount of the aggregate loss incurred by the class,
discounted by the likelihood that the plaintiff class would prevail at a trial of the merits, and
reduced by the costs of litigating the case through trial. Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 682-83 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing how to calculate
settlement value and explaining that "[a] settlement is fair to the plaintiffs in a substantive
sense ... if it gives them the expected value of their claim if it went to trial, net of the costs of

trial").
218. A study of class action settlements in four federal districts found that
"[a]pproximately 90% or more of the proposed settlements were approved without changes."
Willging, supra note 48, at 141. Thus, some scholars have argued that judicial oversight of
settlements is ineffective in reducing agency costs. See, e.g., Class Action Accountability, supra
note 96, at 438 ("Although many reforms are possible and could succeed, only one is sure to
fail: reliance on trial court scrutiny of the settlement.").
219. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(d).
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B. Awarding Fees Under the Empowered Lead PlaintiffRegime
Although no comprehensive study has compared fee awards
before and after the enactment of the PSLRA, it does seem that
district courts increasingly have recognized the PSLRA's
"mandate ...for greater judicial management"22 of securities class
actions targeted at protecting absent class members from perceived
abuses by the plaintiffs' bar. Judge Jed Rakoff from the Southern
District of New York, a frequent venue for securities class actions,
documented this recognition when he wrote, "[S]ecurities class
action litigation continues to be lawyer-driven in material respects
and the reforms Congress contemplated in the Reform Act can be
achieved, if at all, only with some help from the courts."22 1 Beyond
simply expressing an understanding of Congress's objectives, some
presiding judges have attempted to reduce agency costs themselves
by scrutinizing counsel's fees ex post with a view toward maximizing
recovery for the class. A few other courts have attempted to
maximize class recovery (or at least reduce attorneys' fees) by
selecting lead counsel through the use of judicially supervised
competitive bidding, and at least one judge has selected the lead
plaintiff expressly based upon the fees negotiated with the putative
lead counsel.22 These judicial efforts at reducing agency costs call
into question the role of judge as independent arbiter,2 23 as discussed
further in Part IV.
1. Scrutinizing requested attorneys'fees ex post
Although the legislative history of the PSLRA documents
Congress's concern that lawyers "often receive a disproportionate
'
share of settlement awards," 224
Congress gave little guidance to
district courts in determining class counsel's compensation. Rather
than fixing the percentage of fees and costs that courts could award
to class counsel or providing per se quantitative prohibitions, the

220. William B. Rubenstein, A TransactionalModel of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
418 n.210 (2001).
221. In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
222. See infra Part III.B.2-3.
223. Indeed, the presiding judges refer to themselves as the "fiduciaries" or "agents" or
"guardians" of the absent class members in a number of opinions. See infra notes 367-68 and
accompanying text.
224. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 36.
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PSLRA mandates only that total attorneys' fees and expenses
awarded to lead counsel "shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of
the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid
to the class. ' 22 ' This "reasonable percentage" provision evidences
Congress's
intent that district courts would
determine
reasonableness of fees in each case based on the amount of money
actually recovered by class members.22 6
To date, two federal appellate courts, the Second Circuit and the
Third Circuit, have reviewed lower courts' awards of fees and costs
under the PSLRA. Both circuits expressly rejected the use of
benchmarks in securities class actions and endorsed the application of
flexible criteria for determining the reasonableness of attorneys' fees.
In Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., a case arising from the
Michael Milken junk bond scandal of the 1980s, the Second Circuit
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
fees amounting to 4% of the common fund rather than the 25%
requested by class counsel.22 7 In its opinion affirming the trial court's
award-an award calculated under the lodestar method-the court
listed a series of factors for trial courts to consider when reviewing
the reasonableness of fee requests in securities class actions,
"including: (1) the time and labor expended by counsel; (2) the
magnitude and complexities of the litigation; (3) the risk of the
litigation; (4) the quality of representation; (5) the requested fee in
relation to the settlement; and (6) public policy considerations. 22 8
The
Second
Circuit
cautioned
lower
courts
that in

225. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2000).
226. Id.; see also CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 36 ("The Conference
Committee limits the award of attorney[s'] fees and costs to counsel for a class ... to a
reasonable percentage of the amount of recovery awarded to the class. By not fixing the
percentage of fees and costs counsel may receive, the Conference Committee intends to give
the court flexibility in determining what is reasonable on a case-by-case basis."); 141 CONG.
REC. S1085 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) ("The bill requires that courts tie awards of lawyers' fees
directly to how much is recovered by investors, rather than simply how many hours the lawyers
billed or how many pages of briefs they filed.") (statement of Sen. Peter Domenici).
Lawmakers also sought to provide more information to absent class members about counsel's
potential fee by including in the PSLRA new notice procedures. 141 CONG. REC. S9212 (daily
ed. June 28, 1995) (noting that the bill "contains better disclosure of how much a shareholder
might get under a settlement and how much the lawyers will get so that shareholders can
challenge excessive lawyers' fees") (statement of Sen. Peter Domenici).
227. 209 F.3d 43, 44-45 (2d Cir. 2000).
228. Id. at 50 (quoting In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec. Litig.,
724 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)).
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"scrutin[izing] . . . the unique circumstances of each case," presiding
judges must "approach fee awards 'with an eye to moderation"' and
give "'jealous regard to the rights of those who are interested in the
fund,"' that is, the absent class members.2 2 Further, the court
allowed for the use of either the lodestar or percentage approaches,
but it denounced the broad use of customary benchmark percentages
of recovery in securities class actions, describing the use of such
benchmarks as "routine largess" and criticizing the use of
benchmarks as "an all too tempting substitute for the searching
assessment that should properly be performed in each case. 2 3 °
In Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., the Third Circuit
mandated the use of a similar set of criteria to that listed in
Goldberger, except that Gunter also instructed district courts in the
Third Circuit (where percentage fees are mandated) to review the
range of awards in similar cases. 23' Following Gunter, the court of
appeals further instructed lower courts against the use of benchmarks
in In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litigation.23 2 That decision made
clear that presiding judges "may not rely on a formulaic application
of the appropriate range in awarding fees but must consider the
relevant circumstances of the particular case., 233 The appellate court
vacated the district court's fee award, 234 criticizing the lower court
for failing to specify the method used to set the fees and failing to
apply the seven factors adopted by the circuit in Gunter for awarding
fees on a percentage-of-recovery basis in common-fund class
actions.235

229. Id. at 53 (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 995 F.2d 448, 469-70 (2d Cir.
1974)) (citations omitted).
230.

Id. at 51-52.

231.

223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000).

232.

243 F.3d 722 (3d Cir. 2001).

233.

Id. at 736.

234. Id. at 743. Although lead counsel applied for a fee representing 10% of the stated
value of the total amount of rights available for distribution to class members (approximately
$34 million), plus reimbursement of reasonable expenses, the district court instead approved
an award of 5.7% of the amount of net value of the settlement rights (after deducting for
expenses), or $19.3 million. Id. at 725-27.
235. Id. at 733-44. The appellate court admonished the district court for failing to
consider that the case had settled at an early stage of the litigation, that little or no discovery
had occurred, and that defendants had admitted liability, reducing the complexity and risk
involved. Further, the district court erred by not considering fee awards in other cases in which
the common fund exceeded $100 million. Finally, the court of appeals held that the lower
court abused its discretion in failing to cross-check the reasonableness of the percentage-of-
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While both the Second Circuit and the Third Circuit have
denounced the use of benchmarks, neither court announced a rule of
decision to govern the application of the fee award factors they
cited-factors that, upon closer inspection, appear somewhat
redundant and potentially contradict one another. The appellate
courts also failed to provide meaningful guidance to district judges
about the relative importance of the factors.2 36 In fact, review of
more than two dozen decisions reducing fees after enactment of the
PSLRA reveals that, in various ways, presiding judges again are
attempting to value the legal services provided by counsel to the
plaintiff class. And although the courts may scrutinize fee
applications less deferentially after reform, facially applying the same
methodologies2 3 7 and even many of the same award considerations,
the results are hardly predictable. Courts reducing fees emphasize
different factors influencing their awards.2 3 Further, many judges
discount the risk of nonrecovery with the benefit of hindsight
attendant to ex post review. Informational deficiencies continue to
plague the courts in reviewing fee applications, leading to judicial
conjectures about counsel's performance, the reasonableness of the
hours expended, and the value of attorneys' time. Some judges have
developed their own extrastatutory public policy rationales for
cutting fees, and the courts' opinions provide little assurance that
their decisions reflect compensation arrangements that injured
recovery fee against a lodestar calculation with a justifiable multiplier. The court of appeals
suggested that, on remand, "a lodestar multiplier of 3 ... is the appropriate ceiling for a fee
award, although a lower multiplier may be applied in the District Court's discretion." Id. at
742.
236. The Third Circuit did opine that in securities class actions, factors relating to the
skill and efficiency of the attorneys and fee awards in similar cases are of limited use. In re
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 284 (3d Cir. 2001). The court also noted that those two
factors "should receive less weight" in a megafund case. Id. (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 339 (3d Cir. 1998)) (commenting that the size of
the fund created and the number of persons benefited is less important in a megacase).
237. Courts continue to express preference for the percentage-of-recovery method over
the lodestar method. See, e.g., In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1333-36
(S.D. Fla. 2001); In re Fleet/Norstar Sec. Litig., 935 F. Supp. 99, 108-09 (D.RI. 1996).
238. Of the twenty-seven cases reviewed for this Article, only one failed to provide
dtailed reasons for its decision to reduce the requested attorneys' fees. In Gunter v.
Ridgewood Energy Corp., the district court merely stated that the "nature of the litigation," its
resolution "without the necessity of trial," and its value dictated that 18%, rather than the 33%
requested, was a reasonable award. No. Civ. 95-438, 1999 WL 33266979, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov.
16, 1999). The Third Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case to the district court
for a more thorough analysis. 223 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 2000).
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investors would have negotiated directly with class counsel.239 At
best, courts review the "market" for class counsel compensation by
reviewing some sampling of awards made by other courts faced with
the same task. Of course, precedents "cannot establish a valid market
rate.

24 0

5

In sum, fee awards in securities class actions are, if anything,
more subjective and less predictable after the PSLRA and the
abolishment of benchmarks in two circuits. A review of the case law
confirms the judiciary's wide discretion to determine reasonable fees,
but no guiding rules of decision emerge. Judges anchor their
decisions with a myriad of partially duplicative and conflicting factors
utilized to value lawyers' efforts and productivity. These trends
increase the risk for private attorneys general, who will look to prior
fee awards in assessing the expected return from future litigation.
"[S]hrewd plaintiffs' lawyers are able to weigh the risks and rewards
of litigation, but they are much less able to gauge in advance the
reaction of an individual judge to a fee application that is to be given
discretionary review in accordance with ... essentially meaningless
factors .... ,,24 These are not the only unknowns, however, that
plaintiffs' counsel must face. In addition to lawyers facing greater
uncertainty about their compensation in securities class actions, the
following developments in the post-reform fee jurisprudence also

should concern the plaintiffs' bar.242
a. Discounting the risk of nonrecovery. In awarding fees to class
counsel under the common-fund doctrine, courts historically have
considered risk to be the most important factor in determining
239. As Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook observed recently in his opinion
reversing a lower court's fee award in an antitrust case, "The [S]econd [C]ircuit's considereverything approach [adopted in Goldberger] ... lacks a benchmark; a list of factors without a
rule of decision is just a chopped salad." In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 719 (7th
Cir. 2001).
240. John C. Coffee, Jr., The PSLRA and Auctions, N.Y. L.J., May 17, 2001, at 6.
241. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 693 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
242. This is not to say that judges have reduced fees in most or even a majority of
securities class actions. In the Rite Aid megasettlement litigation, for example, the plaintiffs'
counsel received 25% of the $334 million settlement fund, a paycheck of nearly $83 million.
See Shannon P. Duffy, Rite Aid Suit Yields $83 Mil. in Fees, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 4,
2003, at 1. In smaller securities class actions, judges even have awarded class counsel one-third
of the settlement funds. See, e.g., Maley v. Del Global Techs. Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 358
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Safety Components Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.N.J.
2001).
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whether the plaintiffs' counsel deserved an enhancement above the
lodestar amount24 3 or above the benchmark for percentage fees.
Recently, however, many judges awarding reduced fees have
determined that the risk borne by the plaintiffs' lawyers did not
justify the amount of compensation requested. In fact, in more than
half of the cases reviewed, the courts found that the risk of
nonrecovery was small.
Courts analyzing the risk of nonpayment have looked to a variety
of factors to support their conclusions. Judges in five cases stated
that the high rate of settlement in securities class action litigation
generally has eliminated much of the risk for plaintiffs' lawyers. The
court in In re Quantum Health Resources Inc. Securities Litigation
made this point most broadly, stating, "[T]here is no inherent risk of
attorneys [sic] fee non-recovery in securities class action suits."24' 4
Similarly, in Goldberger, the Second Circuit cited a combination of
anecdotal evidence and a law review article245 for the proposition that
there is "no appreciable risk of non-recovery in securities class
'
actions." 246
Subsequent district court opinions within the Second
Circuit have followed Goldbergerin emphasizing this point.24 7 These
courts did not consider the possibility that the PSLRA increased the
risk faced by plaintiffs' counsel.2 48 They failed to cite more recent
studies available suggesting that the plaintiffs' securities bar faces a
greater likelihood of dismissal and protracted litigation.24 9 Nor did
these courts consider that the lawyers made their prefiling

243. Goldberger v. Integrated Res. Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 54 (2d Cir. 2000).
244. 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
245. Alexander, supra note 74, at 578.
246. Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 52 (quoting Alexander, supra note 74, at 578) (court's
emphasis omitted).
247. See, e.g., In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22244676, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2003) (awarding class counsel 20% of settlement fund rather than 25%, as
requested, citing Goldberger and stating, "though this case was brought under the securities
laws, it better resembles a run-of-the-mill commercial litigation").
248. See, e.g., In re Arakis Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 95 CV 3431 (ARR), 2001 WL
1590512, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2001); In re Dreyfus Aggressive Growth Mut. Fund
Litig., 2001 WL 709262, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2001) (cutting class counsel's request
for 30% of recovery in half, finding that "the merits of this case were promising from the
outset" and noting that all but a small percentage of securities class actions settle,
"guaranteeing counsel payment of fees and minimizing the risks associated with contingency
fee litigations"); In re Fine Host Corp. Sec. Litig., No. MDL 1241, 3:97-CV-2619JCH, 2000
WL 33116538, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 2000).
249. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
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investments without any assurance that they would receive the
appointment as lead counsel.
In addition to the generalized notion that there is little risk in
prosecuting securities class actions, many courts have listed casespecific factors that, according to the courts' determination, have
reduced class counsel's risk of nonrecovery.2 5 ° Often, these factors
include some sort of perceived "piggybacking"-that is, class
counsel's reliance upon the efforts of a third party that made the
defendant's liability more evident. In several cases, the courts
reduced fees based on their perception that enforcement actions by
the SEC assisted plaintiffs' counsel or reduced the risk of loss.2 5 ' The
court in In re PaineWebber Ltd. Partnerships Litigation, s2 for
example, found that "piggybacking" justified a reduction in fees
requested. The case concerned PaineWebber's marketing of certain
limited partnerships and investment trusts.253 While class counsel
conducted discovery and began settlement negotiations, the SEC
also investigated PaineWebber's limited partnership sales and
eventually issued an order "finding extensive federal securities law
violations and imposing sanctions." 25 4 The court found that the class

250. In one unique case, Walco Investments, Inc. v. Thenen, the court had established at
the outset that plaintiffs' attorneys "would receive interim payments at a substantially reduced
hourly rate with a final enhancement or reduction of fees based on the amount recovered."
975 F. Supp. 1468, 1470 (S.D. Fla. 1997). At the conclusion of the litigation, the court cut
counsel's fee request, reasoning that because "the attorneys were not paid on a pure
contingency fee basis, the incentives . . . that justify a percentage fee award were not fully in
place." Id. at 1472.
251. Recent empirical studies probably would not change these courts' perceptions.
James Cox and Randall Thomas reviewed 248 securities fraud class actions settled between
1990 and 2001 and found that private suits with parallel SEC actions settle for significantly
more than private suits without such proceedings, and private cases with parallel SEC actions
take substantially less time to settle than other private cases. James Cox & Randall Thomas,
SEC Enforcement Actions for Financial Fraud and Private Litigation: An Empirical Inquiry
(May 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Another study determined that
private class action settlements are significantly larger and constitute a higher percentage of
estimated damages when "accompanied by" a corresponding SEC litigation release or
administrative action. LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, POST-REFORM ACT SECURITIES
LAWSUITS: SETTrLEMENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2002, at 8 (2003), at
http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/LES%20Through%201202.pdf (last visited Oct. 31,
2003).
252. 999 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
253. Id. at 721.
254. Id. at 722.
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counsel's risk in litigating the claims "was substantially reduced by
pressure placed on PaineWebber in the SEC Order."2 5
Even concurrent SEC fraud investigations have influenced the
courts to cut fees to class counsel in both In re Sunbeam Securities
Litigation"6 and In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Securities Litigation.2"
In the Sunbeam litigation, shareholders sued the corporation and its
accountant over allegedly inflated financial statements.2" 8 The
defendant accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, agreed to pay $110
million, and class counsel requested fees totaling 30% of this fund.25 9
The court rejected counsel's request that it depart upward from the
Eleventh Circuit's benchmark award of 25%, citing, among other
reasons, the SEC's concurrent investigation and civil penalties action
against the individual defendants.26 ° Similarly, in Bausch & Lomb, the
SEC conducted an investigation while the private class action
litigation was ongoing. 26 ' Bausch & Lomb agreed to settle the class
action at the same time the SEC ordered the company to cease
committing violations of federal securities law. The court awarded a
multiplier of 2 rather than the 5.7 multiplier requested, reasoning
that the SEC's investigation and subsequent order substantially
reduced the risk of the litigation for class counsel.2 62
Courts offered similar justifications for their decisions to cut fees
in Goldbergerand Quantum. In affirming the district court's decision
in Goldberger, the Second Circuit noted that "the scope of
defendant's misconduct was unprecedented" and that "a good
portion of counsel's lodestar was based on hours spent scouring the
records developed during the parallel criminal proceedings [against
Milken and Drexel]."2 63 In Quantum, a case alleging accounting
fraud, Judge Taylor, in the Central District of California, rejected
class counsel's request for 30% of the $10 million settlement fund.2 4

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
1997).
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Id.at 725.
176 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
183 F.R.D. 78 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
176 F. Supp. 2d at 1327.
Id.at 1328-29, 1332.
Id.at 1336.
183 F.R.D. at 87.
Id. at 87-88.
Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2000).
In re Quantum Health Res., Inc. Sec. Litig., 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1255 (C.D. Cal.
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The court found that the case was not complex, that the violations of
the securities laws were apparent, and that the risks in prosecuting
the case were slight because "the material allegations of the
complaint were supported by the unequivocal results of public
investigations conducted by the California State Controller's Office
Services, as well as
and the California Department of Health
265
significant public admissions by Quantum.
Judges also have recognized that investigations by the news
media reduce class counsel's risk as well. In Bausch & Lomb, for
example, the court noted that Business Week magazine had published
a pair of articles detailing the alleged deficiencies in the company's
accounting.2 66 The court determined that, even if class counsel did
not directly use information from the articles (the articles appeared
after the initiation of the lawsuits), "their publication certainly must
have bolstered counsel's confidence in their chances of success, and
strengthened their hand by equally diminishing B&L's own
prospects in this litigation." 267 News media involvement also
influenced the court in In re Arakis Energy Corp. Securities
Litigation, a case involving misrepresentations concerning a plan to
finance an oil drilling expedition in Sudan.2 6' The judge found that
"substantial news coverage of the Arakis situation in the financial
press" reduced the risk of litigation for class counsel: "press coverage
undoubtedly aided counsel in their preparation for settlement
negotiations, as evidenced by the time spent by counsel reviewing
2 69
this coverage.
Just as defendant's public admissions influenced the court in
Quantum to cut fees, courts have cited to corroborating evidence in
the public domain or other case-specific factors that may minimize
counsel's risk of nonrecovery. For example, in determining a
reasonable range of fees in Cendant PRIDES, the Third Circuit
noted that "the case was relatively simple in terms of proof, in that
Cendant had conceded liability and no risks pertaining to liability or
collection were pertinent., 2 10 On remand of the related litigation,
the district court seemingly voiced disagreement with the court of
265.

Id. at 1259.

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

183 F.R.D. at 87.
Id. at 87-88.
2001 WL 1590512, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2001).
Id. at *12.
243 F.3d 722, 735 (3d Cir. 2001).
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appeals, noting several "practical and procedural questions [that]
made the risk of nonpayment not insubstantial" for the Cendant
" '
class counsel.27
Other courts also have examined the stage of the litigation at the
time of settlement in assessing the risk assumed by class counsel. In
In re Twinlab Corp. Securities Litigation, the judge opined that class
counsel had overstated the risk in the case because prior to
settlement, plaintiffs' complaint had survived defendants' motions to
dismiss several of the causes of action.2 72 So too in In re Dreyfus
Aggressive Growth Mutual Fund Litigation, the court found that,
because the plaintiffs had survived a motion to dismiss before
settlement, the remaining questions dealt with damages rather than
liability. 27 3 The judge also decided that the risk that counsel might
not collect a high premium was not the sort of "contingency risk"
that courts should consider in awarding fees.2 74
Often when assessing ex post the prospect of plaintiffs prevailing,
courts also attempt to assess the novelty and complexity of the
action. As the judge in Bausch & Lomb explained, "the complexity of
the case is mostly relevant only insofar as it affects counsel's degree
of risk of litigation., 275 In Varijen v. H.J. Meyers & Co., the court
decided to award class counsel 20% of the fund rather than the 33%
fee requested, holding that the lower award adequately recognized
"the efforts of counsel and the risks and complexities of this
litigation., 276 The fee decision in In re Fidelity/Micron Securities
Litigation provides a further example.277 Plaintiffs had alleged in that
case that the portfolio manager for the Fidelity Magellan Fund
engaged in market manipulation to increase the value of a particular
stock in the fund's portfolio. In requesting 30% of the settlement
fund, class counsel cited the high risk and novel issues involved in
the case. However, the judge rejected this argument and awarded a
reduced fee, finding that the risk was not out of the ordinary and

271. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 243 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174 (D.N.J. 2003) (approving
lead counsel's request for an award of $55 million in fees as reasonable).
272. 187 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85-86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
273. No. 98 CV 4318 HB, 2001 WL 709262, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2001).
274. Id.
275. 183 F.R.D. 78, 88 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
276. No. 97 Civ. 6742(DLC), 2000 WL 1683656, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000).
277. No. Civ. A. 95-12676-RGS, 1998 WL 313735 (D. Mass. June 5, 1998), vacated on
othergrounds, 167 F.3d 735 (1st Cir. 1999).
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that the fraud-on-the-market theory relied upon by class
counsel had
278
been "thoroughly exposited in the existing case law.",
b. Penalizing for early (or late) settlements. Courts awarding
reduced fees frequently reviewed the amount of work done by class
counsel in support of their decisions to deny the amount requested.
In at least two cases, judges focused attention on the total amount of
time expended by class counsel in prosecuting the litigation,
reducing the fee award on the grounds that the case settled at an
early stage. For example, the judge in In re Fine Host Corp. Securities
Litigation reasoned that the early settlement in that litigation
weighed against an award of 33% of a common fund. 9 The Third
Circuit made a similar observation in the Cendant PRIDES case:
reversing the district court for awarding excessive fees, the Third
Circuit found that the litigation settled only two months after the
attorneys filed for class certification. 8 ° Of course, such decisions
discourage the plaintiffs' bar from resolving cases early and may
encourage class counsel to engage in wasteful activities such as
"confirmatory discovery" in order to justify a large fee award.
While settling too quickly has resulted in a lower fee award,
plaintiffs' counsel also face the risk of a reduced fee if the court
perceives that they litigated too long. In awarding fees in In re
Fleet/NorstarSecurities Litigation, the court penalized class counsel
for excessive litigation.2 8' The guardian ad litem appointed to
monitor the reasonableness of the fee awards found a "remarkable
absence of economy and efficiency," as evidenced by the fee
applications. 82 Class counsel wasted "many, many hours" on a
"deficient initial complaint [that] had to be amended after dismissal
proceedings.,283 The applications also provided evidence of
'
"overcharging" and "extensive duplication of efforts."284
Based on
these findings, the court awarded 20% of the fund to plaintiffs'
counsel, rather than the 30% requested.

278. Id. at *3. The court also noted that, based on plaintiffs' own estimate, the
settlement recovered for class members represented only 20% of their potential damages. Id.
279. 2000 WL 33116538, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 2000).
280. In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 736 (3d Cir. 2001).
281. 935 F. Supp. 99 (D.R.I.1996).
282. Id. at 107.
283. Id. at 110.
284. Id.
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Similarly, in In re Baan Co. Securities Litigation, the court
awarded class counsel 28% of the settlement fund rather than the
32% requested because of the "excessive delays and inefficiencies that
plagued [the] litigation .. .due in large part to counsel's less than
exemplary performance., 28 ' The court specifically noted that
plaintiffs' counsel filed their original complaints some five years
before they reached a settlement accord with the defendants, and
that the parties litigated for nearly four years before the investor class
was certified. In fact, because the court had "perceived . .
significant deficiencies in counsel's performance," the order
certifying the class imposed on class counsel a monthly reporting
requirement "so that the Court could be assured the counsel would
28 6
faithfully comply with the dictates of the PSLRA.1
c. Reviving the lodestar to reduce fee awards. Although the
PSLRA mandates that courts award total fees and expenses not
exceeding a reasonable percentage of the amount recovered for the
class, judges reducing fees often employed the lodestar method, or,
alternatively, determined a percentage-of-recovery fee but then
"cross-checked" the reasonableness of that fee by reviewing a
hypothetical lodestar calculation.287 Use of the lodestar does not
necessarily violate the PSLRA,2 88 but this trend in post-reform fee
jurisprudence may harm the class by encouraging excessive billing
and by delaying resolution of the litigation; plaintiffs' counsel has
little motivation to settle the case until the lawyers have billed
enough hours to justify their anticipated fee request. Lodestar crosschecks also impede counsel's ability to evaluate potential lawsuits.
The uncertainty created by judges using the lodestar method
ultimately may reduce the expected value of such lawsuits for the

285. 2003 WL 22423161, at *6-7 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2003).
286. Id. at *7.
287. See, e.g., Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir.
2000); In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1065-66 (E.D. Mo.
2002).
288. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 36 ("The Conference Committee does
not intend to prohibit use of the lodestar approach as a means of calculating attorney[s'] fees.
The [attorneys' fees] provision focuses on the final amount of fees awarded, not the means by
which such fees are calculated."); cf.141 CONG. REc. S17,957 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) ("The
conference report puts an end to this outrageous practice, called the 'lodestar' approach, by
encouraging courts to award attorney's fees based upon a reasonable percentage of the total
amount of the settlement or judgment.") (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd).
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plaintiffs' bar and, as a result, diminish their financial ability and
willingness to undertake the investments and risks associated with
class action litigation.
Most of the courts that have attempted to value the work
actually performed by counsel determined that the attorneys charged
too much per hour or had billed an excessive number of hours. The
district court's decision in Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.289 so
held. Finding that the rates charged by class counsel (as much as
$495 per hour) were unnecessarily high, the court quipped, "Even if
the greats of legal history were to awaken from the dead and form
their own mythical law practice, a senior partner at the firm Lincoln,
Darrow, Holmes, Marshall, & Blackstone would not be worth such
an eye-popping hourly rate."2 9° In addition, the judge determined
that counsel substantially inflated the total hours expended by
recording its time in quarter hours rather than in tenths. 91 The
combination of these factors led the court to reduce the total award
from $3.0 million to $1.2 million.292
Many other courts have employed an analysis similar to that used
in Zucker. In calculating the attorneys' lodestar, the judge in Bausch
& Lomb found some of the claimed hourly rates to be
"extraordinarily high." 293 In addition, this judge determined that
both the number of lawyers who worked on the case and the amount
of hours billed were excessive. 294 Based on these findings, the court
reduced the lodestar figure by 15%.291 In Feinbergv. HiberniaCorp.,
the court reduced the hourly fees of seventeen individual attorneys
and refused to award fees for time spent on travel, copying
documents, or arguing the issue of attorneys' fees.29 6 Class counsel in
Sunbeam submitted time records detailing more than 80,000 hours
of work; however, because the class settled with only one of the
defendants, the court held that the attorneys should not receive
compensation for the total number of hours worked on the case, and

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

968 F. Supp. 1396 (C.D, Cal. 1997).
Id. at 1402 & n.6.
Id.at 1403.
Id.
183 F.RD. 78, 83 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 85.
966 F. Supp. 442, 447-48 (E.D. La. 1997).
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counsel's request for an upward adjustment of the benchmark fee
was refused.297
Like the court in Sunbeam, many courts that purport to use a
percentage-of-the-fund methodology also employ a lodestar crosscheck. In applying the cross-check, the judge in Arakis discovered
some evidence of excessive billing.298 The court in Lyons v. Scitex
Corp. also evaluated the attorneys' proposed lodestar and concluded
that the firm charged excessive rates.299 An examination of the
lodestar in Twinlab showed that class counsel based its calculation on
rates ranging from $340 to $615 per hour for partners and up to
$410 per hour for associates.3 °° In addition, the Twinlab court found
that many tasks performed by partners could have been delegated to
less costly associates or paralegals.3 ' In Fidelity/Micron, the
attorneys did not provide sufficient information for the court to
perform an accurate lodestar cross-check, but the judge noted that
their representations concerning total hours and hourly rates seemed
excessive.30 2 The findings in each of these cases supported the courts'
decisions to award lower fees than those requested by counsel.
Similarly, the court in In re BankAmerica Corp. Securities Litigation
also used a lodestar cross-check and found that the number of hours
billed and the rates charged by the lawyers "[fell] within the high
end of reasonable. 3 3 Nonetheless, the court refused to award the
requested 25% fee because "[s]uch an award would overcompensate
'30 4
counsel at the expense of the ... plaintiffs.
d. Comparingfees selectively. In six cases where the courts cut
requested fees, judges reviewed fee awards in similar class actions to
aid in their determinations. The Third Circuit endorsed this
approach in the CendantPRIDES litigation, holding that the district
court had failed to properly consider the fees granted in other
megafund settlements in awarding class counsel 5.7% of a $341

297.
298.
299,
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
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In re Twinlab Corp. Sec. Litig., 187 F. Supp. 2d 80, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
Id.
1998 WL 313735, at *3 (D. Mass. Jun. 5, 1998).
228 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
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million fund.3 °5 Examining fees awarded under the percentage-ofrecovery method in a sample of seventeen cases settling for more
than $100 million, the appellate court found that the awards ranged
from 2.8% to 36%.3 o6 However, it also determined that all of the
cases awarding higher percentages involved complex issues and
required extensive time and effort from the attorneys." 7 After
comparing the sampled cases with the case at hand, a comparison
fraught with speculative assumptions, the Third Circuit concluded
that the district court abused its discretion in awarding 5.7% of the
settlement fund to plaintiffs' counsel.0 8
Other courts have reviewed a more limited number of fee
precedents. In Dreyfus, for example, the trial court noted the
emergence of a trend in the Second Circuit of "awarding attorneys
considerably less than 30% of common funds in securities class
actions, even where there is considerable contingency risk" and then
listed three cases rejecting 30% awards and two others approving 30%
awards based upon unique circumstances. 9 The court in Arakis
examined four cases preceding Goldberger as well as five subsequent
decisions. The post- Goldberger awards demonstrated to that court a
trend within the circuit away from the 30% benchmark award.3" 0
Concerned that awarding the requested 25% fee from a $259 million
megasettlement fund might be unreasonable, the court in In re
3Com Securities Litigation ordered class counsel to produce
information about the number of hours worked by attorneys and
paralegals and their hourly rates. Having calculated that the
requested benchmark fee represented a multiplier of 9.27, the court
summarily opined that a 25% fee indeed was "too high under all of
the circumstances," but an award of 18%, representing a 6.7
multiplier, was somehow "more reasonable" in light of uncited
precedent.3 '

305. In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 742-43 (3d Cir. 2001).
306. Id. at 737-38.
307. Id. at 738.
308. Id. at 741.
309. No. 98 CV 4318, 2001 WL 709262, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2001).
310. In reArakis Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 95 CV 3431 (ARR), 2001 WL 1590512,
at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2001).
311. In re 3Com Sec. Litig., No. C-97-21083 EAI, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9,
2001).
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The trial court overseeing the BankAmerica megalitigation
studied a list of decisions submitted by plaintiffs' counsel awarding
25% o3r more to class counsel. Noting its "fiduciary role in
reviewing fee applications," the court instead awarded 18% of the
$490 million megasettlement fund to plaintiffs' counsel, net
expenses.3" 2 Without elaboration, the court simply stated, "Having
studied counsel's list of cases in which the award of attorneys' fees
equaled or exceeded the requested 25%, the Court is nevertheless
convinced that an award of 18% is reasonable considering awards in
similar cases."" 3 The order cited, among other precedents, two other
18% fee awards recently ordered 1 4 in the In re MicroStrategy, Inc.
Securities Litigation"' and 3Com class actions.
Several other courts have reviewed hourly billing rates in
determining the reasonableness of class counsel's fees under a
lodestar calculation. The use of a lodestar cross-check in Lyons v.
Scitex Corp. is one example of such an analysis. There, the judge
compared class counsel's proposed hourly rates to average figures
published by the New York State Bar Association and determined
that the requested rates were excessive. 31 6 Similarly, the court in
Bausch & Lomb refused to award rates as high as $525 per hour after
reviewing three other decisions denying hourly rates in excess of
317
$500.
e. Slashingfees to advance public policy. More than a third of the
courts cutting fees cited public policy concerns for reducing
requested awards. Surprisingly, however, only one of these decisions,
the opinion issued in MicroStrategy, mentioned the policies
underlying Congress's enactment of the PSLRA. 1 8 In MicroStrategy,

312. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1064 & n.5 (E.D. Mo.
2002).
313. Id. at 1064 n.5. The court also determined to calculate the amount of attorneys'
fees from the common funds available after deductions for all reimbursable litigation costs and
expenses, thereby increasing the payout to absent class members. Id. at 1067.
314. Id. at 1064 n.5.
315. 172 F. Supp. 2d 778 (E.D. Va. 2001).
316. 987 F. Supp. 271, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The quality of representation also
seems to have influenced this court's decision. The fraud claims settled for $2.9 million,
representing between 6.4% and 11% of the total losses suffered by the class. Id. at 278. In light
of the small percentage of loss recovered by investors in the litigation, the court decided to
award class counsel only 10.4% of the fund. Id. at 280.
317. In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.R.D. 78, 83-84 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
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plaintiffs alleged
that the
company
and
its auditor,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, misrepresented the company's income,
causing the company's stock to trade at an inflated price.3 19 After
settling with the company for $98.5 million in notes, stocks, and
warrants, and with the accountants for $55 million in cash,32 ° class
counsel applied for a total fee award equal to 27% of the value of the
two settlement funds.3 2' Rejecting the request and awarding an 18%
fee instead,322 the court interpreted the PSLRA to require that class
counsel receive compensation for time spent in litigation, reward for
the results achieved, and incentive to pursue similar cases in the

future.323
Even without focusing on congressional policy, some courts have
sought to preserve as much of the settlement as possible for
members of the class.3 24 In Goldberger, the Second Circuit instructed
lower courts to give "jealous regard to the rights" of absent class
members. 2 Ensuring that the class would receive sufficient funds
was cited in combination with lack of risk in Varljen.326 In its award
decision in In re Prudential Securities Inc. Ltd. Partnerships
Litigation, the court made protecting the class the sole determining
factor in its decision to reduce the class counsel's award.327 The
plaintiffs claimed that Prudential Securities fraudulently marketed
and sold interests in numerous limited partnerships.32 8 Class counsel
obtained a settlement of $22.5 million and requested a fee equal to
30% of the fund. 29 The court determined that the SEC investigation
relating to the case actually aided the defendants rather than the
plaintiffs and that the overall risk of the litigation was "extremely
high." 330 Nonetheless, the court held that it had a "duty to avoid any
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
omitted).
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

172 F. Supp. 2d 778, 784-85 (E.D. Va. 2001).
Id.at 782.
Id. at 781 nn.2, 3.
Id.at 788-89.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 787-88.
See id.at 786.
Goldberger v. Integrated Res. Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 53 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation
2000 WL 1683656, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000).
985 F. Supp. 410, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Id. at 412.
Id. at 415.
Id. at414-16.
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sense of vicarious generosity" and granted a reduced fee amounting
to 26% of the settlement. 33'
Similar considerations played a role in the court's decision in
Arakis, where class counsel sought fees and expenses totaling onethird of the $24 million settlement fund.3 32 Noting that members of
the plaintiff class made claims totaling only $7.2 million, the court
held that public policy weighed against awarding compensation in an
amount greater than that actually claimed by the injured parties. 3
And in In re American Bank Note Holographics,Inc., the court acted
to ensure that class counsel did not receive a benefit unavailable to
absent class members. 3 4 The judge approved a settlement providing
absent class members with approximately $14.9 million in cash and
$6 million in various securities, but the court recognized the risk
33
associated with the securities component of the settlement. 1
Reasoning that the class attorneys should share the risk of
nonpayment borne by class members, the court rejected counsel's
request for 30% of the settlement fund and awarded 25% instead.3 36
As these decisions demonstrate, ex post judicial regulation of
attorney compensation after the PSLRA is highly fact-specific and is
characterized by conflicting norms, especially following the
abolishment of benchmark fees in two circuits. Fee awards in
securities class actions are, if anything, less coherent and predictable
after reform, even somewhat random.
A few judges have sought to avoid the inefficiencies associated
with ex post decision-making by setting counsel's fees at the
inception of the litigation. The next two sections describe these
judicial innovations and discuss why these courts' efforts at ex ante
fee regulation contravene the PSLRA's empowered lead plaintiff
regime.
2. Selecting class counsel using competitive bidding
Rather than attempting to reduce agency costs by scrutinizing
fees ex post, a few judges, most prominently Judge Vaughn Walker

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
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Id. at *13.
127 F. Supp. 2d 418, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 432-33.
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of the Northern District of California, have attempted to reduce class
action agency costs by using competitive bidding to select lead
counsel for the class.337 Judges employing this approach express
dissatisfaction with both the lodestar and the percentage-of-recovery
methods for awarding fees; neither approach effectively simulates the
market nor ensures that class counsel will receive a reasonable fee.338
By soliciting competitive bids for the position of lead counsel and
then using the winning bid to set counsel's compensation ex ante,
judges employing this innovation have attempted to appoint as class
counsel the lawyers who would best represent the interests of the
class at the lowest cost.339

Courts adopting so-called auction procedures select class counsel
by soliciting first-price sealed bids from law firms seeking to
represent the class. These courts often announce a preference for
bids based upon a percentage of the recovery provided to the class in
the litigation, and they require bidding firms to submit information
concerning their qualifications, experience, malpractice insurance,
and the like. After reviewing the bids and accompanying disclosures,
the courts select the winning bid, appoint the winner as lead counsel,
and order that counsel's compensation will be determined in accord
with its bid.
The several judges who have utilized the auction tool justified its
use as a method to approximate an efficient market for class
counsel.34 As Joseph Grundfest has opined, "if [class] counsel fees
are set without regard to market standards, the possibility arises that

337. See, e.g., In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 141 F. Supp. 2d 951, 952-54 (N.D. I11.
2001);
In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784-90 (N.D. Ill.
2000);
Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Sherleigh Assocs. v.
Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688, 691-95 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
338. See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 692 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (explaining
that, in the market, clients would "demand in advance of the litigation the following
information: how much their lawyers will charge ... and the best price available for those
services." (emphasis omitted)).
339. A review of judicial opinions in fourteen bidding cases found that "the most
common reason judges gave for employing bidding was to foster competition among counsel
by replicating the private marketplace for legal services." LAURAL L. HOOPER & MARIE LEARY,
AUCTIONING THE ROLE OF CLASS COUNSEL IN CLASS ACTION CASES: A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY

15 (2001), at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/auctioning.pdf/$file/auctioning.pdf
(last visited Nov. 20, 2003); see also Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 711 ("Judicial
auctions were devised in part to foster greater loyalty by counsel to the class and to award
reasonable fees . . .
340. E.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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fiduciary obligations to absent class members are being violated." 34 '
There is some evidence that courts have achieved success in reducing
attorneys' fees through the use of judicially supervised competitive
bidding.342 Grundfest observed that, based on an admittedly small
sample of cases, these lead counsel auctions substantially reduced fee
awards from the 25% to 33% benchmark awards, to the benefit of
investor classes.343
Still, most courts and commentators have heaped criticism on the
use of court-supervised competitive bidding for the selection and
compensation of class counsel in securities cases. Most prominently,
the Third Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by
conducting an auction to select lead counsel in In re Cendant Corp.
Litigation.44 In that case, the district court initially appointed three
public pension plans as co-lead plaintiffs. These institutions had
selected and retained two law firms to represent the class and
negotiated a retainer agreement providing for a decreasing
percentage of recovery. However, the district court determined that
it would select counsel using a competitive bidding (auction)
process. According to the Third Circuit, the PSLRA prohibits the
use of auctions if there is a sufficient showing that a properly
appointed lead plaintiff selected lead counsel as a result of a "good
faith selection and negotiation process ... arrived at via meaningful
arms-length bargaining. " 14 Because the lead plaintiff in that case had
selected and retained counsel through a sufficiently sophisticated and
sincere search prior to the court-ordered auction, the district court
should have appointed as lead counsel the firm selected by the lead
plaintiff.346 The court of appeals vacated the fee award and remanded
341. Grundfest Proposal, supra note 61, at 5.
342. Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 720 ("It appears that the percentage of
the recovery awarded to counsel in the auction cases is often less than that awarded by
traditional methods." (citing testimony provided to the Task Force)).
343. Grundfest Proposal, supra note 61, at 7-8 (observing that no fee award in an
auction case has materially exceeded 20% of the gross settlement amount).
344. 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). A number of federal district courts also have criticized
auctions. See, e.g., Osher v. Guess?, Inc., CV 01-00871, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6057, at *15
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2001) (stating that courts should interfere with lead plaintiffs' selection of
lead counsel "only if it is necessary to protect the interests of the class"); In re MicroStrategy,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 438 (E.D. Va. 2000) (stating that courts should address
the subject of fees awarded to counsel at the conclusion of the litigation and not ex ante).
345. 264 F.3d at 276.
346. Id. at 278. Further, because the retainer agreement negotiated by the lead plaintiff
required lead counsel to obtain the lead plaintiff's prior approval before submitting a fee
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the case to the lower court to dismiss the fee application. In
evaluating the resubmitted fee application, the Third Circuit
instructed the district court to "seriously consider[]" the possibility
that the presumption of reasonableness accorded to ex ante fee
agreements was rebutted insofar as "this was a simple case in terms of
liability with respect to Cendant, and the case was settled at a very
347
early stage, after little formal discovery.
Prompted by its then-pending review of the class counsel auction
procedure adopted in the Cendant case, the Third Circuit also
commissioned a Task Force on the Appointment of Counsel in Class
Actions to "evaluate the emerging practice of several district court
judges throughout the country of selecting class counsel and setting
fees through [an] auction process." 4 ' Academics argued to the
Appointment Task Force that class counsel auctions violate the letter
and spirit of the PSLRA because they interfere with the lead
plaintiffs' right to select counsel and may discourage institutional
investors from seeking the role of lead plaintiff as Congress intended.
The Appointment Task Force agreed, concluding that "the risks and
complications associated with a judicially-controlled auction counsel
against its use except under certain limited circumstances." '49
Other commentators have questioned whether auction
methodologies could produce reasonable fees in any event. For
example, Jill Fisch has asserted that the class counsel auctions
employed by courts to date have been fraught with problems in their
design and implementation."' According to Fisch, even wellstructured auctions are unlikely to produce reasonable fee awards or
result in the appointment of the most qualified law firms, and,
further, use of auction procedures reduces the accountability of class
counsel and compromises the proper role of the court.3 5'

application for court review, and because there was insufficient evidence that the lead plaintiff
gave prior approval, the Third Circuit ordered that the district court should refuse to accept
any other fee application submitted without the lead plaintiffs prior approval. Id. at 286.
347. Id. at 285.
348. See Press Release, Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Creation of Task Force (Jan. 30,
2001) (on file with author).
349. Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 704.
350. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class
Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 650 (2002).
351. Id. at 725-26.
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3. Appointing lead plaintiffs based on selection of counsel
After receiving criticism for using competitive bidding to select
lead counsel, Judge Walker took a different approach to controlling
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in In re Copper Mountain Networks
Securities Litigation.5 2 In that case, three candidates-two individual
shareholders, Quinn Barton and William Chenoweth, and a group of
five individual investors led by David Cavanaugh-competed for the
appointment of lead plaintiff in the consolidated actions. 3 ' The
Cavanaugh group collectively had the largest loss of the three
contenders (in fact, each member of the Cavanaugh group claimed
to have lost more money than the other two candidates combined),
and the group qualified as the presumptively most adequate
plaintiff.354 However, rather than simply appointing the Cavanaugh
group as lead plaintiff, Judge Walker interviewed the three
prospective appointees about their knowledge of the case, their
negotiations with law firms, and their ability to monitor the
performance of the lawyers for the putative investor class.
Chenoweth revealed that he had not retained counsel, and Judge
Walker disqualified him from further consideration as lead
plaintiff.3 5 The Cavanaugh group represented that they had retained
the nationally known plaintiffs' firm Milberg Weiss and had entered
into a contingent fee contract calling for the lawyers to receive an
increasing percentage of the recovery up to 30%.35 ' Barton disclosed
that he had hired Beattie and Osborne, a small New York firm,
under a fee agreement that would pay between 10% and 15% of the
recovery with a cap of $8 million.3 5 7 Based upon this evidence, Judge
Walker determined that "[t]he significant differences in potential
attorney fees" could not "be rationally explained by intangible
factors such as the well-recognized brand name in securities
litigation" of Milberg Weiss. 35 ' The court entered an order finding

352. In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (consolidated with In
re Copper Mountain Networks Sec. Litig.).
353. Id.at 479.
354.

Id. at 487.

355.

Id.

356. Id. at 480.
357. Id. at 479.
358. Id. at 488.
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that the Cavanaugh group was inadequate and appointing Barton as
lead plaintiff.3" 9
After the Cavanaugh group petitioned for writ of mandamus, the
Ninth Circuit reversed Judge Walker in In re Cavanaugh.36 ° On
behalf of the panel, Judge Alex Kozinski admonished the lower court
for "engag[ing] in freewheeling comparison of the parties competing
for lead plaintiff."36 ' Articulating its vision of the proper role of the
court in reducing agency costs, the court of appeals held that the
only statutory basis for comparing candidates for appointment as
lead plaintiff is the size of their financial stakes in the case. Once it
identifies the presumptively most adequate plaintiff, the district court
then must provide other plaintiffs with the opportunity to rebut the
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff meets the typicality and
adequacy requirements under Rule 23(a). However, the court's
further inquiry is not normative; it is objective. According to the
Ninth Circuit, "[s]o long as the plaintiff with the largest losses
satisfies the typicality and adequacy requirements, he is entitled to
lead plaintiff status, even if the district
court is convinced that some
36 2
other plaintiff would do a better job.
Although Judge Kozinski could have ended his opinion at that
point, he did not. The court went on to instruct that the
presumptive lead plaintiff's choice of counsel and fee arrangements
have only limited relevance in the determination of adequacy under
Rule 23(a). "[T]he district court has no authority to select for the
class what it considers to be the best possible lawyer or the lawyer
offering the best possible fee" arrangement.36 3 According to the
Ninth Circuit, the determination of adequacy for lead plaintiffs in
securities cases is no different than the adequacy determination for
the proposed class representative in any other class action
litigation." Judge Kozinski articulated a more circumscribed role for
359. Id. at 488-89.
360. 306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2002).
361. Id.at 732.
362. Id.; see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 268 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[O]nce
the presumption is triggered, the question is not whether another movant might do a better
job of protecting the interests of the class than the presumptive lead plaintiff; instead, the
question is whether anyone can prove that the presumptive lead plaintiff will not do a 'fair[]
and adequate[]' job. We ...stress that the inquiry is not a relative one.").
363. Cavanaugh,306 F.3d at 732.
364. Id. at 736. Contra Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 483 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the PSLRA raised the threshold for proof of adequacy), reh'g denied,
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presiding judges in reforming securities class actions: "While we
share the learned district judge's concern for reducing the cost of
securities class actions, and for making plaintiffs more responsible, we
believe the way to accomplish these purposes is to diligently apply
the terms of the Reform Act."365 The PSLRA confers on lead
plaintiffs the right to select and retain lead counsel. The Cavanaugh
decision stands for the proposition that the PSLRA thereby delimits
the courts' authority to take certain actions to reduce agency costs in
securities cases.
Perhaps, however, federal judges possess extrastatutory authority
to reduce agency costs. Perhaps the courts have a fiduciary obligation
to protect absent class members from opportunistic lawyers. The
next Part considers but rejects this possibility.
IV. JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: JUDGES AS FIDUCIARIES OF
ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS

In many of their decisions reducing attorneys' fees, judges refer
to themselves as "fiduciaries" (or "agents" or "guardians") of the
absent class members.366 Similar language is found in the opinions of
courts ordering competitive bidding by prospective lead counsel.36 7
How and why did judges become characterized as fiduciaries to
absent class members? The origin of the fiduciary judge mantra is
unclear. However, both the 1985 Third Circuit Task Force and a
few appellate courts have articulated the following rationale for

279 F.3d 313, 313 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that the lead plaintiff should be capable of
understanding and controlling the litigation).
365. Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 736.
366. See, e.g., In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1064 (E.D.
Mo. 2002); In re 3Com Sec. Litig., No. C-97-21083 EAI, slip op. at 5, 10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9,
2001); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2001); In re Bausch
& Lomb, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.R.D. 78, 82 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd.
P'ships Litig., 985 F. Supp. 410, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Feinberg v. Hibernia Corp., 966 F.
Supp. 442, 446 (E.D. La. 1997); In re Quantum Health Res., Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1256
(C.D. Cal. 1997). Courts also have described judges as "fiduciaries" for absent class members
in approving settlements in class actions. See, e.g., Grunin v. Int'l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d
114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that under Rule 23(e), "[the] district court acts as a
fiduciary who must serve as aguardian of the rights of absent class members").
367. See, e.g., In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 967, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2001); In
re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467, 468 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In re Oracle Sec. Litig.,
131 F.R.D. 688, 691 (N.D. Cal. 1990); cf.In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D.
71, 82-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining the rationale for auctioning the role of class counsel in
antitrust litigation).
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depicting judges as fiduciaries: once class counsel reaches agreement
with the defendants to compromise the class claims, counsel assumes
a position adverse to absent class members with respect to how large
a fee she should receive from the class recovery fund.368 Abandoned
by their counsel, no one represents the absent class members at this
point in the proceeding. In the absence of any other representatives
safeguarding their interests, the presiding judge must become the
advocate for absent class members and must serve as the "fiduciary"
for absentees in reviewing class counsel's fee application.3 69 In other
words, presiding judges become fiduciaries by default. As the Ninth
Circuit explained:
[A]t the fee-setting stage, "[p]laintiffs'

counsel, otherwise a

fiduciary for the class, has become a claimant against the fund

created for the benefit of the class. It is obligatory, therefore, for
the trial court judge to act with 'a jealous regard to the rights of
in the fund' in determining what a proper
those Who are3 7interested
0
fee award

is.",

Other appellate court opinions seem to indicate that the courts'
fiduciary status derives from Rule 23 itself. An early decision of the
Third Circuit provided that "[t]he ultimate responsibility [to those
not before the court] is committed to the district court in whom, as
the guardian of the rights of the absentees, is vested broad
administrative, as well as adjudicative, power. 3' 71 Of course,
characterizing any person as a fiduciary only begins the analysis. 72

368. In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir.
1994); Task Force 1985 Report, supra note 54, at 25.
369. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 255 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that the
court is the agent designated to oversee the relationship for class members because clients have
no effective means to oversee counsel's inherent conflicts of interest); In re Oracle Sec. Litig.,
131 F.RD. 688, 691 (N.D. Cal. 1990); see also Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., No.
95C3193, 1999 WL 172313, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 1999), vacated in part on other
grounds, 1999 WL 299898 (N.D. I11.May 3, 1999); Hallet v. Li & Fung, Ltd., No. 95 Civ.
8917, 1998 WL 698354, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1998); In re Gould Sec. Litig., 727 F. Supp.
1201, 1203 (N.D. I11.1989) ("[T]his Court must act as 'fiduciary for the fund's beneficiaries
and must carefully monitor disbursement to the attorneys by scrutinizing the fee
applications."' (quoting Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1988))).
370. In reWash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted).
371. Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973).
372. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
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Although commentators have used this powerful rhetoric,3 73 the
literature does not include any evaluations of the courts' role as
fiduciary or the consequences of the courts assuming fiduciary duties
to absent class members. Review of fiduciary law principles makes
clear that, as a matter of both law and public policy, courts cannot
act as fiduciaries.
A. The Nature of FiduciaryRelationships
The concept of fiduciary originated in the law of trusts. Literally,
the term fiduciary means "faithfulness" and denotes a trustee, or one
in a position of trust.374 As applied in trust law, the fiduciary trustee
holds title to, but not ownership of, the property of the beneficiary,
who can claim the benefits of ownership but who lacks legal title.
The common law imposed on trustees the duty to manage the trust
corpus prudently, and fiduciary law strictly prohibited the trustees
from personally dealing in trust property regardless of whether the
self-dealing harmed the interests of the beneficiary.
The common law of fiduciary developed as courts applied the
trustee-beneficiary construct in other contexts where the relation
between fiduciary and principal was characterized by trust and
confidence.37
Fiduciary responsibilities arise from diverse
associations typically involving delegation of management power by
the owner of assets to another person, the fiduciary, and some
express or implied commitment by the fiduciary to exercise her

373. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating
Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 2119, 2168 (2000) ("Whether by MDL or class action and whether in federal or state
court, judges have long-standing fiduciary obligations to absentees to ensure the integrity,
fairness, and legitimacy of settlements in aggregate litigation."); Grundfest Proposal, supra
note 61, at 5 ("The court, name plaintiff, and counsel owe fiduciary obligations to absent class
members."); see also Koniak & Cohen, supra note 92, at 1122 ("Ostensibly, the court stands in
for the client as a fiduciary to ensure that the settlement is fair to the client and does not
merely serve the lawyer's interest.").
374. ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIPS AND RESULTING TRUSTS 1 (1955).
375. Because of numerous and diverse applications of fiduciary principles, academics and
courts have struggled to create a complete unifying theory for fiduciary relationships. J.C.
SHEPARD, LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 52-88 (1981) (listing and critiquing various descriptive
theories, including those based upon property, reliance, unequal relationship, contract, unjust
enrichment, commercial utility, and power and discretion); see also Robert Cooter & Bradley J.
Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045 (1991).
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discretion to promote the interests of the beneficiary. Some fiduciary
responsibilities arise from the status of the trusted person and the
trusting person, such as the obligations of trustees to beneficiaries,
agents to principals, guardians to wards, partners one to another,
directors to corporations, and lawyers to their clients. 76 The law
does not recognize the relationship of judge to litigant or judge to
underrepresented party as a status-based fiduciary relationship.
However, the law will recognize certain fiduciary relationships
beyond those the law has already established based upon particular
circumstances. Analytically, courts often determine whether a party
acted as a fiduciary in fact by first identifying analogous status
relationships where established law already has imposed fiduciary
obligations. Then, courts decide whether the relationship under
review is sufficiently similar to the paradigm case to support an
extension of fiduciary obligations to that relationship.37 7
Once the courts determine that a relationship is fiduciary in
nature, the inquiry turns to the obligations of the fiduciary to the
beneficiary. Judicial opinions variously describe the responsibilities of
fiduciaries to act in "utmost good faith," 7 ' or with "undivided and
unselfish loyalty"379 or with "the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive." 380 Regardless of the phraseology chosen, fiduciaries
cannot act simply in their own self-interest. In addition, fiduciary law
articulates rules of conduct-so-called duties-applying to those
persons found to be fiduciaries.3 8 ' Imposition of duties reduces the
beneficiary's risk that the fiduciary will take or otherwise misuse
property belonging to the beneficiary as well as the risk that the
fiduciary will behave carelessly. Here, too, courts resort to analogy in
order to determine the rules applicable to fiduciaries in particular
circumstances. Those legal rules then govern subsequent
determinations as to whether the fiduciary has acted wrongly and, if
so, what monetary and nonmonetary remedies are available to
376. VINTER, supra note 375, at 9.
377. Seegenerally id.at 11-12.
378. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
379. Id.
380. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.).
381. In his positivist theory of fiduciary duties, Robert Clark identified four legal
attributes of fiduciary relationships: (1) affirmative duties to disclose; (2) open-ended duties to
act; (3) closed-in rights to positional advantages; and (4) moral rhetoric. Robert C. Clark,
Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF
BUSINESS 55, 71-79 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
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redress that wrongful conduct. For example, the law describes
corporate directors as fiduciaries of the corporation, imposing on
them duties of care and loyalty, including the duty to avoid usurping
corporate opportunities. These duties enable beneficiaries to rely on
their fiduciaries' honesty. If a director violates her fiduciary duties,
the corporation may sue to require her to disgorge all gains arising
from her wrongful acts.
As the law has evolved, the duties imposed by fiduciary status
vary depending upon the circumstances of the relationship, including
facts such as the positions of the trusted party and the trusting party;
the ability of the trusted party to influence the trusting party; the
allocation of function, if any, to the trusted party; and the potential
for opportunistic behavior. Not surprisingly, then, the law subjects
trustees to more stringent restrictions on their use of trust property
than corporate officers face in transacting with the corporation. 8 2
B. Why Judges Cannot Serve as Fiduciaries
The imposition of fiduciary status on judges presiding over
securities class actions is misplaced. In making awards of attorneys'
fees to class counsel under the common-fund doctrine, judges
determine the allocation of the common fund, a fund consisting of
assets belonging both to the class and, under equitable principles, to
class counsel as well." 3 Neither the class nor its counsel actually
entrusts property to the court, nor does the court accept property
and consent to serve anyone. Judges derive their power to allocate
the common fund from their judicial office and from the equitable
common-fund doctrine. Despite their considerable discretion to
award attorneys' fees from the common fund, judges who rule on fee
applications do not have legal title or even actual access to the assets
in that fund, and the common-fund doctrine does not make absent
class members' assets vulnerable to judges themselves.
More importantly, imposing fiduciary status on the courts is
inconsistent with the PSLRA's empowered lead plaintiff model.
Congress did not legislate reforms requiring judges themselves to act
382.

Id.

383. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 536 (1881) (noting that attorneys have
claim to fees payable out of common fund created through their efforts); see also In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 589 (3d Cir. 1984) (dividing predistribution interest
earned on the common fund between class counsel and the class in proportion to each party's
interest in the fund).
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as class representatives. Instead, by enacting the lead plaintiff
provisions of the PSLRA, federal lawmakers adopted a novel
mechanism for regulating opportunism by class counsel, enabling
enhanced oversight by financially interested class members who can
better internalize the interests of the absent class members than can
judges. Congress gave to the courts very specific statutory
responsibilities: to approve the lead plaintiff's selection and retention
of lead counsel and to ensure that the total fees and costs awarded to
plaintiffs' counsel do not exceed a reasonable percentage of any
damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class. Nothing
in the PSLRA evidences a congressional intent that courts fulfill
fiduciary responsibilities to absent class members. Similarly, nothing
in Rule 23 contemplates that the court itself will represent the
investor class.
Instead, the PSLRA and Rule 23 require the courts to enforce
the duties of others deemed to be fiduciaries to absent class
members, namely, the lead plaintiff and lead counsel. Courts enforce
these persons' duties when courts engage in their statutorily
mandated review of the lead plaintiffs' selections for lead counsel and
the proposed terms of retention. At the conclusion of the case,
courts again consider whether the lead plaintiffs and lead counsel
have fulfilled their duties in reviewing and approving the terms of
any settlement and attorneys' fees and costs requested by plaintiffs'
counsel. Thus, fiduciary jurisprudence gives content to the
responsibilities of lead plaintiffs vis-a-vis the class, including the lead
plaintiff's duty to the class "to obtain the highest quality
representation at the lowest price.' 3 84 Just as courts do not become
fiduciaries themselves in cases involving trusts, bankruptcies,
corporate governance disputes, guardianships over infants or the
mentally incompetent, or the like, so too in this context the law
simply calls upon judges to evaluate other fiduciaries' qualifications,
activities, and requests for compensation.
If judges nonetheless attempt to act as fiduciaries, they may
defeat the objectives of the PSLRA by disempowering lead
plaintiffs.3 8 ' This possibility is not simply theoretical. In Wenderhold
384. In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
385. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 696 (N.D. Cal. 1990) ("For a court
simply to fix a percentage contingent fee without seeking competitive alternatives is thus
inconsistent with the court's fiduciary duty to the class.").
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v.Cylink Corp.,386 Judge Walker invoked his purported fiduciary
responsibilities to absent class members when he disempowered the
lead plaintiff from selecting and retaining counsel and ordered
competitive bidding instead. "As a general matter, the lead plaintiff
selects lead counsel to represent the class subject to the court's
approval.... The court, however, is charged with ensuring that the
class receives quality representation at a fair price and cannot,
therefore, simply defer to lead plaintiffs choice of counsel."3 87 The
prospect that a fiduciary judge will select lead counsel herself
through a bidding process or will disregard the retention agreement
negotiated by the lead plaintiff may disable lead plaintiffs from
obtaining prospectively binding compensation commitments from
putative lead counsel."' Also, the greater the likelihood that the
court will substitute its judgment for that of the lead plaintiff, the
fewer the number of law firms that will choose to compete for the
appointment. The lead plaintiffs ability to bargain for the benefit of
the class will suffer. The result is a weakening of the incentives for
institutional investors and others with greater stakes to participate as
lead plaintiffs in securities class actions.389
Applying fiduciary lexicon to judges presiding over class actions
is also inconsistent with the mission of the federal bench under our
adversarial system of justice. Article III judges decide cases or
controversies on the law and the facts. They do not represent
litigants or interested parties in litigation. They do not advocate on
behalf of any of the parties. They are not loyal to any of the parties.
The Code of Conduct for Judges makes clear the importance of an

386. 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
387. Id. at 587. The lead plaintiff, an individual,
almost certainly does not have the expertise and resources of a large institutional
investor. His ability to select and monitor the conduct of class counsel on behalf of
the entire class throughout the duration of this litigation is, therefore, inherently less
than that of the ideal lead plaintiff contemplated by Congress.
Id.
388. Judge Walker justified the need for judges to override the decisions of lead plaintiffs
when he wrote, "If the court were acting as a private fiduciary, the law would require [the
court] to obtain the best price the market would yield for the services of the class's lawyers." In
re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 692 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
389. Institutional investors have claimed that "the major incentive for [institutional]
participation [as lead plaintiff] ... is the opportunity to negotiate a counsel fee for the benefit
of the class." Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 754 n.227.
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independent and impartial bench. 9 ° "Judges have been schooled to
remain independent and aloof ... ."'9' Thus, fiduciary judging is
contrary to the accepted model of appropriate judicial behavior. To
use one analogy, courts more typically act like umpires, calling balls
and strikes, or deciding whether a player is out or safe. 3 92 The parties
play the game in our adversarial system, not the judges. The judge as
umpire looks over the parties' shoulders to "keep[] the playing field
level"'3 93 but does not play the game for them. If the judge plays the
game for or with the parties, he may become a "blind and
blundering intruder, acting in spasms as sudden flashes of seeming
light may lead or mislead him." '3 94 Given the mindset, not to
mention the workload, of the federal bench, it is not realistic to
expect that most district court judges can embrace the responsibility
to advocate as fiduciaries for absent class members.
To be sure, the very nature of class action litigation makes absent
class members vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by class counsel.
Like other litigants, some, perhaps many, absent class members
would say that they repose trust and confidence in the integrity and
fidelity of the courts to police class action settlements for collusion
and to award counsel a fair fee from the common fund. If polled,
plaintiffs' attorneys possibly would say that they, too, repose trust
and confidence in the court's ability to compensate them fairly.
However, it does not follow from the fund claimants' state of mind
that the court assumes fiduciary obligations to them.3 9 Judges
390. Canon I states that "a judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary." CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES (2000). Canon 2 provides that "a judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." Id. Finally, Canon 3
states that "a judge should perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently." Id. The
commentary for Canon 2 sets forth the test for the appearance of impropriety as "whether the
conduct would create in reasonable minds ... a perception that the judge's ability to carry out
judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence is impaired." Id.
391. Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action
Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 406 (1987).
392. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1033 (1975).
393. Jay Tidmarsh, UnattainableJustice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits
ofJudicialPower, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1745 (1992).
394. Marvin E. Frankel, supra note 393, at 1042; see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, The
Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 & n.20, 15
(1978).
395. In any event, the law does not require a finding of actual trust before imposing
fiduciary duties. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209,
1227-28 (1995).
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exercise legal or equitable discretion without presumptively assuming
the responsibilities to advocate for and act in the best interest of one
of the parties affected by their decisions. The courts rarely, if ever,
express that they intend to act on behalf of a litigant, much less that
they will act solely in that party's best interests as her fiduciary.
Indeed, trust and confidence in the courts are premised upon judges
acting impartially when making their determinations. In order to
maintain legitimacy for judicial decisions, the bench must remain an
independent institution, unrestrained by the responsibility to
advocate on behalf of a particular party, even if that party otherwise
becomes underrepresented. Courts using this argot gratuitously
undertake undefined obligations that absent class members cannot
enforce in any event.
Even assuming some benefit in placing the fiduciary mantle on
judges, courts portraying themselves as fiduciaries fail to articulate
what the status requires in this context, much less what they have
done to satisfy their fiduciary duties for the benefit of absent class
members. The invocation of the court-as-fiduciary vernacular does
not follow from judicial admissions that, unless restrained, judges
awarding attorneys' fees to class counsel may pursue their own selfinterests at the expense of absent class members. Certainly courts
describing themselves as fiduciaries have not intended to restrain
their own discretion. Rather, courts seem to use this language to
justify their discretion, i.e., to justify decisions to award reduced
compensation (even absent any objection to class counsel's petition
for attorneys' fees) or to auction the position of class counsel to the
lowest bidding firm despite the lack of statutory authority to do so.
If systematically adopted, such decisions, while well-intentioned, may
damage the interests of defrauded shareholders in the long run by
diminishing the incentives for the private attorney general to enforce
the securities laws.
Perhaps characterizing presiding judges as "fiduciaries" performs
an expressive function when used by appellate courts or their blueribbon panels. The rhetoric expresses that someone is looking out
for the absent class members. When used by appellate courts, the
language also may serve to communicate to the district bench that
they should take care when engaging in the difficult task of
approving settlements and awarding fees to class counsel. Further, by
articulating to judges that they must act to protect the interests of
absentees, the bench will review fee petitions with a heightened
1322
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cognizance of the danger of lawyer opportunism. Nonetheless, the
judge-as-fiduciary metaphor invokes images, if not rules, in conflict
with the accepted notion of judges as unbiased umpires in our
adversarial system of justice. In light of these prudential concerns, it
is preferable for courts to avoid using such language in describing
the role of district judges overseeing class actions.
Finally, courts need not assume the responsibilities of fiduciaries
themselves in order to reduce agency costs in securities class actions.
To reform securities class actions, the courts must require the lead
plaintiffs to fulfill their fiduciary duties to the injured plaintiffs that
they represent. One special competence of the judiciary as an
institution lies in its ability to enforce fiduciary responsibilities and
mayPSLRA.
best judge
how courts
I turn
requirements."'
procedural
in the
the now
modelto adopted
fiduciaries under
the true class
V. REDUCING AGENCY COSTS BY JUDGING
FIDUCIARIES MORE EFFECTIVELY

If embraced by district court judges, the legislatively sanctioned
mechanism for aligning the incentives of class counsel with those of
the class-the PSLRA's empowered lead plaintiff model-will reduce
agency costs in securities class actions more efficiently and effectively
than fiduciary judging without threatening the values inherent in the
umpireal model of adversarial adjudication.
The PSLRA does not rely upon ex post judicial paternalism to
protect absent class members from opportunistic class counsel, nor
does the statute place responsibility on the federal bench to select
and retain the lawyers. Rather, the statute divides responsibility for
monitoring class counsel between the lead plaintiff and the court, as
evidenced by the statute's lead plaintiff selection rule, lead counsel
selection rule, and the attorneys' fee rule. Both the text of the
PSLRA and the Conference Report 97 make clear that presiding
judges retain authority to approve fees and expenses,39 but it is fair
to say that lawmakers recognized that ex post judicial review of the

396. Nat Stern, The Practicalityof Outreach Statutes Enforcing Directors'Duty of Care,
72 NEB. L. REv. 905, 920 (1993).
397. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995).
398. Moreover, Congress left undisturbed the courts' authority to determine adequacy
under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) and to determine the fairness of settlements under FED. R CIV.

P. 23(e).
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lawyers' fee petition is "an imperfect safeguard" at best. 99 Therefore,
Congress provided the courts with a statutory standard for exercising
their authority over class counsel compensation-the attorneys' fee
provision-as well as new procedures for doing so-the empowered
lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA.
A. The Responsibilitiesof Lead Plaintiffs as Class Fiduciaries
In order to comply with the statute and fulfill their duties as
fiduciaries, lead plaintiffs must search for high-quality counsel willing
to do the work on the terms most favorable to the class. Unlike the
presiding judge, the most adequate plaintiff (presumably a large and
sophisticated investor, if not an institutional investor) has a
substantial interest in the outcome of the lawsuit. Absent any reason
to believe that the lead plaintiff is atypical or inadequate to represent
the class (which should have disqualified the lead plaintiff from
appointment), it is safe to assume that the interests of the lead
plaintiff in maximizing the recovery for the class are aligned with
those of the absent class members. Thus, the lead plaintiff's cx ante
selection and negotiation with lead counsel over the terms of the
representation best provide lead counsel with incentives designed to
reduce agency costs. Because of their incentives, as well as their
experience, sophistication, and access to information about the
lawyers' performance and compensation in prior comparable
lawsuits, lead plaintiffs are in a better position than the courts to
assess accurately the risk of opportunism.
Although the PSLRA initially inspired few institutional investors
to come forward and volunteer for the role of lead plaintiff,4 °° that
situation has changed. In the past several years, as more and more
public companies have restated their financials, and as the SEC has
opened one accounting fraud investigation after another of major
corporations, institutions have become active participants in private
enforcement.4 1 Most of the institutions volunteering to serve as lead
399.
400.

Unfaithful Champion, supra note 132, at 5, 31.
SEC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE

CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION

REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 2, 4, 55-56 (1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/lreform.txt.
401. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8525 (S.D.N.Y.
May 22, 2003) (naming New York State Common Retirement Fund, alleging losses of $306
million, as lead plaintiff); In re AOL Time Warner Inc. Sec. & "ERISA" Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist.
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plaintiff are public pension funds and union pension plans regulated
under the Taft-Hartley Act,4" 2 but other institutions have sought
appointments as well.4" 3 In fact, institutional investors increasingly
have competed against each other for the role of lead plaintiff in
financial fraud megacases like those brought against Cendant, Waste
Management, Bank of America, Enron, and WorldCom.4 °4
Commenting on how the recent financial fraud scandals have
encouraged institutional activism, Milberg Weiss' Bill Lerach recently
wrote,
Now institutional investors are involved in almost every securities
class action case. I spend a lot of time with institutional
investors.... Pension funds that would not have considered
litigation five years ago-not even considered it-today are willing
to march into federal or state court to assert their rights as
shareholders. 405
What motivates institutions to seek appointments as lead
plaintiff? A number of institutions told the Third Circuit Task Force
that they wanted to control the selection and compensation of class
counsel.40 6 Experience demonstrates that institutions applying for the
role of lead plaintiff can and do negotiate fee agreements with
putative lead counsel before selecting the attorneys for the class. In
LEXIS 145, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2003) (naming Minnesota State Board of Investment,
alleging losses of more than $249 million, as lead plaintiff); In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206
F.R.D. 427, 451-58 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (naming Regents of the University of California,
alleging losses of $144 million, as lead plaintiff); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D 144,
147 (D.N.J. 1998) (naming New York City Pension Funds, New York State Common
Retirement Fund, and California Public Employees' Retirement System, with combined losses
of $89 million, as co-lead plaintiffs).
402. The Taft-Hartley Act regulates any employee benefit plan funded with employer
contributions if a union or union representative has authority to administer the plan or manage
its assets. 29 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). Union pension funds have invested more than $5 trillion in
assets by recent estimates. Steven Greenhouse, Labor to Press for Changes in Corporate
Governance, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at C7.
403. See, e.g., Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P'ship v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
212 F.R.D. 400 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (appointing investment partnership as co-lead plaintiff); In
re EquiMed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17976 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2002)
(appointing investment company as lead plaintiff).
404. See, e.g., Edward Iwata, Law Firms Tussle over Enron Case, USA TODAY, Feb. 12,
2002, at lB.
405. LERACH, supra note 70, at 17.
406. Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 761-62 & n.258; see also Fisch, supra note
351, at 709 (reporting results of interviews with approximately a half-dozen counsel of public
pension plans that have volunteered most frequently to serve as lead plaintiffs).

1325

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2003

the Waste Management megalitigation, for example, lead plaintiff
Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust funds negotiated a
contingent fee agreement with lead counsel Goodkind Labaton
Rudoff & Sucharow at the outset of the case. The pact included a
provision capping the attorneys' fees if the case settled after
resolution of motions to dismiss but before a decision on motions
for summary judgment. The court approved the contract fees as
reasonable and awarded counsel 7.93% of the cash recovered for the
class in the megasettlement, or $36.225 million of the $457 million
recovery fund. Acting as lead plaintiff in the megalawsuit arising
from the Enron debacle, the University of California Board of
Regents also negotiated a contingent fee contract with lead counsel
Milberg Weiss calling for a fee below 10% of any recovery 40 7 -again,
substantially lower
than the 25% benchmark previously utilized by
40 8
many courts.
To the extent public and union pension plans have assumed the
role of lead plaintiff in a number of lawsuits, they have become
repeat players rather than one-shot purchasers of class counsel
services and can negotiate superior fee agreements with better
information. Presumably, qualifying lead plaintiffs also are more
sophisticated, "cost-conscious" purchasers of legal services than
other investors. Many institutions serving as lead plaintiffs employ inhouse attorneys and even outside law firms to investigate and
evaluate potential claims in advance of interviewing putative lead
counsel. In any event, applicants for lead counsel under the PSLRA
must negotiate the terms of their retention with potential clients
who are motivated by their greater losses to participate in the

407. Jeffrey Toobin, The Man Chasing Enron: Why America's C.E.O.'s Hate Bill Lerach,
NEW YORKER, Sept. 9, 2002, at 86, 92. Under the fee agreement, plaintiffs' lawyers would
accept 8% of the first billion dollars in recovery, 9% of the second billion, and 10% of any
recovery over $2 billion. Id.; see also Maureen Milford, UC Takes Charge of Enron Suit, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 4, 2002, at A15, A18.
408. Acting outside the spotlight, some institutions not serving as lead plaintiffs also have
persuaded class counsel to reduce their fee requests without filing formal objections. Keith L.
Johnson & Douglas M. Hagerman, The Elephant in Your General Counsel's Office: Managing
Losses to Legal Fees in Shareholder Class Actions, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, March/April
2001, at 8 (citing various examples). In addition, public pension funds have assembled data
used to evaluate fee applications in securities class actions. Id. Institutional Shareholder
Services, a provider of proxy voting and corporate governance services to institutional
investors, has established a proprietary database for tracking securities class actions from initial
filing to payment of claims. See Governance Matters-Institutional Shareholder Services, at
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/analytics/scas/index.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
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litigation. Lead plaintiff candidates (ideally, institutional investors)
will bargain over fees and, perhaps, even send the engagement out
for competitive bidding. In scrutinizing fee proposals, these injured
investors can consider the likelihood that the lawsuit will generate a
megafund or will settle early, the probability that the case will survive
the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the settlements and fee
awards in like litigation. They also can assess the quality of service
variations among potential counsel, evaluating which law firm
proposal likely would maximize the net recovery for the class. Based
upon good faith judgments about these and other similar factors,
lead plaintiffs will select lead counsel and negotiate her retention
accordingly. Perhaps lead plaintiffs and counsel will agree to more
than one contingency fee, depending on the stage of the litigation or
a particular litigation event (e.g., settlement, trial, appeal). Perhaps
they will design a fee structure involving differing percentages,
capped amounts, or some combination for each contingency. By
bargaining at the inception of the litigation, "in the shadow of the
litigation's uncertainty," lead plaintiffs and candidates for the
position of lead counsel can assess intelligently "the costs and
benefits of particular systems and risk multipliers."4" 9
B. Judging the Lead Plaintiffs and Their Proposed Lawyers
The lead plaintiff cannot meet her fiduciary duty to maximize the
recovery for the class unless she has bargained with the attorneys in
good faith, employing independent decision-making. For this reason,
courts should order appointees to access the market and negotiate
the terms of a fee agreement with prospective lead counsel ex ante. 1 °
After negotiating the terms of retention in the usual marketplace
manner, the lead plaintiff then should submit the proposal in camera
for the court's approval. Before approving the lead plaintiffs
selection and retention agreement, the presiding judge should
require the lead plaintiff to make sworn representations to the court
sufficient to satisfy the court that the lead plaintiff negotiated
counsel's compensation in "an open and appropriately arm's length
manner" and that the retention agreement "include[s] all of the

409. In reSynthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 718-19 (7th Cir. 2001).
410. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 276 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he proposed
counsel fees [should] be the result of hard- bargaining." (quoting In re Nice Sys. Sec. Litig.,
188 F.R.D. 206,223 (D.N.J. 1999))).
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features normally contained in comparable arrangements that are
negotiated directly between counsel and client.", 4 11 Putative lead
counsel, too, should be ordered to disclose its qualifications to serve
as lead counsel and the existence and extent of any conflicting
interests.41 2
Assuming these procedural prerequisites are met, the court
should presume the reasonableness of the proposed agreement4 13 and
simply retain the ultimate authority to revise the fee if later
extraordinary circumstances warrant. This retention of authority is
consistent with the courts' statutory obligation to determine that
total attorneys' fees and expenses awarded do not exceed a
reasonable percentage of any damages and prejudgment interest
actually paid to the class,414 a finding the court cannot make without
a determination of what monies the class will receive from settlement
or, more rarely, by litigated judgment.
However, courts should not interfere with an arms-length
negotiated fee except when presented with proof of fraud, duress, or
unconscionability-the same extraordinary circumstances recognized
for voiding agreements under contract law. As the Third Circuit
recognized in In re Cendant Corp. Litigation, the appointed lead
plaintiff is in the best position to determine the fee for lead counsel
at the inception of the litigation.4"' Courts should not second-guess

411. Task Force 1985 Report, supra note 54, at 256; see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig.,
264 F.3d 201, 276 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he ultimate inquiry is always whether the lead
plaintiffs choices were the result of a good faith selection and negotiation process and were
arrived at via meaningful arm's length bargaining."). Grundfest has proposed a series of five
appropriate questions for a presiding judge to ask lead plaintiffs before approving their
selection and retention of lead counsel. Grundfest Proposal, supranote 61, at 10-11.
412. Where the court has appointed a public pension plan or Taft-Hartley plan as lead
plaintiff, the court must not overlook the danger that potential class counsel may have
exchanged political contributions for the right to represent the class. See Kevin McCoy,
Campaign Contributions or Conflicts of Interest?, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2001, at lB. If the
law firm selected by the lead plaintiff has contributed to the campaign of any elected official
with responsibilities for administering the fund or who could influence the selection of lead
counsel, the court should exercise its discretion to disapprove the law firm as lead counsel.
413. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[U]nder the
PSLRA, courts should accord a presumption of reasonableness to any fee request submitted
pursuant to a retainer agreement that was entered into between a properly- selected lead
plaintiff and a properly-selected lead counsel."). The possibility that class counsel will underinvest in the litigation exists regardless of the method used to calculate the fee because no fee
arrangement can perfectly align the interests of class counsel and the class in all circumstances.
414. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2000).
415. 264 F.3d 201, 282 (3d Cir. 2001).
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the lead plaintiff at the conclusion of the case without evidence of
some wrongdoing or conflict; judges cannot assess fairly the
reasonableness of contingent fees after the outcome of the lawsuit
and the hours of work expended on that outcome become known
definitively. Furthermore, the advantages of the empowered lead
plaintiff model will be undermined if, at the end of the litigation,
counsel may not receive the full fee negotiated with the lead plaintiff
or, alternatively, if counsel may renegotiate the terms of the retainer
upward with the court. 416
The court's role, then, is not to be the fiduciary, but to judge the
fiduciary-to assess whether the lead plaintiff has fulfilled its fiduciary
duties to the absent class members and to enforce those duties. In
approving the selection and retention of lead counsel, the presiding
judge must satisfy herself that the appointed lead plaintiff has fulfilled
its fiduciary obligations. Effective judicial oversight actually will
empower the lead plaintiff to control agency costs by enhancing its
bargaining power vis- -vis potential class counsel. Unlike courtsupervised competitive bidding and similar interventions by presiding
judges," 7 the "judging fiduciaries" approach reconciles the tension
between the courts' authority and the authority of empowered lead
plaintiffs under the PSLRA.
C. Judging FiduciariesReduces Agency Costs andJudicialErrors
By requiring the lead plaintiff to negotiate the terms of retention
with lead counsel at the inception of the litigation, the court will
have evidence of the market value of the attorneys' services.
Assuming competition in the market for legal services, market
pricing should provide representation to the class at the lowest
possible price that will award class counsel with a reasonable profit.4 1
The market will produce a fee and other terms of retention that are
presumptively reasonable. Courts can dispense with ex post market
proxies such as lodestar calculations and lodestar cross-checks,
416. Task Force 1985 Report, supra note 54, at 258.
417. The lead plaintiff selection procedure struck down in In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d
726 (N.D. Cal. 2002), is an example of such an intervention. See supra Part III.B.3.
418. Competition in the market for lead counsel services requires further study. The same
small group of law firms seems to compete for and win the appointment as lead counsel in
securities class actions. See Thomas et al., supra note 135, at 194. There also is evidence that
"Milberg Weiss and other big players in the industry ... have actually tightened their hold on
the litigation since 1995." Alison Frankel, Class Warfare, AM. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 76, 81.
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thereby avoiding time-consuming investigations to determine the
amount of actual work performed by class counsel and the customary
hourly rates in a particular community.
Utilizing the actual compensation contract entered into by class
counsel also reduces the risk of judicial error. The court can avoid
subjective analyses biased by hindsight. No longer will the court have
to speculate about risk or counsel's skill. Assuming a successful
prosecution, plaintiffs' attorneys will receive the compensation
explicitly agreed to by the lead plaintiff and approved by the court at
the inception of the litigation. If the market for lead counsel services
is competitive, lead counsel can be more certain about what
compensation they will obtain if they successfully prosecute the
lawsuit. Class counsel prosecuting similar claims for damages and
facing similar risks will not receive widely differing fee awards. By
according a presumption of reasonableness to the lead plaintiffs ex
ante negotiated terms of retention, more attorneys may enter the
market to represent shareholder classes, and more institutions may
apply for lead plaintiff positions. Only by safeguarding the lead
plaintiff's statutory authority to select and retain lead counsel will the
courts fulfill the legislative scheme.
Finally, the "judging fiduciaries" model will enhance the
legitimacy of the private enforcement regime. Judicial utilization of
contracts negotiated by sophisticated lead plaintiffs may help dispel
the public perception that private securities litigation benefits only
the attorneys and not the investors they purport to represent.
Presiding judges employing this approach need not serve as
advocates in the litigation nor become adversarial to class counsel.
VI. CONCLUSION

Congress attempted to reform securities litigation by inserting
into the lawsuits class representatives, preferably institutional
investors, with economic incentives to hire and monitor class
counsel, much in the way that plaintiff-clients in traditional bipolar
litigation oversee their lawyers. Because institutional involvement in
securities class actions has become more prevalent only recently, it is
still too early to evaluate whether the empowered lead plaintiff
model actually is fulfilling its theoretical promise of reducing agency
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costs. Although some anecdotal evidence exists,41 9 there is much we
do not know about lead plaintiffs' performance in lawsuits.4 2 More
evidence for review will come shortly, as megasecurities class actions
arising from Enron, WorldCom, and other recent corporate frauds
wind their way through the federal judicial system.
What is clear is that the objectives of the PSLRA's empowered
lead plaintiff model cannot be realized unless the bench allowsindeed requires-the most adequate plaintiff to select and retain class
counsel. In exchange for receiving the right to act on behalf of the
class and to select and retain lead counsel, the empowered lead
plaintiffs assume fiduciary responsibilities to absent class members.
They must act to maximize the net litigation recovery for the injured
investors they represent. By requiring empowered lead plaintiffs to
access the market for legal services and negotiate legal fees ex ante,
courts can remain impartial and dispense with much of the cost,
guesswork, and subjectivity associated with compensating class
counsel. Judicial fee awards will come closest to duplicating
compensation arrangements that the market would have produced if
419. For example, the legal press has reported that the University of California Board of
Regents, appointed as the sole lead plaintiff in the Enron securities fraud litigation, has
assigned five attorneys in its 40-lawyer in-house legal department to work on the case, that one
attorney plans to attend every hearing in the case, and that the general counsel believes, "It is
[the University's] responsibility to make the choices for the direction the case will go."
Maureen Milford, UC Takes Charge of Enron Suit, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 2002, at A15, A18; see
also Fisch, supranote 351.
420. As more institutions receive appointments as lead plaintiffs, we can make more
observations based upon actual performance. Do injured investors recover a greater percentage
of their losses when represented by institutions? Do the settlements contain different terms for
the benefit of the class? How do lead plaintiffs supervise class counsel? What decisions do lead
plaintiffs participate in? How do they influence litigation strategies and objectives? What do
lead plaintiffs do to monitor the lawyers? How much time, effort, and expense do they devote
to the litigation? What mechanisms do lead plaintiffs use to evaluate the performance of lead
counsel?
The limited empirical work available to date indicates that institutions tend to participate
in larger cases, and that cases led by institutional investors "are associated with significantly
higher settlement amounts." LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, POST-REFORM ACT
SECURITIES LAWSUITS: SETTLEMENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2002, at 6 (2003),
(last
available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/LES%20Through%201202.pdf
visited Nov. 21, 2003). Another recent study found that "settlements are about 20% higher in
cases where the lead plaintiff is an institutional investor." BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at
11. Although this settlement data may indicate that institutional investors retain higher quality
lead counsel and/or supervise lead counsel more closely and effectively than other potential
class representatives, it also is possible that institutions simply do not volunteer to participate as
lead plaintiffs unless they determine that the investor class can assert strong fraud claims and
recover large damages.
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absent class members could contract with their lawyers directly, thus
reducing the agency costs of the litigation. By more effectively and
efficiently judging the persons who do have the fiduciary duty to
maximize recoveries for injured investors, the courts may make
securities class actions more "virtuous" after all.
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